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 Abstract 
 
The thesis is about the World Bank and the political dimensions of the 
new aid architecture. 
The new aid agenda, which emerged out of the post-Washington 
Consensus (PWC), has led to debates over its real significance. While 
Joseph Stiglitz has argued that the new consensus actually marked the 
end of the era of market fundamentalism, sceptics have rather concluded 
that it represents nothing more than a discursive shift. 
 The Bank’s own ambiguous narrative on the new aid framework may 
explain such divergent analysis on the new agenda: On the one hand, the 
poverty reduction and participatory narrative linked to the model have 
appeared to be signalling a genuine shift towards a more social policy 
agenda. On the other hand however, there has been a contradictory 
move towards a stricter governance model that seems to be specifically 
designed to insulate policy-makers from vested interests. The overarch-
ing objective of this thesis is to shed new light on this apparent paradox 
inherent in international aid reform. It seeks to untangle the existing con-
fusion between narrative, assumptions and methods entwined with the 
so-called PWC. 
Specifically, the crux of this thesis is to address the particular contri-
bution of the World Bank in forging, promoting and implementing the 
PWC. It focuses both on the theoretical sources that triggered the World 
Bank, under the leadership of James D. Wolfensohn, to adopt a new 
model and on the political objectives of this agenda. Within such a re-
search focus, the Bank’s narrative and its new aid allocation mechanisms 
are seen as one entity under the label ‘Integrated Development Model’ 
(IDM). The IDM – as a main object of study – allows us to transcend 
common country-based analyses of the Poverty Reduction Strategies 
(PRS) experience and to re-position the new aid allocation mechanisms 
within the larger reordering of power on behalf of market-oriented inter-
ests.  
This theoretical framework brings together key analysis from the field 
of International Political Economy and emphasises the usefulness of 
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theories that understand institutional change in terms of conflicts over 
power and the construction of state authority. The analytical framework 
of this thesis triangulates the two core concepts of the IDM: Governance 
and Civil society, with citizenship – the conceptual absentee of the Model. In 
light of such framework, it is argued that contrary to the mainstream ar-
guments, the new development paradigm – as coined by the World Bank – is 
far more than a mere ‘structural adjustment in disguise’.  
The overarching proposition defended in this thesis is that the IDM is 
part of a contemporary project aimed at locking in neo-liberal policies 
and achieving the reordering of political and social power necessary for 
this. Three sub-propositions are further argued. First, the aid reform is 
closely linked to the former consensus and as such – and contrary to 
what the Bank has been arguing – the IDM cannot be defined as a ‘new 
aid paradigm’. Secondly, the IDM represents a fundamental part of a 
greater socio-political project linked to the political consolidation of the 
neo-liberal agenda at the global and local levels. Thirdly, and logically, 
this socio-political project has tangible political consequences closely 
linked to the idea of citizenship – the conceptual absentee of the IDM. 
On the ground, such a socio-political project is implemented by shap-
ing new modes of governance in reforming countries in two comple-
mentary ways: by transforming the conditionality model; and secondly, 
by attempting to capture, co-opt and mobilise civil society elements be-
hind the market agenda. In order to illustrate such arguments, the Pov-
erty Reduction Strategies, which have become the aid reform’s main aid 
allocation mechanisms, serve as the case study of the thesis. 
Crucially, such experiences demonstrate that the IDM represents an 
attempt to insulate from political competition a highly political and nor-
mative agenda, which has proven to be highly problematic in the past. 
The correlation of the reform’s insulating mechanisms brings forth seri-
ous concerns relating to this attempt to embed new modes of authority 
in PRS countries and as such, to mingle with representative politics. This 
is to say that the IDM’s systematic attempts to curtail the realm of politi-
cal society in countries under reform may be characterised as a promo-
tion of a specific form of neo-populism that raises serious concerns over 
issues linked to the very idea of citizenship.  
This contribution brings forth important questions about the conse-
quences of having a multilateral organisation such as the World Bank 
attempting to insulate from political competition a highly political and 
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normative agenda for the reordering of social and political power. Cru-
cially, such a process marginalises issues linked to rights, citizenship and 
political contestation. This study is evermore timely as more than seventy 
countries have now joined the PRS process, which signifies that the con-
sequences of the transformation of the international aid architecture may 
shape the fate of a billion and a half people. 
 
Key words: Civil Society; Citizenship; Governance; Parliaments; Participa-
tion; Post-Washington Consensus; Poverty Reduction Strategies; James 
Wolfensohn; World Bank. 
  
 Samenvatting 
 
 
Een politieke houdgreep: De Wereldbank, het ‘Integrated Development Model’ 
(Model voor geïntegreerde ontwikkeling) en burgerschap op een beslissend moment 
 
Dit proefschrift gaat over de Wereldbank en de politieke aspecten van de 
nieuwe opzet van de ontwikkelingshulp. 
Het nieuwe beleid op het gebied van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
is een uitvloeisel van de Post-Washington Consensus (PWC). Over de werke-
lijke betekenis van dit beleid zijn de meningen verdeeld. Volgens Joseph 
Stiglitz betekent dit het einde van het marktfundamentalisme, maar vol-
gens anderen is alleen het taalgebruik veranderd. 
Het feit dat de Wereldbank de nieuwe opzet van de ontwikkeling-
shulp niet eenduidig omschrijft, kan verklaren dat de meningen over dit 
nieuwe model verdeeld zijn. In dit model is er enerzijds sprake van ar-
moedebestrijding en participatie, wat lijkt te wijzen op een koerswijziging 
in de richting van een socialer beleid. Aan de andere kant zien we echter 
een stap in de richting van een bestuursmodel waarin de principes van de 
vrije markt bepalend lijken te zijn. Het hoofddoel van dit proefschrift is 
om inzicht te verschaffen in de schijnbare paradox die besloten ligt in de 
internationale hervorming van de ontwikkelingshulp. Dit onderzoek 
beoogt de wirwar van beschrijvingen, aannamen en methoden waaruit de 
PWC bestaat te ontrafelen.  
Dit onderzoek richt zich vooral op de bijdrage van de Wereldbank 
aan het tot stand brengen, propageren en implementeren van de PWC. 
Het richt zich zowel op de theoretische overwegingen die de Wereldbank 
onder leiding van James Wolfensohn deden besluiten om een nieuw 
model in te voeren, als op de politieke doelstellingen van het nieuwe 
beleid. In dit onderzoek worden het beleid van de Wereldbank en de 
nieuwe manier waarop de Wereldbank hulp toewijst als één geheel 
beschouwd, onder de noemer Integrated Development Model (IDM; Model 
voor geïntegreerde ontwikkeling). Door zich te richten op het IDM, han-
teert dit onderzoek een hoger analyseniveau dan onderzoeken die zich 
richten op de Poverty Reduction Strategies (strategieën voor armoedebestri-
ix 
Abstract (Dutch) x 
 
jding) binnen één land. Bovendien plaatst het onderzoek de nieuwe wijze 
waarop hulp wordt toegewezen hierdoor binnen het bredere kader van 
de hergroepering van macht ten behoeve van de marktsector. 
Het theoretisch kader van dit onderzoek omvat de belangrijkste in-
zichten uit de Internationale Politieke Economie en gaat uit van theo-
rieën die institutionele verandering bezien in termen van machtsconflic-
ten en het opbouwen van het staatsgezag. Dit analytisch kader is 
vernieuwend omdat het een derde element toevoegt aan de twee kernbe-
grippen van het IDM (Bestuur en Civiele samenleving). Dit derde ont-
brekende element is Burgerschap. In tegenstelling tot de heersende opvat-
tingen wordt op grond van dit analytisch kader gesteld dat het nieuwe 
ontwikkelingsparadigma van de Wereldbank veel meer is dan slechts een 
‘verkapte structurele aanpassing’. 
De overkoepelende stelling van dit proefschrift is dat het IDM deel 
uitmaakt van een strategie die op een neoliberaal beleid gericht is en dat 
men de politieke en sociale machtsbalans wil aanpassen om dit doel te 
bereiken. Deze stelling bestaat uit drie onderdelen. Ten eerste is de her-
vorming van de ontwikkelingshulp nauw verbonden met de eerder 
bereikte consensus en daarom is het IDM geen ‘nieuw ontwikkeling-
sparadigma’, zoals de Wereldbank het noemt. Ten tweede is het IDM 
een wezenlijk onderdeel van een breder sociaal-politiek project dat te 
maken heeft met de politieke consolidatie van de neoliberale agenda op 
mondiaal en lokaal niveau. Ten derde heeft dit sociaal-politieke project 
logischerwijs tastbare gevolgen die nauw verbonden zijn met het idee 
van burgerschap. Dit is het begrip dat ontbreekt in het IDM. 
Dit sociaal-politieke project wordt in de praktijk geïmplementeerd 
door nieuwe bestuursvormen in te voeren, waarbij de betreffende landen 
op twee elkaar aanvullende manieren hervormd worden. De eerste her-
vorming betreft het conditionaliteitsmodel. Daarnaast probeert men 
elementen van de civiele samenleving te rekruteren, in te lijven en te 
mobiliseren om het beleid van marktwerking gestalte te geven. Om dit te 
illustreren zijn de Poverty Reduction Strategies, de belangrijkste wijze waarop 
hulp wordt toegewezen in de nieuwe structuur, als casestudy in dit proef-
schrift opgenomen. 
Hiermee wordt aangetoond dat het IDM een zeer politieke en nor-
matieve beleidsagenda, die in het verleden voor veel problemen heeft 
gezorgd, probeert uit te sluiten van politieke concurrentie. De onderlinge 
samenhang van de uitsluitingsmechanismen die de hervorming met zich 
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meebrengt is zorgelijk, omdat men op deze wijze probeert een nieuwe 
vorm van gezag te vestigen in de landen waar de Poverty Reduction Strategies 
gelden. Dit betekent een inmenging in het democratisch proces. De sys-
tematische wijze waarop het IDM probeert het politieke domein te 
beperken in de landen waar de hervormingen doorgevoerd worden, kan 
beschouwd worden als het bevorderen van een bepaalde vorm van neo-
populisme. Dit vormt een serieus probleem voor zaken die verband 
houden met het idee van burgerschap. 
Dit onderzoek roept belangrijke vragen op over het beleid van de 
Wereldbank. Wat zijn de gevolgen als een dergelijke multilaterale 
organisatie een zeer politieke en normatieve beleidsagenda, waarmee 
men de politieke en sociale machtsbalans wil aanpassen, probeert te 
vrijwaren van politieke concurrentie? Dan worden zaken die te maken 
hebben met rechten, burgerschap en politieke strijd gemarginaliseerd. 
Dit onderzoek komt op het juiste moment, omdat ruim zeventig landen 
zich al bij de Poverty Reduction Strategies hebben aangesloten. Dit betekent 
dat de hervorming van de ontwikkelingshulp gevolgen heeft voor ander-
half miljard mensen. 
 
Trefwoorden: Civiele samenleving, burgerschap, bestuur, parlementen, par-
ticipatie, Post-Washington Consensus, Poverty Reduction Strategies (strategieën 
voor armoedebestrijding), Wereldbank. 
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The World Bank, the Integrated De-
velopment Model & Citizenship at a 
Cross Road: A Framework 
 
 
Introduction 
The past two decades have witnessed drastic changes in development 
theory and policy. The trauma of the Asian financial crisis, the question-
able record of structural adjustment programs, the unsettling entrance of 
the eastern block countries into capitalist markets, and the rise of anti-
globalisation movements, have indeed led the greater international aid 
community to rethink the basis of the policy prescriptions that became 
known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1989).  
Under the Washington Consensus, indebted countries were expected 
to liberalise markets, privatise public enterprises, apply constraint to fis-
cal policy and control money supply in order to seek economic growth. 
The later consensus was thrust upon developing countries via the Struc-
tural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which were introduced in the early 
1980s as a set of short-term measures to remove the inefficiencies con-
sidered responsible for the debt crisis that had struck developing coun-
tries at that time. Championed by the conservative Reagan-Thatcher duo, 
SAPs were intended to pave the way for a system of markets free of in-
tervention. Neo-classical economists had laid the blame for the debt cri-
sis at the feet of developing states; whether for their perceived expan-
sionist bureaucracies, misguided economic policies or corrupt leaders. 
However, SAPs often failed to generate economic growth and the ex-
pected ‘trickle down effect’ did not emerge to level off the social and en-
vironmental consequences of such economic prescriptions. Coincidently, 
the ascent of the post-Washington Consensus (PWC) reflects not only a 
perceived need to mend the flaws of the former consensus but also to 
acknowledge the urgency of the social dimension of development. 
18 
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While grappling with its own internal contradictions and subjected to 
external pressures, it is the World Bank (the Bank) that quickly took the 
leadership role in carrying out the foundations of a new international aid 
architecture. The Bank gives paternity to the rise of such ideas to its 
ninth president, James D. Wolfensohn (1995-2005). In 1998, the ‘Renais-
sance Banker’ (World Bank 2008g) introduced the first corner stone of 
what was to become the institution’s new ‘aid paradigm’: the Compre-
hensive Development Framework (CDF). The new framework was ex-
pected to drastically change the way the Bank and the other major do-
nors thought about, planned and allocated international aid – a process 
that was soon to be extended to debt relief. Recognizing the pivotal role 
that should be played by state and civil society alike, this model was to 
put developing countries’ governments back ‘in the driver’s seat’ (Wolf-
ensohn 1999a). 
Less than a year after Wolfensohn’s proposal, the World Bank 
launched the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), a new aid allocation 
mechanism that was expected to carry out the CDF philosophy. The 
central stated objective of the PRS is to tackle poverty. Swamped with 
the burden of debt and weak economic growth, governments of Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) faced a blatant incapacity to reach the 
international development goals. As such, the objective of the Strategy, 
which must be summarised in a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), is to orient the funds freed from debt relief toward poverty re-
duction. In effect, PRS replaced the structural adjustment paradigm and 
as such, they represented a new form of conditionality. 
The PRS carried with them a strong narrative for participation. With 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) providing their central pa-
rameters, PRS were to enhance local populations’ participation, foster 
greater coherence in aid allocation and overall, set new ground for inno-
vative partnerships between state, donors and civil society. Along a 
greater involvement of the state, PRSPs were to be written by govern-
ments along with the participation of ‘civil society’. Fostering local own-
ership and social capital, civil society’s participation would, according to 
the Bank’s proposed framework, increase the reforms’ efficiency. Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) became de facto one of the key actors rep-
resenting the poor in the participatory process. 
This thesis sets out to investigate the political dimensions of this new 
international aid architecture promulgated by the Bank under the Wolf-
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ensohn presidency. It seeks to untangle the contradictory narratives that 
it has brought forth. On the one hand, the poverty reduction and par-
ticipatory narrative linked to the new model have indeed appeared to 
signal a genuine shift towards a more social-oriented agenda. On the 
other hand, there has been a contradictory move towards a stricter gov-
ernance model that seems to be specifically designed to insulate policy-
makers from vested interests. As such, the overarching objective of this 
thesis is to shed a new light on this apparent paradox inherent to the in-
ternational aid reform. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The following section repre-
sents a first step to untangle the overall confusion between narrative, as-
sumptions and methods entwined with the Bank’s new aid paradigm, 
which is itself rooted in the PWC. The review of the debate presents 
three main approaches that have emerged to explain this shift to a new 
international aid architecture. 
The aim and significance of the study are laid out in section two. Spe-
cifically, this thesis addresses the particular contribution of the World 
Bank in forging, promoting and implementing the PWC. It focuses on 
the theoretical sources that triggered the Bank to adopt such a model, its 
political objectives, as well as the implementation strategies that it has set 
forth.  The crux of the thesis is to tease out the consequences of such 
model on the political spaces of PRS countries. 
In section three, the research questions are presented. The main ques-
tion relates to how the World Bank’s aid reform – the Integrated Devel-
opment Model – derives from a larger reordering of power linked to the 
consolidation of the neo-liberal agenda. It further asks how such proc-
esses are changing power relations in countries under reform in terms of 
political representation.  
The sub-sequent section of this chapter is dedicated to the conceptual 
framework which guides the main propositions of this thesis. The 
framework builds on a range of scholarly contributions that understands 
institutional change in terms of conflicts over power and the construc-
tion of state authority. The central proposition defended is that the 
Bank’s new model is part of the contemporary neo-liberal project and 
serves to lock-in neo-liberal policies. Three sub-propositions are further 
presented, one relating to the contestation of the ‘novel’ nature of the 
new aid framework, one relating to the implementation process of the 
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reform and one relating to the political consequences of such model on 
the ground.  
Following the methodology section, which allows for the explanation 
of how the research problem will be tackled, an introduction of the the-
sis overall structure will be presented. 
1.1 Survey of the Debate 
The restructuring of the international aid architecture has been both 
praised and severely criticized, not only by the conservative right and by 
liberals but also by international NGOs, academia and think tanks, both 
in the Global South and the North. The core of the contentions has 
been over whether the new model’s take on governance and social insti-
tution is one that redefines development policy in terms of the needs of 
civil society and local interests, or one that simply attempts to co-opt 
them within the agendas of the market.  
In order to untangle the literature on the subject, three main ap-
proaches to this problem of development policy are proposed. An obvi-
ous first approach is to look at the ideas of Joseph Stiglitz, the World 
Bank Chief Economist from February 1997-2000, who is commonly re-
ferred to as the architect of the PWC. Stiglitz’s approach has been piv-
otal in influencing the new aid model in respect to the difficulties of in-
stitution building, participation and democratic change in countries 
under reform. A second approach, which constitutes a critical reaction to 
the Stiglitz reforms, is that of New Institutional Economic (NIE) theo-
rists which are still influential in the World Bank. This approach can be 
teased out by looking at some of the key disputes within the World Bank 
and the way different departments have influenced the reform. NIE 
theorists are highly critical of the new emphasis on civil society, prefer-
ring to focus on governance as an instrument for insulating technocratic 
decision-makers from vested interests. The third approach comes from 
the participatory narrative driven mainly by development NGOs and fo-
cuses on the positive effects of participation on governance, while criti-
cising the failure of the new institutional and social agendas to shift 
power to communities. 
After analysing these three approaches, it will become clear that they 
have not given enough consideration to the impact of both the narrative 
of the aid reform and its implementation process. An alternative frame-
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work which takes into account these two realities will thus be proposed 
in this chapter.  
1.1.1 A ‘Rebel’ With a Cause: Joseph Stiglitz and the ‘New 
Development Paradigm’ 
In 1998, Joseph Stiglitz challenged some of the fundamental assumptions 
of the Washington Consensus. He suggested a need to retreat from the 
ideas of what he termed ‘market fundamentalism’ as well as a need to 
adopt a ‘post-Washington Consensus’ (Stiglitz 1998a). Denouncing the 
narrow pursuit of economic growth through market deregulation, Stiglitz 
argued that it was imperative to recognize that institutions were impor-
tant and a certain amount of state intervention in the economy could 
have positive effects:  
[…] governments can make matters worse. No doubt, the Washington 
Consensus represented, in part, a reaction to the failures of the state in at-
tempting to correct those of the market. But the pendulum swung too far 
in the other direction and for too long. The consensus policies often as-
sumed the worst about the nature and capability of governments and 
made that one size fits all (Stiglitz 2004: 3). 
The former Chief Economist further argues: 
[W]e have come to a better understanding of what makes markets work 
better. The Washington Consensus held that good economic performance 
required liberalized trade, macroeconomic stability, and getting prices 
right. Once the government handled these issues – essentially, once the 
government ‘got out of the way’ – private markets would produce efficient 
allocations and growth. To be sure, all of these are important for markets 
to work. […] But the policies advanced by the Washington Consensus are 
hardly complete and sometimes misguided. Making markets work requires 
more than just low inflation, it requires sound financial regulation, compe-
tition policy, and policies to facilitate the transfer of technology, and 
transparency, to name some fundamental issues neglected by the Washing-
ton Consensus (Stiglitz 1998a: 1). 
Such evidence was strongly supported by the East Asian miracle, 
which drastically contrasted with the systematic failure of the African 
continent to spur economic growth – a continent that ironically, was fol-
lowing the orthodox prescriptions of the Washington Consensus. While 
indeed fiscally conservative, East Asian states played an important role in 
 Chapter 1 23 
the economic success of these countries1. As observed by Fine, the East 
Asian miracle can be read not simply as reaffirming the market but more 
as a renewal of a belief in the role of the state (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pin-
cus 2001: 2). After more than two decades of being shunned, Stiglitz was 
making the case for letting the state back in: ‘the choice should not be 
whether the state should or should not be involved. Instead, it is often a 
matter of how it gets involved’ (Stiglitz 1998a: 14). The core idea here is 
to have the state and the markets play complementary roles with the 
state paving the way for markets where imperfections arise (Stiglitz 
1998a: 14). Stiglitz brought together ideas that challenged the concept of 
the self-regulating market and the need for strong institutions to regulate 
its operations. As such, he did contribute to broaden the analytical and 
policy scope of the Washington Consensus. 
Another important segment of Stiglitz’s design is linked to the social 
development agenda. He stated that the importance of broadening de-
velopment objectives to include social goals – such as sustainable devel-
opment, egalitarian development, and democratic development (Stiglitz 
1998a). Stiglitz argued that an important part of development today 
would be to seek complementary strategies that advance these goals si-
multaneously: 
We seek increases in living standards – including improved health and 
education – not just increases in measured GDP. We seek sustainable de-
velopment, which includes preserving our natural resources and maintain-
ing a healthy environment. We seek equitable development, which ensures 
that all groups in society enjoy the fruits of development, not just the few 
at the top. And, we seek democratic development, in which citizens par-
ticipate in a variety of ways in making the decisions which affect their lives. 
Knowledge has not kept pace with the proliferation of our goals. We are 
only beginning to understand the relationship between democratization, 
inequality, environmental protection, and growth. What we do know holds 
out the promise of developing complementary strategies that can move us 
toward all of these objectives (Stiglitz 1998a: 18). 
This new emphasis on the social dimension of development, coupled 
with the pivotal role to be assumed by the state, does reflect an impor-
tant change away from the Washington Consensus. While the PWC in-
deed broadened the analytical and policy scope, Fine, Lapavitsas and 
Pincus conclude that it fails to challenge the roots of the former model 
or to consider alternatives for future perspectives (2001: 4). In the intro-
 Chapter 1 24 
duction of an important compilation of critical assessment of the emerg-
ing PWC – Development Policy in the Twenty-first Century: Beyond the post-
Washington consensus, Fine underlines that the PWC’s: 
[…] intellectual narrowness and reductionism remain striking, for it re-
places an understanding of the economy as relying harmoniously on the 
market by an understanding of society as a whole based on (informational) 
market imperfections (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2001: 4).  
Stiglitz’s work does not stray far from orthodox economics. Fine fur-
ther points out that Stiglitz’s argument remain based on methodological 
individualism, and fails to acknowledge the political and historical di-
mensions of the Washington Consensus.  
An important point of this thesis is to highlight the fact that the 
overwhelming focus on what Carroll has labelled the ‘Stiglitzian Post-
Washington consensus’ (2007: 11), fails to render a complete picture of 
the new agenda. In fact, while Stiglitz did have an important influence on 
the blue prints of the latest aid framework, the reform has had other im-
portant influences; some within the World Bank itself and others from 
the NIE academic stronghold. As underlined in the next approach, the 
Bank itself was exploring key debates and concepts long before Stiglitz’s 
undertaking. 
 
1.1.2 The Reactionary Approach: the Internal Turmoil of the 
World Bank(s) 
The World Bank’s own literature on the new aid agenda is both descrip-
tive and prescriptive. It is also often contradictory, as it reflects the inter-
nal turmoil that pushed the institution to adopt a particular framework. 
Contrary to the World Bank’s own simplistic narrative of the reform’s 
timeline, the emergence of the new aid agenda is far from being solely 
equated to James D. Wolfensohn’s official quest to tackle world poverty. 
As shown in detail in the next chapter, the aid reform has been the 
product of power struggles within the institution, and of greater interna-
tional events. 
It is no coincidence that the aid reform emerged during Wolfensohn’s 
presidency at the Bank. As he took his position in 1995, Wolfensohn 
inherited an arrogant institution taking fire from all sides of the spec-
trum2. Amongst the numerous verbal critics, the international campaign 
Fifty Years is Enough3 did a lot to tarnish the institution’s already unsteady 
reputation. The environmental impact of Bank financed mega-projects 
 Chapter 1 25 
(see Goldman 2005), the systematic failure to consult local stakeholders, 
and the overall lack of transparency of the institution, were some ele-
ments of the shaky legacy of Wolfensohn’s predecessors – Lewis Preston 
and Barber Conable. Not only was the Bank now far from McNamara’s 
poverty focused narrative of the 1970s (Kapur, Prior Lewis and Webb 
1997), it was also coming under fire from the conservative right who 
frowned upon the institution’s weak performances with public moneys. 
While this serious legitimacy crisis was an important factor for insti-
gating the institution’s change, the Bank’s own Social Development Network 
had a solid influence on the social narrative at the core of the reform. 
Flag concepts associated to the poverty reduction narrative, such as ‘par-
ticipation’, ‘partnership’ and more importantly ‘social capital’, emerged 
out of the relatively small department. The overwhelming emphasis on 
such social concepts within the aid reform led many to argue that the 
Bank was finally democratising its aid structures. From this perspective, 
the participatory agenda now promoted by the Bank would bring forth a 
genuine empowerment of local entities – although not without difficulti-
es4.  
More radical studies have argued that orthodox economists, who out-
number the other social scientists at the Bank, have ‘hijacked’ the social 
development narrative in the institution to serve other ends (Fine, La-
pavitsas and Pincus 2001; Harriss 2002). In fact, while the social narra-
tive was streamlined within the Bank, it also coincided – more often col-
lided – with another important debate at the heart of the aid reform: the 
conditionality dilemma and the overall efficiency of multilateral aid5.  
The influence of the report Assessing Aid (World Bank 1998a) reso-
nates within one of the main pillars of the Bank’s CDF: the call for a 
‘new partnership’ amongst donors and state clients. Amidst this litera-
ture, it has been suggested that aid should reflect a new partnership be-
tween donors and indebted countries, in order to trade ‘conditionality’ 
for ‘selectivity’6. The proponents of ‘aid selectivity’ make their case by 
stating that the imperfection of markets remain less of an evil than the 
state’s imperfections. In this view, rent-seeking behaviour by govern-
ments coupled with protectionism distorts prices and leads to market 
failure. These critical assessments of the state have been the basis of the 
SAPs and thus, a shift toward a poverty reduction focused agenda is seen 
as a step away from the primary goals of economic efficiency and of de-
regulated markets. The renewed gains of the governance agenda within 
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the new international framework are telling of the strength of these ideas 
at the Bank. As such, the overwhelming emphasis on the concept of 
governance within the institution’s latest framework is undeniably the 
result of the close affinities between the institution’s staff – mostly 
economists – and academic theorists of the public choice school and 
NIE. The governance umbrella has thus been key in reforming condi-
tionality and promoting legal-juridical reforms, which as argued in the 
following contribution, serve to isolate market-enabling policies from 
political realms. 
However, the internal resistance to the emerging social agenda at the 
Bank was also largely based on the belief that rigorous introduction of 
market reforms would ultimately force change on the ground. As such, 
traditionalist orthodox economists not only resisted ideas about partici-
pation and targeted social policies but also some of the governance and 
institutional reform programmes. 
Beyond the paradoxes of its own organisational structures as well as 
the struggle against its loan culture, the Bank’s new agenda must also be 
studied in light of the new aid allocation mechanisms that it has set forth. 
The key point is that the implementation process of the PRS – the very 
aid allocation mechanisms which serve to implement the new agenda – is 
vital to the explanation of the ever-changing narrative of the reform and 
the different directions it has taken since its inception. In fact, PRS proc-
esses are crucial to effectively challenging the narrative of what the new 
agenda should be and what it actually does in practice, as analysed in the 
following section. 
1.1.3 The Civil Society Approach: Business As Usual at the Bank 
While Stiglitz and some elements at the Bank advocated for greater par-
ticipatory schemes, this change in direction has also been the subject of 
much criticism and caution. Indeed the past decade has witnessed a 
growing backlash against participatory approaches7. 
International NGOs have been key in monitoring the World Bank’s 
new participatory agenda – such as Bank Information Centre, Bretton 
Woods Project, EURODAD, Oxfam International, Southern Civil Soci-
ety, World Development Movement, World Vision, etc. The value added 
by these monitoring activities has unquestionably been the country-by-
country follow-up of the PRS process; the new aid architecture’s main 
allocation mechanisms. A common methodology adopted by these stud-
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ies has been to analyse the existing contradictions between the participa-
tory agenda of the PRS and the actual experiences of the different coun-
tries implementing them.  
Although experiences have been somewhat different from one coun-
try to another, the official narrative of the reform has often clashed with 
the reality of the implementation process. This clash has lead to a general 
suspicion that the Bank’s shift would be more a public relation endeav-
our than a genuine intention to embrace a wide participatory process. 
Such failure of participatory approaches at the heart of the Bank’s new 
model to foster meaningful change and to help tackle poverty is a com-
mon theme in the analyses of international NGOs. Save the Children 
Fund, for example, asks whether the new model is truly participatory: 
‘does it represent business as usual, or is it a new way of thinking and 
tackling poverty’ (2001: 8)? For World Vision: ‘the changes of recent 
years have amounted to little more than tinkering with a process that ur-
gently requires a fundamental overhaul’ (Wood 2004: 5). For 
EURODAD – a network of European development NGOs – the prob-
lem is straightforward: the poor are not participating, they are being par-
ticipated (2001b: 8). Analyses of PRS experience do find conclusive evi-
dence to contradict the Bank’s official narrative, which portrays PRSPs 
as a ‘country driven’ initiative. World Development Movement con-
cludes that: ‘[...] despite the fine words surrounding participation and 
‘country-ownership’, the evidence demonstrates that PRSPs have be-
come a rubber-stamping exercise for conventional Bank and Fund poli-
cies’ (Jones and Hardstaff 2005: 7).  
In light of such critical assessments, many international NGOs fur-
ther proceeded to prescribe changes to the current practices. Policy pre-
scriptions were suggested in all stages of the aid allocation mechanisms 
cycle in order to improve the quality of the participatory process8. How-
ever, this thesis puts forth the arguments that such prescriptions remain 
firmly nestled within the very framework that they are seeking to criti-
cise. This is to say that while many international NGOs have critically 
analysed the new aid architecture in terms of the contradictions between 
its narrative and its implementation process, it is here argued that even 
such critics have often remained trapped within the very prescriptions of 
the main narrative.  
This overview of the three main analyses of the new aid reform can 
be summed up by two major trends which appear to be contradictory: 
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On the one hand, the aid reform is emphasising poverty reduction and 
participation which appears to signal a genuine shift towards a more so-
cial policy agenda. On the other hand however, there appears to be a 
contradictory move towards a stricter governance model that is designed 
specifically to insulate policy-makers from vested interests. This thesis 
represents an attempt to address this apparent paradox.  
1.2 The Aim and Significance of the Study 
In this thesis, the new aid agenda is seen as far more than a simple dis-
cursive endeavour. As such, it is argued that the model triggered by the 
World Bank under the leadership of James D. Wolfensohn, cannot be 
defined solely by its aid allocation mechanisms or its narrative. In order 
to emphasise this reality, the combination of the World Bank’s narrative 
and the implementation mechanisms attached to the reform9 are referred 
to as the ‘Integrated Development Model’ (IDM)10. This cornerstone of 
the framework is helpful in order to avoid the trap of analysing the new 
aid architecture strictly within the discursive compounds of the World 
Bank. As such, the very assumptions of both the protagonists of the 
model – certain segments of the Bank and Stiglitz – and the critical per-
spectives which suggest that it is ‘business as usual in the aid condition-
ality business’ (Oxfam International 2001: 5), are challenged.  
The aim of this thesis is to go beyond the mainstream critical and pre-
scriptive approaches addressed to the new aid agenda. This is accom-
plished by analysing: the theoretical sources that triggered the World 
Bank to adopt a new model; the impacts that such a model is intended to 
have on reforming economies; and crucially, what possible consequences 
it may have on ideas of citizenship. 
Such objectives are closely entwined with the current debate over the 
nature of the PWC itself. As such, the research builds on the ideas of 
critical International Political Economy (IPE) authors who are challeng-
ing the mainstream conceptualisations of the PWC and the shift at the 
Bank, as explained in the section pertaining to the theoretical framework 
of this thesis. The theoretical target of this thesis is to provide an analysis 
of the IDM in terms of the larger reordering of power on behalf of mar-
ket-oriented interests. The analytical framework’s given originality is to 
specifically triangulate the two core concepts of the World Bank’s new 
model: Governance and Civil society, with the conceptual absentee of the 
IDM: citizenship. In other words, the thesis provides an analysis of the 
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Bank’s conceptualisation of the state and civil society and assesses its 
attempts to carry out this agenda on the ground – primarily (but not ex-
clusively) via the PRS process. 
Empirically, this contribution investigates the political ramifications 
of PRS processes in countries under reform. It therefore evaluates the 
transformation of democratic structures carried out by PRS in reforming 
countries– i.e. on the executive, legislative and judiciary branches. This 
thesis’ significance therefore, is to map how the PRS are shaping new 
modes of governance in reforming countries in two complementary 
ways: by transforming the conditionality model; and secondly, by at-
tempting to capture, co-opt and mobilise civil society elements behind 
the market agenda.  
As further explained in the methodology section of this chapter, an 
important initiative of the thesis is to focus on the IDM itself rather than 
on the PRSP process of a specific country. This reflects the need to tran-
scend current analyses and to reposition the strategies in their global 
framework, rather than only focusing on the technical process that led to 
the production of the strategies themselves. 
1.3 Research Questions  
This thesis asks how the World Bank’s aid reform – the IDM –  relates 
to a larger reordering of power linked to the consolidation of the neo-
liberal agenda. It further asks how such processes are changing power 
relations in countries under reform in terms of political representation.  
Three sub-research questions are further investigated in the thesis. 
First, the global and internal forces that have pushed the Bank to adopt 
the IDM are investigated. This is done in light of the contradictory na-
ture of the IDM itself, as it emphasises both a social policy narrative and 
a stricter governance model that appears to be specifically designed to 
insulate policy-makers from vested interests. Secondly, the theoretical 
bases of the aid reform are investigated and the question of whether they 
are linked to a particular reordering of power is tackled. Thirdly, it is asks 
how PRS – the IDM’s main aid allocation mechanisms – are in practice 
reordering power at the global and local levels.  
In order to address the research questions, the thesis argumentation is 
cast within three core propositions. First, the aid reform is closely linked 
to the former consensus and as such – and contrary to what the Bank has 
been arguing – the IDM should not be defined as a new aid paradigm. 
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Intrinsically linked to this is the fact that the IDM should be viewed as a 
fundamental part of a greater socio-political project linked to the political 
consolidation of the neo-liberal agenda at the global and local levels. 
Thirdly, and logically, this socio-political project has tangible political 
consequences closely linked to the idea of citizenship – the conceptual 
absentee of the IDM. This is further explained in the theoretical section 
of this chapter. 
1.4 The Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework builds upon the work of two sets of critical 
authors from the field of IPE11.  
First, it relies on the framework of important authors who have criti-
cally re-examined the PWC and defined it as an attempt to embed neolib-
eralism. This is a rich literature that frames the overall thesis – such as 
Cammack (2003), Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus (2001), Gill (1995; 2000). 
Soederberg (2004b) refers to the New International Financial Architecture, 
which she defines as a class-based strategy that forces the Global South 
to accede to the neoliberal rules of free market mobility. Cammack 
(2003) refers to the ‘completion of the world market’, while Gill refers to 
the ‘political project of attempting to make transnational liberal, and if 
possible liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model of future develop-
ment’ (Gill 1995: 8).  
The thesis also builds on the work of authors who have set out to 
disaggregate the assumption of NIE by mapping out: ‘the interests and 
conflict associated with class relations and global capitalism that give rise 
to specific complexions of social structures’ (Rodan, Hewison and Robi-
son 2001: 86). What is imperative to distinguish is that while some as-
sume change can be induced by means of institutional engineering and 
others by market reforms, the social conflict approach rather suggests 
that both markets and institutions are the products of conflict over 
power and its distribution. Social conflict theorists therefore, under-
stands institutional changes in terms of conflicts over power and the 
construction of state authority – such as Chaudhry (1994), Hadiz (2004), 
Higgott and Robison (1985), Jayasuriya (2001, 2003, 2006), Robison 
(2006a, 2006b), Robison and Rodan (2001).  
The framework of this thesis further builds upon authors who have 
studied the World Bank in a way that underlines the specific impact of its 
policies on power relations on the ground – such as Campbell (1996, 
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1997, 2000a, 2005), Harrison (2004, 2006), Taylor (2004) and Harriss 
(2002).  
Building on these authors’ contributions, this thesis provides a theo-
retical analysis of the Bank’s unique contribution to the PWC. The IDM 
therefore, which is seen as a specific agenda encompassing both the 
PWC narrative and new aid allocation mechanisms, is a crucial construct 
to address the local/global nexus contradictions inherent to the Bank’s 
agenda. In other words, the thesis investigates how the IDM relates to 
the shifts in neoliberalism, as well as to local experiences with power re-
ordering.  
An important feature of the analytical framework is to specifically tri-
angulate the two core concepts of the World Bank’s new model: Govern-
ance and Civil society (and other key concepts linked to the Bank’s social 
development and poverty reduction narrative – such as participation, 
social capital, ownership), with the conceptual absentee of the IDM: citi-
zenship.  
The central proposition which derives from this framework is that the 
Bank’s new model is part of the contemporary neo-liberal project and 
serves to lock-in neo-liberal policies. Specifically, the IDM represents an 
attempt to insulate from political competition a highly political and nor-
mative agenda, which has proven to be highly problematic in the past. 
The correlation of the reform’s insulating mechanisms brings forth seri-
ous concerns relating to this attempt to embed new modes of authority 
in PRS countries and as such, to mingle with representative politics. This 
is to say that the IDM’s systematic attempts to curtail the realm of politi-
cal society in countries under reform may be characterised as a promo-
tion of a specific form of neo-populism that raises serious concerns over 
issues linked to the very idea of citizenship. 
This core statement is further explained in the following section 
where three sub-propositions are presented: one relating to the contesta-
tion of the ‘novel’ nature of the new aid framework, one relating to the 
implementation process of the reform and one relating to the political 
consequences of such model in terms of political representation. 
1.4.1 Historical Linkages of the Aid Reform  
In the introduction of ‘Neither the Washington Consensus nor the Post-
Washington Consensus’, Ben Fine (2001) suggests that the PWC is di-
rectly embedded in the earlier consensus but the difference is that it ac-
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knowledges and addresses market imperfections. In other words, while 
indeed introducing a shift in the former practices, the PWC does not 
challenge the roots of the former consensus. So while there is a change, 
it is one that is far from radical politics as it does not dispute the neo-
liberal basis of the structural adjustment era.  
In terms of the IDM, this implies that the current agenda should be 
read as an extension of the old consensus, an extension fuelled both by 
the successes and failures of two decades of structural adjustment condi-
tionality. Harrison (2004; 2006) and Campbell (1996, 1997, 2000a, 2005) 
demonstrate how the interventions of major donors– mostly the World 
Bank – have led to successive generations of political engineering within 
countries under reform – most importantly in Africa. As such, the au-
thors suggest that the new social and political considerations brought 
forth by the PWC should not be read as the demise of the neo-liberal 
agenda but rather as a new step in the project of embedding neo-
liberalism (Harrison 2004: 5). Such historical assessment of the shift 
from the Washington consensus to the PWC also has a strong hold in 
the work of Jayasuriya (2001; 2003; 2006). 
So while there is continuity in the change, one might argue that the 
case for studying the ‘not so new’ framework is old news, as ample litera-
ture is readily available on the subject. The Washington Consensus and 
the structural adjustment era – notwithstanding specific case studies on 
the socio-economic, political and environmental impacts of such a neo-
liberal framework, have indeed led to a prolific literature (Such as 
Caufield 1997; Cornia, Jolly and Stewart 1987; Culpeper 1997; Goldman 
2005; Harrigan, Mosley and Toye 1995; Mallaby 2004; Peet 2003; Sar-
rasin 1999; Toye 1987). However, as argued in the thesis, there is a fun-
damental shift currently taking place in the global aid architecture, one 
that indeed rests on the premises of the former consensus but pushes 
forward into the fabric of society. This introduction makes the case for 
the study of the politics of such change by emphasising its impact on the 
political society of countries under reform. 
1.4.2 A Socio-Political Project 
In addition to the significance of acknowledging the historical setting of 
the aid reform, a second pivotal characteristic of the framework is the 
emphasis on the IDM as a socio-political project. 
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While the governance agenda linked to the Bank’s conditionalities has 
indeed significantly transformed economic policies within countries un-
der reform over the last two decades, the neo-liberal model has been fac-
ing increasing challenges12. Amongst these challenges, the social, eco-
nomic and environmental impacts of neo-liberal policies have spurred 
local, national and global contestation and as a result, political tensions 
have been brewing. What this implies is that neo-liberals were forced to 
transform the model in order to address its internal contradictions. As 
such, the PWC may be viewed as an attempt to consolidate the neo-
liberal model by extending it to the political and social realm. Propelled 
by NIE principles, this serves to address two distinct challenges: on the 
one hand to fill the institutional void now recognised as necessary to ad-
dress market failure and on the other hand, to introduce new forms and 
practices of social regulation.  
As argued by Jayasuriya the PWC is ‘[...] an attempt to develop a po-
litical institutional framework to embed the structural adjustment policies 
of the Washington Consensus’ (2003: 2). Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 
suggest that while the PWC does broaden the analytical and policy scope 
of the earlier consensus, it does so: […] by ‘completely by-passing all 
criticism of its predecessor that is not based on an approach tied to its 
own understanding of market imperfections, and it precludes such ap-
proaches as alternatives for future perspectives’ (2001: 4). 
Building on Fine and Jayasuriya’s work on the PWC, the thesis sug-
gests that the Bank’s IDM quest to transform the political society in 
countries under reform should be seen as a socio-political project. Fur-
thermore, such a project should be viewed as a new corner stone of 
Gill’s New Constitutionalism, which he defines as a ‘political project of at-
tempting to make transnational liberal, and if possible liberal democratic 
capitalism, the sole model of future development’ (Gill 1995: 8). Applied 
to the case of the World Bank, this translates into the institution’s effort 
to reshape internal and external structures of the state to create an ‘ena-
bling state’ (Gill 2000: 6).  
Such a framework is useful to analyse the processes of the IDM in re-
lation to the new institutional imperatives coupled with the social narra-
tive that it promotes.  
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1.4.3 The Socio-Political Impacts of the IDM on the Ground 
The third central argument of the thesis relates to the implementation 
process of the IDM. It suggests that its aid allocation mechanisms – pri-
marily the PRS – are instruments to carry out the Bank’s socio-political 
project. The central aim of the IDM’s aid allocation mechanisms is to 
lock-in market-enabling policies while simultaneously managing the op-
position that arises from the reforms. This clearly stems out of the spe-
cific roles assigned to both states under reform and civil society. These 
new roles are vital components of the new neo-liberal form that is em-
bedded in the PRS processes. 
On the state side, a close examination of the historical process of the 
Bank’s conditionalities – mostly under the governance umbrella – is cru-
cial (see Campbell 1996, 1997, 2000, 2005; Dollar and Levin 2004; Harri-
gan, Mosley and Toye 1995; Jayasuriya 2001, 2003). Harrison (2004) ob-
serves that while a first generation of reforms was focused on economic 
liberalisation – i.e. the rolling back of the state, a second generation of 
reforms is more interested with ‘the nature of the state action and its 
scope’ (Harrison 2004: 18). While the PWC remains nestled in orthodox 
economics, it indeed adds an important twist: the idea that states must 
intervene to correct market imperfections – a change that is in itself, ar-
gues Fine, hardly novel (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2001: 5). However 
obvious, the growing influence of New Institutionalism has gradually 
paved the way for what would have been considered heresy a decade ago 
within economist conservative bastion13. The change is important within 
development policy as it now suggests that state stability is the guarantor 
of the health of the market (Harrison 2004: 19). Building on the ambigu-
ous governance decade, the PWC’s take on the state remains functional-
ist and minimalist and introduces specific sets of institutional and legal 
reforms that entail highly political stakes (Biersteker 1990; Campbell 
1996, 1997, 2000b, 2005). As such, the PRS serve to lock-in neo-liberal 
policies – i.e. to insulate neoliberal policy prescriptions from political 
contestation – by using legal-juridical mechanisms (Gill 1995).  
It is with this mutation in mind that the Bank’s new focus on civil so-
ciety should be analysed – as well as the poverty reduction narrative at-
tached to it14. What in fact the framework seeks to achieve is to build on 
the Washington Consensus foundations to extend its outreach to non-
orthodox realms such as civil society (Biekart 1999; Edwards 2004; 
Hearn 1999; Hickey and Mohan 2005; Van Rooy 1997; Wood 1990). At 
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the core of the IDM is the new belief that civil society can be usefully 
put to work in order to manage the social impacts of the reforms with-
out having to rethink the reforms themselves. While this role assigned to 
civil society does indeed represent a balm on the drastic economic medi-
cine prescribed by the International Financial Institutions (IFI) in the last 
decades, it does however, denigrate its other functions, which might 
come to have served to challenge the framework it is now integrated in-
to15.  
The thesis specifically looks at how such redefinition of the roles for 
civil society and the state are being carried out by the PRS process. The 
objective is to exemplify how the IDM is posing serious strains on the 
political society of countries under reform. It becomes clear that PRS 
seek to neutralise the realm of political society in countries under reform 
by shifting power relations amongst the different structures of the state 
itself – legislative, executive and judiciary, and between the state and civil 
society. In this study, it is argued that under the IDM, the concept of 
citizenship is reduced to the technicalities of participating in the electoral 
process.  
1.5 Methodology  
The thesis arguments rest on a qualitative methodology and draw from a 
wide range of sources: primary and secondary data analyses, as well as in-
depth personal interviews. The main focus of the thesis relates to the 
impact and intention of policies linked to the IDM and as such, the re-
search strategy was explanatory and critical in nature.  
This research is imbedded in a limited set of critical literature which 
has sought to link the World Bank’s policies to the larger reordering of 
power in favour of market interests. Building on the insights of these 
authors, the thesis specifically maps the theoretical sources that triggered 
the World Bank to adopt a new model; the impacts that such model is 
intended to have on reforming economies; and crucially, what possible 
consequences such model may have on ideas of citizenship. 
Key to the thesis has been the attempt to transcend conventional 
methodologies used to study the PRS processes so far. This has implied 
two strategic methodological choices: one in relation to the construction 
of the theoretical framework and one relating to the choice of the case 
study. 
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1.5.1 Justification of Sources  
The term Integrated Development Model (IDM) as the central focus of the 
study, reflects a methodological choice in itself. It allows for the desegre-
gation of generic terms such as the ‘new international aid architecture’ 
and ‘post-Washington Consensus’ by focussing strictly on the World 
Bank’s own contribution to the current transformation of the aid archi-
tecture. The term IDM also purposely focuses on the fact that the Bank’s 
reform has been a mix of narrative and aid allocation mechanisms. Such 
differentiation sets the ground for the analysis of the Bank’s narrative 
and the implementation processes by emphasising their complementary 
nature.  
Methodologically, this has called for an historical analysis to map the 
Bank’s transforming agendas, confronting the Bank’s narrative to the 
actual changes that have taken place. The time-line analysed has focused 
mainly on the structural shifts in the planning period 1970s; the struc-
tural adjustment period 1980-1991; the Governance period 1997-1999; 
and of course, the IDM period 1998-2008.  
The primary data for the historical analysis consisted of official publi-
cations from the World Bank, as well as key critical literature on the dif-
ferent historical periods studied16. Such analysis allows for the identifica-
tion of the important historical factors underpinning the Bank’s decision 
to embrace a new development paradigm, a process that permits to dif-
ferentiate between the official narrative and the actual motives for 
change. 
While specifically focussing on the IDM, the proposed theoretical 
framework brings together key authors from the field of IPE and pro-
poses to highlight the intrinsic political nature of the reform17. Such 
framework allows for the study of the apparent contradictions within the 
Bank’s new aid agenda; the contrasts between the Bank’s social devel-
opment narrative and its governance agenda.  
The primary data consisted of official publications from the World 
Bank such as World Development Report (WDR), Annual reports, Op-
eration Evaluation Department18 (OED) reports. Furthermore, back-
ground documents on the Comprehensive Development Framework19 
and the overall Poverty Reduction Strategy official literature have also 
been central to the study. The thesis also rests on data collected from the 
Bank’s extensive website – such as Social Development Network, pov-
erty reduction, civil society, anti-corruption and governance, social capi-
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tal web pages20. Speeches from James D. Wolfensohn have also been 
thoroughly analysed (see Wolfensohn 1997; 1998; 1999a; 1999b). 
An extensive range of academic sources has also fed the greater ar-
gument of the thesis. Beyond the key authors instrumental for the theo-
retical framework, the thesis argument rests on the study of central 
themes redundant to the Bank’s IDM, such as governance (see Cammack 
2004; Campbell 1996, 1997, 2000, 2005; Dollar and Levin 2004; Harri-
gan, Mosley and Toye 1995; Harrison 2004; Jayasuriya 2001, 2003), civil 
society participation (see Biekart 1999; Edwards 2004; Hearn 1999; Hickey 
and Mohan 2005; Jayasuriya 2003; Kamat 2004; Van Rooy 1997; Wood 
1990), social capital (see Bebbington; Fine 1999; Fine, Lapavitsas and Pin-
cus 2001; Guggenheim, Olson and Woolcock 2004; Harriss 2002; May-
oux 2001; Ponthieux 2003; Putnam 1995) – as well as the conceptual ab-
sentee of the Model, such as democracy and citizenship (see Dagnino 2008; 
Hearn 1999; Hickey and Mohan 2005; Jones and Hardstaff 2005; Taylor 
1998; Wood 1990). 
Interviews: Methodological Choices 
While interviews of Bank officials were conducted, official Bank publica-
tions have been selected as the primary ‘voice’ of the Bank, or in other 
words, as representing the outcomes of debate within the Bank and the 
maps for implementation. Although such overwhelming focus on official 
publications does not highlight the subtleties of the Bank’s internal 
struggles – which have undoubtedly influenced the content of such pub-
lications – it was strategically decided to adopt the Bank’s official publi-
cations as the best vehicle to assess the institution’s strategy towards the 
IDM. The internal struggles of the World Bank are nonetheless ad-
dressed in chapter two of this thesis, in the section ‘Structural Contradic-
tions, Power Swings, and Stakeholder Constraints: the Anatomy of the 
World Bank’ (section 2.1.1). However, as discussed previously in the 
presentation of the theoretical framework, of particular interest of this 
research is to investigate how both the social-development narrative and 
the new aid allocation mechanisms – i.e. the IDM – relate to the greater 
understanding of the PWC. In such light, official publications rather than 
the opinions of individuals working for the World Bank were a more 
appropriate methodological focus.   
Some semi-structured individual interviews were nonetheless con-
ducted with World Bank officials in order to complement the research. A 
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few key informants were specifically chosen for their overall knowledge 
of the social-development narrative or of the shift in governance condi-
tionalities during the Wolfensohn presidency. Of particular interest, were 
Bank staff that had a very broad historical sense of the shifts happening 
at the Bank.  
Another distinct set of interviews was motivated by a gap in the litera-
ture. This was quite uncommon for this topic, as World Bank publica-
tions are not only extremely rich in data, but readily available as well – 
notably because of the new Bank policy on public disclosure. However, 
the literature on the Bank’s initiatives towards parliamentarians is quite 
poor. Therefore, the Bank official who specifically started the outreach 
initiatives with parliamentarians and is now the senior manager of the 
entire programme was interviewed, as well as parliamentarians participat-
ing in the programme. Another broad set of official interviews and in-
formal consultations were carried out with members of international ad-
vocacy NGOs and experts from academic circles, throughout the period 
of the thesis (2004-2008).  
Fieldwork and Time-Table 
Bank officials have been interviewed during the two months of intensive 
fieldwork in Washington D.C. Further interviews were carried out during 
specific events such as the Annual Meetings Boards of Governors of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group (Singapore, 
September 19-20, 2006), the Annual Bank Conference on Development 
Economics (Bled, Slovenia, May 17-18, 2007), and during academic 
events such as the Garnet Network conference on ‘Governance and the 
Politics of Development’ (November 16-17, 2006, Institute of Social 
Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands).  
An intensive fieldwork at the site of the main policy agencies – in 
Washington D.C. – was carried out for a period of two months (Sep-
tember-October 2006). The fieldwork served to generate exchanges with 
World Bank staff and researchers in the range of institutions also located 
in Washington that are focused on Bank policy and that of other devel-
opment agencies and international financial institutions. The Bank Infor-
mation Center21 (BIC), which provided office space in Washington D.C. 
during the period of the fieldwork, represented a daily environment to 
discuss and debate the content of the thesis and provided a convenient 
point of entry for accessing the different networks linked to World Bank.  
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Experts from academic circles, Bank officials and international 
NGOs have also been consulted, notably during three distinct work-
shops specifically crafted for PhD students researching the World Bank. 
The workshops have been supported by the Economic and Social Research 
Council of the United Kingdom and organised by the Centre for the Study of 
Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in conjunc-
tion with the Researchers Alliance for Development. They were held in Buda-
pest, Hungary (April 1 and 2, 2005), Singapore (September 18, 2006) and 
Bled, Slovenia (May 16, 2007)22. 
1.5.2 The Case Study: the PRS Experience 
The central focus of the thesis is the World Bank’s IDM. Although also 
conceptual in nature, the IDM carries with it new aid allocation mecha-
nisms: the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), the Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (PRS), the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Any of these would 
have been appropriate choices to serve as the case study for the IDM. 
PRSPs are the official strategic document of the country, while CAS are 
IDA’s ‘business plan’ in support of the country’s PRS and CPIAs are a 
diagnostic tool which indicate areas where attention needs to be focused. 
CDFs on the other hand, were initiated in 1998 by Wolfensohn and are 
now viewed as the ‘philosophy’ guiding the PRS (World Bank 2006a). 
While each of these aid allocation mechanisms represent an important 
building block of the IDM – and as such, they are all addressed in the 
thesis – it was decided that PRS would represent an adequate case study. 
This was a tactical choice; the scale of the PRS endeavour itself has 
meant that it has been the subject of countless analyses and therefore, 
both primary and secondary data were readily available, from a great va-
riety of official and critical sources. PRS have indeed been the subject of 
numerous publications from International NGOs – such as Bank Infor-
mation Centre, Bretton Woods Project, EURODAD, Oxfam Interna-
tional, Southern Civil Society, World Development Movement, World 
Vision, etc. These organisations provided detailed case study of the PRS 
process in all the countries involved in the process. Academic analyses of 
the PRS are also abundant, mostly in relation to country case studies23. 
Furthermore, relevant International Monetary Fund, Development As-
sistance Committee-OECD and bilateral donors’ related documents have 
been instrumental to the study. Primary data on PRS has also been read-
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ily available. As such, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers/Interim Papers 
from the 65 countries involved in the process; the Joint Staff Advisory 
Notes/Joint Staff Assessments; and the PRSP Progress Reports repre-
sented a key sources of primary data for the basis of comparative analy-
ses and sources of examples to consolidate the thesis arguments. 
Another tactical methodological decision was to focus on the overall 
PRS experience rather than to focus on a single country. While both 
choices are methodologically sound, the idea here was to try to transcend 
the literature on the PRS participatory process, which has so far been 
saturated with country-based case study. Instead of collecting new coun-
try data on PRS country experiences, the method has rather been to fo-
cus on available data from a wide sample of PRS countries and from di-
verse sources – academic, official, International advocacy NGOs and 
interviews. In other words, the objective here has been to build a synthe-
sis of PRS country experiences.  
In addition, this methodological choice to focus on the overall PRS 
experience serves to contrast with the overwhelming amount of case 
studies that have methodologically been designed within a the very com-
pounds of the IDM’s narrative. This is to say that most critical analyses 
of PRSPs have set out to investigate whether the Bank’s official narrative 
attached to the PRS experience, was taking place on the ground. Accord-
ingly, and as discussed in section 1.1.3 of this chapter, a great deal of case 
studies have been asking analogous questions linked to assessing the 
quality of the participatory process or the impact of a given PRSP on 
poverty reduction. In other words, because the Bank states that partici-
pation is at the heart of the reform, assessments have indeed been over-
whelmingly focussing on evaluating the quality of the participation proc-
ess of a given PRS. While such studies are vital to transcend the 
normative aspects of the model – as it deconstructs the social and pov-
erty focused narrative – they give a fragmented window on the aid re-
form and most of all, it downplays the scale of its political implications. 
In contrast to such analyses, this thesis builds on the data provided by 
this range of case-studies and seeks to tease out global patterns from 
these individual experiences. This is however not done within the com-
pounds of the Bank’s own narrative but rather by assessing what the PRS 
are actually doing on the ground in relation to the reordering of power – 
something that is very much absent from the Bank’s official narrative. 
This methodological choice is reflected in the last three chapters of the 
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thesis which set out to investigate the transformation of democratic 
structures carried out by PRS in reforming countries– i.e. on the execu-
tive, legislative and judiciary branches.  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The methodology is reflected in the structure of the thesis, which is di-
vided into six chapters, each of which constitutes a discrete element of 
analysis. 
 The following chapter explores how the World Bank has historically 
adopted successive development models and what crises, ideas and nar-
ratives have marked the transitions from one model to the next. This 
historical analysis grounds the foundations within which later chapters of 
the thesis will be set. It is observed that the 1990s were harsh on the 
structural adjustment model and such intricacies gave momentum to new 
conceptualisations of the state, now commonly referred to as the PWC. 
In chapter two therefore, the intricate historical, political and organisa-
tional rationales that compelled the Bank to adopt a new aid develop-
ment paradigm are analysed. It is argued that the World Bank was forced 
to rethink its former model – which was to address the escalating set-
backs of the Washington Consensus.  
Following this historical analysis, the theoretical foundations of the 
PWC are analysed. In chapter two, it is argued that in order to truly un-
derstand the political ramifications of the new aid architecture as pre-
sented by the Bank, the theoretical underpinnings of the aid reform must 
indeed be thoroughly analysed. Setting aside the Bank’s own experiences, 
this chapter sets out to investigate the key architects of the PWC; analys-
ing in turn Stiglitz and other authors of the greater New Institutional 
Economics academic stronghold. Crucially then, this chapter is about 
clarifying the confusion between narrative, assumptions and methods 
entwined with what we refer to as the PWC. Such a process exposes a 
clear dichotomy between an emphasis on the regulatory state and a nar-
rative revolving around participation and social development. After pre-
senting an analysis of Stiglitz’s and NIE’s agenda centred around the 
pivotal role of institutions in economic development, the chapter’s focus 
of analysis shifts towards the conceptual absentee of the theoretical 
framework of the PWC: power. Such exercise sheds great light on the 
political underpinning of the new consensus and allows us to re-locate 
the framework within the greater context of the consolidation of neo-
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liberalism. The key point here is to demonstrate that the PWC is about 
addressing the tensions of the Washington Consensus without actually 
challenging its fundamental assumptions and goals. This is done by en-
tering directly the realm of politics, pushing the reforms further into the 
political fabric of society.  
The remainder of the thesis pertains to the specific role played by the 
World Bank in carrying out such an agenda in countries under reform, 
via the Integrated Development Model. Consequently, the next three 
chapters address how the Bank’s IDM and its new aid allocation mecha-
nisms are effectively transforming the state architecture – shifting the 
political spaces between state, civil society and markets in a manner that 
benefits one over the others.  
Building on a study of the mechanics of the new aid allocation 
mechanisms embedded in the IDM, chapter four is the subject of the 
transformation of the conditionality model. It is argued that there exists 
a clear attempt to circumscribe borrowing governments in their possibili-
ties to challenge orthodox policies as prescribed by the Bank and the 
greater donor community. Nestled in the NIE stronghold, the new aid 
architecture’s overarching influence on aid allocation or debt relief sug-
gests that neo-liberals have indeed found a way to institutionalise the 
market ideology within the developing state.  
In light of the obvious challenges that the restructuring of the state’s 
architecture is posing for the democratic process in countries under re-
form, chapter five is an attempt to address the Bank’s participation nar-
rative. It is argued that the participatory agenda is proving to be quite 
puzzling, especially with its flagship aid allocation mechanisms, the PRS. 
The investigation of the Bank’s new interest in the role of civil society in 
the IDM demonstrates that while civil society is undeniably a direct an-
swer to the Bank’s legitimacy crisis, it also serves as a tool for managing 
civil unrest within countries under reform. This argument is based on an 
analysis of the new participatory agenda and how powerful groups within 
the Bank have hijacked its initial objectives. The chapter then reviews the 
functions assigned by the Bank to civil society and concludes that such 
functions are deprived of the political attributes traditionally associated 
to civil society. This new ‘hybrid’, as a direct product of the PWC, re-
veals the uneasiness of a World Bank faced with an increasingly political 
stage for its reforms.  
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While debates have been roaring over the quality of civil society par-
ticipation in the new aid allocation mechanisms, chapter six observes 
that there has curiously been very little analysis on the great absentees of 
the process: Members of Parliament (MPs). One common aspect of all 
PRS has indeed been the almost complete absence of MPs. Beyond is-
sues such as lack of capacity, the risks of partisan attachments and hi-
jacking of issues, MPs remain the sole official representatives of the peo-
ple and purportedly the democratic voices of citizens. This chapter 
argues that the specific role assigned to MPs in PRS is jeopardising the 
already fragile legitimacy of the institution. It also raises the fundamental 
question linked to the influence of IFI policy in the very fabric of the 
democratic process in countries under reform as it establishes the prece-
dent of technocratic parliamentarian involvement. In order to demon-
strate such an argument, the chapter first reviews the World Bank’s his-
torical stance on parliaments and concludes that there is an obvious 
dichotomy between the Bank’s official narrative on a country’s owner-
ship and the actual experience of participation in the PRS. However, and 
this will be addressed in the second section of the chapter, the Bank’s 
approach on parliamentarians’ involvement appears to have recently 
shifted from one in which parliaments were defined as problematic and 
unmanageable, to one in which MPs are defined as a new ally against 
corruption and a source of legitimacy for reform. The chapter’s last sec-
tion, analyses this new stance on parliaments in the context of the larger 
political debate of the possible clash between technocracy and democ-
racy that lies at the heart of the PRS endeavour. 
The concluding chapter of the thesis reflects on the IDM and its im-
plication for the concept of citizenship. It looks at the Bank’s response 
to the crisis of legitimacy and control and its attempt to adapt the neo-
liberal framework at the local level. It concludes that the model and its 
aid allocation mechanisms are key components of a contemporary neo-
liberal project as they serve to lock-in neo-liberal policies. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Such as controlling domestic finance, imposing restrictions on capital flows, 
often discouraged foreign direct investments, controlled international capital 
flows, regulated several domestic markets and owned significant parts of the in-
ternational productive capacity (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2001: xv). 
 
 Chapter 1 44 
 
2 See Mallaby (2004). 
3 Founded in 1994, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of 
the World Bank and IMF, 50 Years Is Enough is a U.S. Network for Global 
Economic Justice, a coalition of over 200 U.S. grassroots, women's, solidarity, 
faith-based, policy, social and economic-justice, youth, labour and development 
organizations dedicated to the profound transformation of the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund. See http://www.50years.org 
4 See for example: Bebbington et al. 2004; Davis 2004; Hickey and Mohan 
2005; Interview Robert Chase 2006; Mallaby 2004; Wolfensohn 1998; World 
Bank 2008h. 
5 On the subject, see Burnside and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Levin 2004; 
EURODAD 2001a, 2001b, 2002; OED 1999; 2004a, 2004b; Paris High Level 
Forum 2005; Powell 2004; World Bank 1998a, 2002b). 
6 Also see on the subject of ‘partnership’: Development Assistance Commit-
tee OECD (1996) Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-
operation, Paris: OECD. 
7  For a review of the debate see Hickey and Mohan 2005. 
8 As thoroughly analysed in chapter five of this contribution. 
9 Aid allocation mechanisms such as the CDF, the PRS, the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). 
10 The World Bank does not use such term explicitly. In most publications, it 
refers to either the narrative – i.e. the social agenda – or to the aid allocation 
mechanisms themselves. The Bank does explicitly points to ‘a new way to do 
business’, a ‘new model’ and to a new ‘aid paradigm’. For the sake of clarity, 
the reform package itself is here coined as the IDM. To our knowledge, the 
specific term ‘IDM’ was first used by the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) in 2002 – in its French version ‘Cadre de Développement 
Intégré’ – specifically to address the World Bank changes (CIDA 2002).  
Within this thesis, we use the terms IDM, new aid paradigm, new aid model and new 
aid architecture in an interchanging way. 
11 IPE builds on methods drawn from economics, political science, and sociol-
ogy and it provides an analysis of international relations in combination with po-
litical economy. As such, IPE provides the foundations to assess the influence of 
multilateral organisations on the interactions between the state (politics) and the 
market (economics). 
12 The more commonly cited challenges are the trauma of the Asian financial 
crisis, the structural adjustment’s questionable score card, the misguidance of 
the eastern block countries entrance into capitalist markets, and to some extent, 
the rise of anti-globalization movements. 
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13 Such as Ann Krueger, Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, etc. 
14 Key concepts such as ‘participation’ and ‘social capital’ on implicitly linked to 
the IDM. See for example Bebbington; Fine 1999; Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 
2001; Guggenheim, Olson and Woolcock 2004; Harriss 2002; Mayoux 2001; 
Ponthieux 2003; Putnam 1995. 
15 See for example the work of Carroll 2007; Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2001; 
Harriss 2002; Hearn 1999; Jayasuriya 2003, 2004; Van Rooy 1997. 
16 Such as Campbell 1997, 1998; Caufield 1997; Cornia, Jolly and Stewart 1987; 
Culpeper 1997; Goldman 2005; Harrigan, Mosley and Toye 1995; Harrison 2004; 
Mallaby 2004; Peet 2003; Sarrasin 1999; Toye 1987. 
17 Key authors on the subject are Campbell 1996, 1997, 2000b, 2005; Fine, La-
pavitsas and Pincus 2001; Hadiz 2004; Harrison 2004; Harriss 2002; Jayasuriya 
2001, 2003, 2006; Robison 2006a; 2006b. 
18 The OED is the independent branch of the World Bank which is now called 
the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). 
19 See for example http://go.worldbank.org/DXQURB2UH0, accessed No-
vember 10, 2008) 
20 Available at http://go.worldbank.org/MQDEW3VLO0 (accessed January 
2008). 
21 The BIC is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization that 
advocates for the protection of rights, participation, transparency, and public ac-
countability in the governance and operations of the World Bank, regional devel-
opment banks, and the IMF. 
22 The interviews were not taped in order to give greater confidence to the 
interviewee. Notes were taken during the interview and completed immediately 
afterwards. Follow-up questions have also been sent and answered via email, 
when required. 
23 For example, the Institute of Social Studies (http://www.iss.nl/Cross-cutting-
themes/PRSP), the Institute of Development Studies 
(http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/browse-by-subject/poverty) or the Institute of Devel-
opment Policy and Management 
(http://www.ua.ac.be/main.aspx?c=.IOB&n=57994) all have ongoing research 
project on PRSPs. 
  
2 
On shaky Ground: the Bank’s Legiti-
macy & Political Crisis at the End of 
the Millennium 
 
 
Like laundry detergent, aid is always ‘new and improved’ 
(Easterly 2002: 35) 
 
Introduction 
By the end of the 20th century it had become increasingly apparent to the 
Wolfensohn’s presidency that the Bank had to change direction. How-
ever, such an endeavour was easier said than done. As observed by 
Robert Wade: ‘The Bank's legitimacy depends upon the authority of its 
views; like the Vatican, and for similar reasons, it cannot afford to admit 
fallibility’ (1996: 34). Yet, it was clear that the structural adjustment pe-
riod was dramatically failing to achieve its objectives, as these failures 
were being increasingly broadcast and attacked by a loose but effective 
coalition of global critics. The Washington Consensus increasingly be-
came a negative and pejorative term. In the streets of many countries 
under reform, angry critics attacked the International Financial Institu-
tions (IFI) for being unmoved by the plight of the world’s poorest. Envi-
ronmentalists were outraged by infrastructure projects backed by the 
Bank and their impact on the environment; human rights activists de-
nounced loans to dictatorships, while gender rights advocates were 
pointing out the negative impacts of Bank policies on women. Ironically, 
the Bank was also facing attacks from within. Joseph Stiglitz – the Bank’s 
Chief Economist from 1997 to 2000 – was himself pushing for major 
changes within the Bank. Stiglitz was delivering public lectures, speeches 
and publications on the failure of the Washington Consensus, which was 
really the quintessential statement of Bank orthodoxy. To make matters 
worse, the Bank’s own statistics and evaluations pointed to serious defi-
cit in the legacy of the Washington Consensus. 
46 
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The response came at the 1997 Annual Meeting in Hong Kong, 
where the newly appointed president presented his vision of the future 
of the World Bank. From this time onward, proclaimed Wolfensohn, the 
institution would be committed to eliminating poverty in a way that di-
rectly addressed the social aspects of distress and to forging closer part-
nerships with other actors in the development process, including those 
within civil society: ‘Our dream is a world free of poverty’, he declared. 
Wolfensohn’s vision soon became the Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF), the World Bank’s official new ‘Development Para-
digm’ (OED 1999: 4). The Framework was presented as a tool to be 
used by the entire development community to achieve greater develop-
ment effectiveness in a world challenged by poverty and distress. CDF 
would not only change the way development efforts were conceived and 
coordinated, it would change the very nature of aid itself. 
It was not however, the first time that the Bank distanced itself from 
past practices and called for a new development model. The Bank had 
acknowledged the failure of the ‘planning paradigm’ amidst the early 
1980’s debt crisis and embraced the ‘structural adjustment paradigm’. 
This was the first great watershed. Now, amidst the East-Asian eco-
nomic crisis, the governance predicament of indebted countries, as well 
as the former communist countries’ bumpy ride to economic liberalisa-
tion, the World Bank saw grounds for a new aid paradigm, making the 
CDF the third distinct development model.  
This chapter is about understanding why the Bank proposed a new aid 
model at the end of the 1990s. It maps the intricate historical, political 
and organisational rationales that compelled the Bank to adopt what it 
now presents as a new aid development paradigm. What will become 
particularly evident is that the World Bank’s shift was motivated by far 
more than an altruistic quest to reach the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) and to foster a participatory framework. In fact, it will be 
argued that the Bank was forced to rethink its former model in order to 
address the escalating setbacks of the Washington Consensus.  
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first section takes a 
step back from the official narrative and provides the reader with an 
analysis of the Bank’s incentives for change. Mapping the precise histori-
cal incentives that compelled the Bank to dissociate itself from its former 
strategy is not a simple endeavour. Therefore, these will be studied in 
two separate, although intrinsically linked, levels. First, we look at the 
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internal turmoil that compelled the Bank to propose the new aid frame-
work. This will be followed by an analysis of the historical and political 
contexts that forced the Bank to dissociate itself from its former model – 
at least discursively. The second part of this chapter provides a descrip-
tion of Wolfensohn’s proposal for a new development model. It maps 
the official objectives and functions of the model as described by Wolf-
ensohn. As such, this chapter sets the case in its historical background 
and as such, a process vital for the ongoing argument of later chapters. 
Such historical settings will lead to the following chapters, which in turn 
explore the theoretical foundations of the new aid architecture, how such 
change has been made operational and crucially, the political significance 
of the change. 
2.1 From One Aid Paradigm to the Next: Why the Bank 
Changes Gears 
In the following section, the Wolfensohn presidency is located within the 
historical and political context of the mid-1990s in order to understand 
the Bank’s incentives for change. It will become clear that the Bank had 
to change. This will be analysed in two distinct parts. First, we look at 
the Bank’s internal structures in order to assess its incentives for change. 
In the second part the international context of the 1990s is analysed and 
it is argued that the Bank’s shift is undoubtedly a direct response to the 
crisis provoked by the very failures of structural adjustment itself. 
2.1.1 Structural Contradictions, Power Swings, and Stakeholder 
Constraints: the Anatomy of the World Bank 
According to the Bank’s own historical chronology, the institution’s abil-
ity to adapt its agendas is rooted in the flexibility of its founding articles: 
‘Fortunately, the articles of Agreement are sufficiently flexible (a more 
polite word than vague) to permit the Bank to perform its task despite 
changed circumstances’ (World Bank 2005). The first article of Agree-
ment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) states that the institution shall be guided in all its decisions by 
the following purposes1: to assist in the reconstruction and development 
of territories of members; to promote private foreign investment; to 
promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the 
maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments; to arrange the loans 
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made or guaranteed by it in relation to international loans through other 
channels; to conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of in-
ternational investment on business conditions. Over time, these pur-
poses have encompassed the institution to push its core agendas with 
different degrees of emphasis and more interestingly, with different in-
terpretations2. 
Beyond the elasticity of the Bank’s founding articles – which has in-
deed been an asset for the institution’s changing narratives – one must 
also ask why over time particular agendas have been pushed further than 
others. One answer is provided in the internal politics of the institution 
itself. Here, the Bank’s changing agendas have often been regarded sim-
ply as the manifestation of its shareholders shifting political, strategic and 
overall economic interests. It is indeed clear that the power within the 
Bank is not equally distributed amongst its 184 member countries. While 
each member is a shareholder, the voting power is directly linked to the 
size of the shareholding3. Together, the five largest shareholders (France, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) represent 
more then 37% of the voting power. This overwhelming dominance held 
by the planet’s richest nations has spurred relentless debates over the 
political influence they hold over the institution, especially the United 
States, which accounts for 16.39% of the shares4.  
The World Bank – and the IMF – has been an efficient instrument 
for enhancing and supporting US foreign economic policy or, in other 
words, opening markets to US investment and trade. As argued by Wade 
(2001b), the dilemma faced by the US is to what extent it can use the IFI 
to persuade local elites to adopt policies beneficial to the US economy 
without jeopardizing the institutions’ legitimacy as multilateral organisa-
tions. Wade further observes that the US has a ‘discreet but firm institu-
tional control’ over the Bank. Amongst other instruments of influence at 
the US disposal, he mentions the fact that the US appoints the president, 
it is the only member able to exercise a veto on various key constitu-
tional issues and it makes the biggest contribution to the International 
Development Agency (IDA) (Wade 2001a: 127). 
The mayhem surrounding the making of the 2000 World Develop-
ment Report Attacking Poverty (World Bank 2001a) is illustrative of the 
power struggles within the World Bank itself and the US influence5. This 
was telling of a conflict between market fundamentalists and institutional 
revisionists; between the Washington Consensus and the PWC.  
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The highly publicized resignation of Ravi Kanbur, the Report’s direc-
tor – who coincidently had been brought in by Joseph Stiglitz – clearly 
revealed: ‘[...] deep divisions within [the Bank] over the extent to which 
adherence to a neo-liberal ideology best serves the interests of the poor’ 
(Mosley 2001: 308). On July 4th 2000, The Guardian reported on the grow-
ing divisions within the Bank: 
The departure of Kanbur, following last year’s resignation of the bank’s 
chief economist, Joe Stiglitz, has exposed a growing rift at the Washing-
ton-based body, the world's largest development fund. On the one side are 
the ultra-orthodox economists who believe that if poor countries adopt a 
set of tried and tested policies – conquer inflation, slash government 
budgets and open their economies to trade – they will reap the benefits in 
economic growth. According to this school of thought, growth is good for 
everybody, and even the poorest households share in rising wealth. On the 
other side are those like Prof Kanbur and Prof Stiglitz who argue that 
growth alone is not enough. The quality of growth matters and policies 
should make sure that the poor get the most benefit from rising prosperity 
(Denny 2000). 
With Kanbur at the helm, Bank reformists and international NGOs 
perceived the annual WDR as deviating from the overwhelming empha-
sis on economic growth which had characterised former WDRs. The 
Report allowed for the study of the non-income dimensions of poverty, 
thus clashing with the ultra-orthodox traditional economic policies6. The 
international NGO Global Policy Forum concludes that the Kanbur ver-
sion of the WDR: ‘[…] moved beyond national average figures on pov-
erty incidence to examine the many factors which influence poverty out-
comes for vulnerable population groups’ (Global Policy Forum 2000). 
Kanbur resigned in May 2000, citing undue outside pressure. He would 
have resigned as a result of direct intervention by Lawrence Summers7, 
the US Treasury Department Secretary. Summers would have forced 
changes in the content of the Report8 (Peet 2003: 134). On the subject, 
the Financial Times reported that Kanbur notably objected: ‘to the playing 
down of “empowerment” – widely interpreted to mean income and 
wealth distribution – in favour of “opportunity”, of which the key ele-
ment is economic growth’ (Beattie 2000). 
In addition to this internal rift between the conservatives and the re-
formists relating to the best ways to achieve economic growth, the Bank 
was also the subject of external pressures notably linked to the way mar-
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kets underpin US strategic interests. In this regard, Stiglitz’s resignation 
as the Bank’s Chief Economist is also quite revealing of the US Treas-
ury’s influence on the institution. While Stiglitz stayed as a ‘special advi-
sor’ to the Bank presidency, his resignation a month before the end of 
his term (January 2000), led to much speculation on whether Stiglitz 
jumped or was pushed (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2001: 17). On the 
subject, The Nation commented: ‘Stiglitz had made one too many public 
criticisms of the economic policies preferred by the bank and its ultimate 
master, the US government’ (Henwood 2000). Wade recalls quite a re-
vealing statement by Laurence Summers:  
At a dinner party a few years ago Laurence Summers […] exclaimed en-
thusiastically that until he entered the treasury he had not realised just how 
useful were the bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for US 
foreign-policy objectives. His remark is all the more striking because he 
had earlier been vice-president for economics and research at the bank - so 
he was scarcely an outsider (Wade 2007). 
However, one cannot simply conclude that the Bank’s decisions are 
the sum of each significant member country’s geo-strategic and eco-
nomic interests. As pointed out by Miller-Adams (1999: 9), while the 
Bank is indeed a prominent actor within an international system gov-
erned by states, it is also a large and complex institution whose relative 
autonomy transcends the sum of its members’ interests. 
It is useful at this point to call upon organisational theory within the 
field of sociology to map the Bank’s normative aspects such as its social 
obligations, morals and values. There is an abundance of literature argu-
ing for the study of the ‘subterranean processes’ of the World Bank in 
order to understand the way it changes9. In this respect, Vetterlein argues 
that international organisations have a ‘personality’, which explains: ‘why 
an organisation would be more or less active in taking on and processing 
new ideas, setting agendas and new policies, and consequently, creating 
new policy norms’ (2007: 1). The Bank’s changing agendas do find 
meaning in the institution’s organisational culture – here understood as 
its ‘pattern of norms and attitudes that cuts across its whole social unit' 
(Schein 1990 cited in Miller-Adams 1999: 21). There are two main norms 
which stand out of the literature: the Bank’s apolitical and technical insti-
tutional norms (Miller-Adams 1999: 22). This is clearly entrenched in the 
Bank’s founding charter, which states that:  
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The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political 
character of the member or members concerned. Only economic consid-
erations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall 
be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I 
(IBRD Article of Agreement IV, Section 10). 
As we will see, these claims to technical and apolitical norms have li-
censed the Bank to navigate across the numerous historical challenges it 
has encountered throughout the last sixty years and it is a vital element in 
explaining how the World Bank has adapted over the years. As observed 
by Miller-Adam, these norms have come to serve three very practical 
organisational purposes. First, it allowed the Bank to work with all its 
members despite their different ideology and political cultures; second, it 
allowed for its staff to adopt a seemingly professional non-partisan work 
ethic; and finally, it seemingly increased its legitimacy in the eyes of its 
borrowers by presenting itself as being above politics (1999: 23). This 
internal logic derives from the Bank’s core belief in the existence of an 
‘economic rationality’ which transcends any political debate (Wade 1996). 
As studied throughout the following thesis, such a norm undeniably al-
lows for the Bank’s narrative to bypass any political debate other than 
the mainstream neo-liberal orthodoxy, a process that ‘renders develop-
ment a curiously straightforward process’ (Harrison 2004: 12). This point 
is also argued by Boas and McNeill, who state that while the agenda of 
these institutions (World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organisation) has 
been broadened:  
The process has taken place within established and largely unquestioned 
boundaries, firmly kept in place by a certain frame of knowledge. As in the 
heyday of technical assistance, knowledge is still mainly understood in in-
strumental terms: as a non-political and objective tool that, if correctly im-
plemented, will lead to better policies (Boas and McNeill 2003: 50). 
In order to support this myth, the Bank’s employees are presented as 
experts in a great variety of technical areas10, although they are still over-
whelmingly composed of economists. Interestingly, up to 80 percent of 
the Bank’s economists are educated in either North America or in the 
UK (Wade 1996: 30). As such, the ‘art of paradigm maintenance’ within 
the Bank’s staff and thus its publications, is derived from a deep belief in 
orthodox Anglo-American economics and it is an entrenched criterion 
for the selection of the Bank’s employees: ‘If they [the candidates] were 
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to show sympathy for other ideas [...] they would be unlikely to be se-
lected for the Bank, on grounds of incompetence’ (Wade 1996: 30). In 
other words, the Bank is also driven by the interests of its own officials, 
who have an interest in maintaining a technocratic façade that protects 
them from criticism. 
2.1.2 Trying to Keep Up: the Bank and Crisis Management 
Despite seeing itself as technical and apolitical, the Bank of the 1990s 
was coming under increasing criticism and under pressure to acknowl-
edge the failure of structural adjustment. Outside the Bank, international 
events were rattling the orthodoxy: the East Asian experience – both its 
economic miracle and its crisis – as well as the bumpy ride of Eastern 
Europe’s ex-communist block towards a market economy, were chal-
lenging the economic dogma which had prevailed for the last two dec-
ades. To make matters worse, an increasingly vocal and well-organised 
anti-globalisation movement was actively scrutinising the negative im-
pacts of the Bank and the IMF on the World’s poor. One could argue 
that the point of no return was reached, ironically, when Joseph Stiglitz – 
the ‘rebel within’ – joined the wave of discontent. From his position as 
Nobel Prize winner, his attacks not only had the weight of academia, 
they also had the whistle blower effect: was he not the Chief Economist 
at the Bank since 1997? 
Three intrinsically related problems particularly stand out when look-
ing back at the last decade of the Bank’s activities: the failure of condi-
tionality, the failure to achieve economic growth and to tackle poverty, 
and the emergence of a more organised and vocal international civil so-
ciety. 
Facing the Statistics: the Failure of Conditionality 
Structural adjustment programmes were designed to be quite straight-
forward. They were to turn around the emergency economic situation 
that emerged from the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Inflated by the be-
lief in a linear modernisation11, developing states had embraced the de-
velopment era head on12, managing the oil crisis through the borrowing 
opportunities linked to the recycling of petrodollars in Northern coun-
tries. To make matters worse, faced with a growing fiscal deficit the 
Nixon’s presidency had ended the Bretton Woods system by suspending 
the convertibility from dollar to gold13. The borrowing euphoria became 
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highly problematic when on the one hand, interest rates dramatically es-
calated, and on the other hand, the terms of trade became detrimental 
for developing countries – the main exporters of primary goods. The 
constant exchange rate deterioration, the second oil shock and the eco-
nomic recession in the industrialized nations would do the rest. The de-
veloping countries debt service, which was in foreign currencies with 
floating interest rates, became unmanageable14. The borrowing period 
was over and, motivated by the threat of a possible domino effect set off 
by the Mexican and Brazilian debt crisis in 1982, the International Finan-
cial Institutions turned to the structural adjustment paradigm. As ex-
pressed in the World Development Report (WDR) on Adjustment, the 
ideals of the planning paradigm had slowly led to a serious deadlock – 
the debt crisis: ‘[…] countries that have borrowed to support unsustain-
able patterns of production, consumption and trade soon face the reck-
oning of excessive debt and forced macro-economic contraction’ (World 
Bank 1981: 113). 
While the IMF imposed ‘stabilisation’ measures to compel fiscal and 
monetary discipline as a condition for receiving short-term balance of 
payments credits, the Bank stepped in to manage the longer-term struc-
tural problems faced by the indebted countries. It indeed quickly instated 
a new type of lending – the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), 
here defined in the 1981 WDR: 
[…] structural adjustment lending (SAL), will help oil importers adjust to 
the changing international environment. SAL will assist countries in for-
mulating and carrying out structural adjustment programs and will provide 
finance during the adjustment period. Structural adjustment loans are 
planned as a series of three to four operations over a five- or six-year pe-
riod (World Bank 1981: 55). 
SAPs were based on a concrete policy programme, now commonly 
referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’. This was an expression 
coined by John Williamson to describe the existing consensus on Latin 
American reforms amongst the economists of the three institutions hav-
ing their headquarters in Washington D.C.: the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the American Treasury. More precisely, the Washington Consensus 
contained the following propositions: fiscal discipline; a redirection of 
public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic 
returns and the potential to improve income distribution; tax reform (to 
lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base); interest rate liberalisa-
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tion; competitive exchange rates; trade liberalisation; liberalisation of in-
flows of foreign direct investment; privatisation; deregulation; secure 
property rights (Williamson 2000: 252). Concretely, these policies took 
the form of local currency devaluation, a strict budget policy, public sec-
tor privatisation, interest rates increase and a banking system reform. 
Conditionality, which will be thoroughly studied in the following 
chapter, became a significant tool to promote a specific economic ideol-
ogy as the Bank’s power to withhold aid became the fundamental in-
strument to induce governments to liberalise their economies (Boas and 
McNeill 2003: 51). While conditionality in itself was not new, the scale 
and the depth of the SAPs did represent a significant benchmark. For 
Boas and McNeill, this broadening of the scope of conditionalities at-
tached to loans took place in a process which involved three compo-
nents: as they switched to programme lending, Bank loans were no 
longer given for the purpose of conducting a certain development pro-
ject, but as a general support for a balance-of-payments deficit to facili-
tate imports. Furthermore, it not only combined programme lending with 
requirements for policy change, it also broadened these conditions from 
the sectoral or subsectoral to the national macroeconomic level (Boas 
and McNeill 2003: 51). 
At the turn of the 1990s, the end of the Cold War came to further rein-
force the Bank’s conditionality model. While the Cold War ‘made it impos-
sible to investigate your allies’, argued Alan Gelb, Director of the Devel-
opment Policy at the World Bank, the end of the Cold War solidly 
positioned the governance agenda (Interview September 18, 2006). For 
Mallaby, the end of the Cold War ‘made it easy to be pure [as finally, the] 
lessons of structural adjustment and the logic of geopolitics converged’ 
(2004: 96). As countries could no longer call on the now defunct Soviet 
Union to receive aid, donor countries started to acknowledge the govern-
ance predicament of many developing countries and to push further the 
market liberalisation agenda. The 1990s was indeed a period of high hopes 
in development as aid was said to be finally free of its ideological bias. At 
last, it was argued, free markets would no longer be hampered by donors’ 
geo-political and economic bias with international aid.  
Over time, however, SAPs became a long-term, one-size-fits-all eco-
nomic restructuring programme, or as stated in the Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) report: ‘Two-year time 
frame for success turned into five-year, ten-year and, in most cases, two-
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decade projects without sustained economic development in sight’ 
(SAPRIN 2004: 2). This is mostly due to the fact that as the 1980s un-
folded, the World Bank was entangled into a reform process that turned 
out to be far more complex than first suggested by the neo-classical eco-
nomic models feeding the SAPs. 
The Bank and Civil Society: the Battle for the Voice of the Poor  
From 1986 onwards, the rising poverty indicators and the environmental 
consequences associated with the Bank’s projects were publicly de-
nounced by a range of strong and newly organised international civil so-
ciety organisations. President Wolfensohn indeed inherited this growing 
nightmare from his predecessors15. The shift to neo-liberal orthodoxy 
was initiated by Tom Clausen16 who had dissociated the Bank from 
McNamara’s antipoverty narrative when he took the reins of the Bank in 
1981, suggesting that it was distracting the Bank from its economic mis-
sion. While McNamara’s legacy (1968-1981) remains controversial for its 
clear anti-communist objectives, the presidency clearly reoriented the 
Bank’s main narrative towards the purpose of poverty reduction. While 
throughout the 1970s the Bank had been arguing for ‘Redistribution with 
Growth’, the 1980s new mantra was ‘Adjustment with growth’ meaning 
that economic balance and stability would be the mandatory step to ob-
tain sustainable development (Sarrasin 1999: 9). A decade later, this shift 
according to Mallaby: ‘made it all too easy to paint [the World Bank] as 
heartless’ (2004: 46). By the time Barber Conable (President of the Bank 
from 1986 to 1991) tried to shift gears, the Bank had become widely per-
ceived as an inhumane and technocratic institution: 
The image of the Worlds Bank economist flying first class from Washing-
ton to some third-world capital and handing out cash to a corrupt strong-
man became engraved in the public mind: structural adjustment came to 
be seen as a nefarious pact between bureaucrat and autocrat (Mallaby 
2004: 47). 
The core stated argument emerging from these international criti-
cisms was that beyond the Bank’s discursive shifts, such as the an-
nouncement by President Lewis that for now on: ‘poverty reduction is 
the Bank’s overarching objective’, the Bank did not, in fact, tackle the 
pressing issue of poverty. The debate over the negative impacts of SAPs 
was galvanised by the publication of ‘Adjustment with a Human Face’ in 
1987, a UNICEF study of ten country case studies that illustrated the 
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severity of the debt crisis and the ill-effects of economic adjustment on 
vulnerable groups (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart 1987), a campaign which, 
according to Mosley, Harrigan and Toye: ‘[…] made a considerable im-
pact to changing policy-makers’ positions as well as their rhetoric’ (1995: 
xxi). The expression of ‘Adjustment with a Human Face’ suggested a 
strategy that would combine the promotion of economic growth, the 
protection of the vulnerable and macro-economic adjustment (Cornia, 
Jolly and Stewart 1987). Amidst the 1990s, international coalitions of 
civil society organisations multiplied their efforts and embarked on a 
global campaign against the ‘social costs’ of structural adjustment pro-
grammes. Campaigns such as Fifty Years is Enough17 and the multiplication 
of protests, notably during the Bank and the IMF joint annual meetings 
were now front-page news. 
This indeed led to a greater debate over the negative impact of the IFI 
standard policy package on the most vulnerable: privatisation rimed with 
layoffs and pay cuts, promotion of exports often disrupted domestic 
production, trade liberalisation exacerbated unemployment while cuts in 
government spending and the introduction of user fees decreased poor 
people’s access to water, health and education services. Over the years, 
case studies establishing a direct correlation between poverty and ad-
justment policies multiplied. For example, rural poverty in Kenya, Ma-
lawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Ghana – countries ‘intensively adjusting’ – 
increased from 56.6% in 1965 to 62.4% in 1988 and in countries such as 
Gambia, Mali, and Gabon the index of rural poverty increased from 
45.1% in 1965 to 60.7% in 1988 (Ali 2002). As summarised by SAPRIN: 
For the dozens of countries that have travelled down the adjustment road, 
the problem is not that the reform process has failed to generate economic 
benefits. It is that these benefits have tended to be concentrated in rela-
tively few hands, both domestic and foreign, while millions of other peo-
ple have increasingly been deprived of the resources and opportunities 
they require to move out of poverty (2004: 220) 
The Bank does acknowledge the rise of poverty during the SAPs era 
(World Bank 2001: 4). In its 1999 Annual Review report, the Operation 
Evaluation Department (OED)18 observes that per capita income fell 
during 1985-95 by 1.4 percent a year in low-income countries (excluding 
China and India) and the number of poor people living on less than 
US$1 a day rose from 1197 million in 1987 to 1,214 million in 1998 
(1999: xi). The report further concludes that ‘excluding China, there are 
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100 million more poor people in developing countries than a decade ago’ 
(OED 1999: 1). 
One might argue here that growth rates in Latin America and Africa 
in the last decade have been higher than in the 1980s and as such, it 
could be attributed to SAPs. However, as pointed out by Woo: ‘[…] 
even if the Washington Consensus were the reason for the improvement 
in African and Latin American growth, one could be content with the 
Washington Consensus prescriptions only if one had dismally low expec-
tations’ (cited in Teunissen and Akkerman 2004: 12). The author makes a 
compelling point as the Sub-Saharan growth rates during the 1990-2001 
were of -0.1 percent and Latin America’s were 1.5 percent. 
In the early 1990s, as international criticism intensified and street riots 
disturbed large international meetings of the Bank and the IMF, the 
Bank started to acknowledge the existing link between SAPs and poverty. 
In order to address some of the main criticisms it was facing, the Bank 
made structural and institutional changes with longer-term funds aimed 
at lessening the immediate impacts of the reform on poverty (SAPRIN 
2004: 2). In a review of the evolution of Social development policy at the 
Bank, Gloria Davis, who was the Director of the Social Development Net-
work at the Bank from 1997 to 2000, confirms that the Bank of the mid-
1990s was feeling quite pressured by outside critics to instigate changes 
toward a social agenda: 
In response to external criticism of the environmental and social impacts 
of large scale infrastructure projects, and to mounting concerns that top-
down growth was not reaching the poor, internal organizational structures 
emerged to deal with these issues, and there was a significant increase in 
the work on methods and tools to identify social issues, to bring people’s 
perspectives into projects, and to harness their energy for more effective 
development. Many of the distinctive features of a “social development 
approach” were also evident. Of particular importance was the interest in 
mitigating adverse social impacts, including poor and disadvantaged 
groups in development operations, and in understanding different cultures 
and contexts in order to tailor interventions to diverse environments. With 
all this complexity also came a preference for listening to people and facili-
tating their choices and decisions, rather than advocating particular devel-
opment outcomes (Davis 2004: 11) 
Interestingly, the Bank has published no less than 24 relevant reviews 
on poverty issues and completed 22 poverty-assessment reports on Sub-
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Saharan countries up to August 1995 (Ali 2002). As a result of the Bank’s 
Wapenhans Report (1993), steps toward addressing the critics’ main con-
cerns were officially taken19, including the creation of an inspection panel 
to investigate claims against the Bank. However, criticism increased, 
reaching another peak in 1994 at the Annual Meetings in Madrid. As the 
years went by, it became evident that the World Bank was trying to keep 
up with international criticism. As observed by Peet, the World Devel-
opment Report Attacking Poverty (2001a): ‘[…] also reflects this struggle 
over image and substance outside and within the Bank’ (Peet 2003: 132). 
As stated by the World Bank: ‘As can be seen in Seattle, and April 2000 
World Bank-IMF Annual meeting in Washington, and a foreshadower 
Prague, much suspicion still exists on the part of certain well-organized 
members of civil society. This must be overcome’ (2000: 9).  
The crisis faced by the Bank – and the IMF – at the end of the 1990s 
was also a crisis of hubris. The policy package of the Washington Con-
sensus was obviously failing and yet, the major international financial 
institutions, notably the World Bank and the IMF seemed unable to 
abandon its central precepts. Structural adjustment policies gave the 
Bank an apparent aura of objectivity, which was undoubtedly concordant 
with its stated apolitical and technical norms. As underlined by Fine, La-
pavitsas and Pincus, in the three high decision circles represented by the 
Washington Consensus, the framework was perceived as the only possi-
ble avenue to pursue: 
To oppose the Washington consensus, as plenty did, both in theory and 
practice, was to demonstrate plain ignorance or, worse, obtuseness. And in 
many case, if the effortless intellectual superiority of Western-trained 
economists were not enough to persuade developing countries to wear the 
hair shirt, a simple lever was available to force them to do so: condition-
ality (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2003: xv). 
The Quest for Growth: the Orthodoxy, the East Asian Experience and 
the Rebel Within 
The main problem however, was that the Bank’s multiplying efforts 
would not yield the expected results: economic growth failed to material-
ise itself. Indeed the World Bank’s own OED observed that in 1992, out 
of 18 Sub-Saharan African countries, no less than 14 had experienced a 
fall in investment rates during adjustment. The conclusions of the 
Wapenhans Report, a confidential study evaluating projects financed by the 
 Chapter 2 60 
World Bank commissioned in 1992 by the Bank’s vice-president, were 
revealing. The report reviewed 1300 projects in 113 countries and sug-
gested that 37.5 per cent of projects were unsatisfactory upon conclusion 
and only 22 per cent of financial commitments seemed to be in line with 
Bank directives (World Bank 1992). Less than 20 per cent of adjustment-
related technical assistance loans were substantially effective, and 15 per 
cent had only a negligible impact (OED 1992 cited in Peet 2003: 129).  
By 1995, eighty-eight countries had embarked on Bank funded ad-
justment programmes and, reports Caufield, not a single one had kept to 
the Bank’s original timetable of completing adjustment in three to five 
years (Caufield 1997: 149). More recently, an OED report stated that less 
than half the Bank’s projects in the fiscal year of 1998-1999 had the po-
tential to achieve sustainable results, a performance that would inscribe 
itself in the statistical trend of the entire decade (OED 1999: 7):  
The fact of growth and poverty in the 28 countries [studied] between 1991 
and 1997 are sobering […]. These findings confirm the view underlying 
the CDF: that the battle against poverty is being lost and that business as 
usual will not accomplish the objectives of the development community 
(OED 1999: 17). 
The US congress commission on the IMF and the World Bank effi-
ciency in 2000 did little for the status of the institution. In this respect, 
the Meltzer Report estimated that 65 to 70% of the Bank’s projects in 
poorer countries were dismal failures (Meltzer 2000). 
Beyond the statistics of failed growth and the multiplication of condi-
tionality, the East Asian financial crisis did a lot to rattle the Washington 
Consensus. The East Asian experience presented quite the conundrum 
for neo-liberal policy-makers. While the economic miracle may not have 
been the product of the orthodoxy, the mismanagement of the Asian 
financial crisis – notably by the IMF – went a long way to discredit the 
Washington Consensus. As argued by Jayasuriya and Rosser (2001), the 
orthodoxy was suddenly caught between blaming cronyism and defend-
ing the regimes it had largely created. The crisis sparked a fundamental 
debate within and outside the orthodoxy20, leading to the call for the 
PWC, as further analysed in the following chapter. Furthermore, amidst 
such paradoxes, the former communist countries transitioning to market 
oriented-economies were to experience a more difficult ride than ex-
pected. 
These crises led to a reconsideration of the role of the state in devel-
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opment and a rejection of so-called market fundamentalism. Joseph 
Stiglitz has undeniably been at the forefront of the criticism of the neo-
liberal framework. Much of his ammunition against the Washington 
Consensus was focused on the circumstances of the East Asian miracle, 
which contrasted with the systematic failure of the African continent to 
spur economic growth – a continent that ironically, was following the 
orthodox prescriptions of the Washington Consensus:  
The observation of the successful, some even say miraculous, East Asian 
development was one of the motivations for moving beyond the Washing-
ton Consensus. After all, here was a regional cluster of countries that had 
not closely followed the Washington Consensus prescriptions but had 
somehow managed the most successful development in history (Stiglitz 
1998a: 1). 
While East Asian countries did follow some of the prescriptions of 
the Washington Consensus, such as low inflation and fiscal prudence, 
they also deviated from the orthodoxy, especially in regards to the finan-
cial sector (Stiglitz 1998a: 1). If the East Asian economic crisis, which 
struck in 1997, has led some ‘ideologues’ to suggest that the roots of the 
crisis were to be found in the system of active state intervention (Stiglitz 
1998a: 2), Stiglitz argues that the crisis should by no means be seen as a 
refutation of the East Asian miracle21 (1998a: 2): 
We are unjustifiably treating the occurrence of a crisis as compelling evi-
dence of a fundamentally malfunctioning economy. No economy since the 
beginning of capitalism has escaped fluctuations. The historical record, in 
fact, shows that East Asia has had less such fluctuations than other parts 
of the world – hardly evidence of a striking vulnerability in the economies. 
In the last three decades, Indonesia and Thailand have not had a single 
year of negative growth, and Korea and Malaysia have only had one each. 
In contrast, the United States and United Kingdom have had 6 years each 
of negative growth over the same period (Stiglitz 1998b: 25). 
In fact, highlighting the debacle following the IMF attempts to diffuse 
the crisis22, Stiglitz suggested that the East Asian experience demon-
strates the importance of the role of the state: ‘the heart of the current 
problem in most cases is not that government has done too much, but 
that it has done too little’ (1998a: 2)23. The intricate experience of transi-
tional countries from the former communist block has also demon-
strated such need (Stiglitz 2001: 519). Stiglitz argues that not only was 
the Washington Consensus insufficient in many aspects – such as mac-
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roeconomic stabilisation, financial reform, liberalised trade, and privatisa-
tion – it failed to tackle vital questions such as what the government 
should do and how it can do what it does more effectively (1998a: 2). As 
argued and analysed in detail in the next chapter, Stiglitz’s analysis of the 
South East Asian experience became a corner stone of the framework 
now commonly known as the PWC. In this respect, it clearly had a 
strong theoretical influence on the Bank’s IDM. From 1997 on, the Bank 
indeed rehabilitated the idea of the state as a necessary and important 
element of development – as illustrated by the topic of the Bank’s 1997 
World Development Report The State in a Changing World. 
2.2 The Proposal for Change: the Bank’s Proposal for a 
New Development Paradigm 
In light of these numerous challenges – internal and external – faced by 
the Bank in the late 1990s, the following section maps the main changes 
proposed by the Bank under the Wolfensohn presidency. Such proposed 
changes, which were presented as a radical change from former prac-
tices, are important to examine since they remain the very basis of the 
official narrative of the new aid architecture and its aid allocation 
mechanisms. The objective of this section is thus to describe what the 
Bank says it has been doing and why it is doing it, a depiction which will 
be challenged in the following chapters. 
2.2.1 A President With a Mission 
In 2005, in the foreword to a book on the Wolfensohn era at the World 
Bank, Bill Clinton, a former President of the United States, was asked to 
reflect upon the Wolfensohn legacy:  
In early 1995 I had to nominate a new president of the World Bank at a 
time when the institution faced unprecedented challenges. […] The new 
President had to meet the challenge of leading development assistance ef-
forts in the post-Cold War era. Jim Wolfensohn embraced it creatively, 
vigorously, and effectively.  
 Looking back over the many discussions I have had with Jim, one con-
stant has been his passion for unleashing the tremendous potential of the 
World Bank to serve the world’s poorest people. As President of the 
World Bank he has challenged the notion of what could be done and fo-
cused his leadership on what should be done. This has led to a revolution 
in how the Bank does business. He has made poverty reduction the raison 
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d’être of the Bank, put the client at the driver’s seat, and focused the insti-
tution on results. […] Jim’s dream of a world free of poverty sparked a 
ripple of hope which has, in ten short years, set in motion a current that is 
sweeping across the world offering hope to the world’s poorest people 
(Clinton cited in Kagia 2005: iii). 
 Echoing Clinton’s praise, the Bank’s website further emphasises the 
drastic changes that took place within the institution during Wolfen-
sohn’s presidency: ‘[…] James D. Wolfensohn focused the spotlight back 
on the institution's true purpose – ‘fighting global poverty and helping 
the world's poor forge better lives’ (World Bank 2008d).  
The first building block of this official shift in the Bank’s narrative 
under the Wolfensohn presidency took place in 1997. In his speech dur-
ing an annual meeting – ‘The Challenge of Inclusion’ (Wolfensohn 1997) 
– Wolfensohn insisted on the importance of forging greater partnerships 
with development actors in order to enhance development effectiveness. 
It is in the following annual speech however that the President first 
called for an ‘integrated’ approach to development assistance, in which 
the country itself would articulate its development strategy (Wolfensohn 
1998). Wolfensohn’s framework was outlined in detail in a discussion 
memo circulated within the Bank in January 1999 entitled ‘A Proposal 
for a CDF’: 
When I think of a development framework for a country and for re-
gions, I think of a balance sheet with two sides. On the left is the macro-
economic presentation […]. 
 There is however, a clear need for a second side which reflects more 
adequately an analytical framework that presents the structural, social, 
and human aspects. It must go beyond the familiar statistics of infant 
and maternal mortality, unemployment and children in school, to address 
fundamental long-term issues of the structure, scope and substance of 
societal development.  
 […] Perhaps we could speak of two sides of a coin, or two parts of a 
duet. What is key is that the two parts, namely macroeconomic aspects 
on the one side and the social, structural and human on the other, must 
be considered together (Wolfensohn 1999a: 4-5). 
Wolfensohn then proceeded to propose a matrix in which different 
development actors – the ‘players of the development business’ – would 
be coordinating their efforts in a new partnership: the governments, mul-
tilateral and bilateral agencies, civil society in all its forms, private sector, 
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domestic and foreign (Wolfensohn 1999a: 21-22). The vertical axis of the 
matrix was correlated to fourteen subjects which encompassed ‘the pre-
requisites for sustainable growth and poverty alleviation’24. 
In this respect, the CDF proposal was expected to reconcile the mac-
roeconomic imperatives with structural, social and human needs (Wolf-
ensohn 1999a). It is now defined as a management tool, theorising what 
is described as an emerging consensus among the major donors on the 
need for a new stakeholder partnership. More specifically, the model is 
officially drawing on lessons learned from the DAC-OECD 1996 ‘New 
Partnership’ and from the convergence of views between the United Na-
tions, some non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other mem-
bers of the international development community. 
2.2.2 Implementing Wolfensohn’s Vision: the Pillars of the 
Reform 
In March 2000, less than a year after instating the CDF, the Bank 
launched the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), which were presented 
as the embodiment of the CDF philosophy. Instigated during the annual 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) joint meeting of 
September 1999, PRS became a precondition for all the Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPC) to access any debt relief25 or concessional 
loan. This general strategy must be summarised in a Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP), which covers a three-year period. The objectives 
are to orient the funds freed from debt relief toward poverty reduction. 
Crucially, the PRS are to provide the framework to achieve the MDG26.  
According to the Bank, it was the structural adjustment inefficiencies 
– as enumerated in Table 2.1 – and the persistence of world poverty that 
led Wolfensohn to state that if fifty years of aid efforts had indeed led to 
better living conditions, great efforts remained to be done in order to 
fight poverty. The Bank here does acknowledge the urgent need for aid 
to become more efficient (OED 1999: 2).  
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Table 2.1 
From One Aid Paradigm to the Other at the World Bank 
SAPs CDF 
 Pervasive government failures 
 Market-led development 
 Short-term adjustments 
 Incentive-led development  
 Economists & financial experts 
dominant 
 Liberalisation & privatisation 
 Donors determine resource envelope 
 Donors impose policies 
 Donor-driven monitoring of policy  
 Situation-dependent failures 
 Country-led development through 
partnerships 
 Long-term vision 
 Investment, incentives, institutions 
viewed jointly 
 Multidisciplinary approach 
 Policy to match state capability 
 Country drives aid coordination  
 Donors provide advises to empower 
stakeholders 
 Participatory monitoring & evaluation  
Source: Adapted from OED 1999: 4. 
 
In light of such deficiencies in the old development model, Wolfen-
sohn’s proposal rests on four interlinked pillars which are expected to 
mend the past failures: a holistic approach to development, a stronger 
partnership between donors and local governments, a local ownership 
of development initiatives and a result-based approach, as explored in 
details below. 
A Holistic and Long Term Approach 
With the adoption of the CDF – and this is indeed a step away from the 
SAP model – the Bank acknowledges that the pursuit of economic 
growth is no longer sufficient in itself. The Bank is indeed recognising 
that the sole pursuit of economic growth may have harmful effects on 
the populations of countries under reform (World Bank 2008c: 79). The 
CDF thus recognises that reforms should be framed within a long-term 
holistic approach. This was nothing less than the recognition of the 
complexity and the interdependency of all development facets: social, 
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structural, human, governance, environmental, macroeconomic and fi-
nancial. 
It was also recognised that under the former model, aid efforts were 
short term oriented. Factors such as project approach, financial crisis, 
political instability linked to electoral cycles, or the planning system of 
the donors, were well known obstructions to the long-term planning 
process.  
The Call for a New Partnership 
According to the Bank, a fundamental problem with the structural ad-
justment model was its failure to acknowledge the importance of local 
ownership of the reforms. The institution states that the former model 
would have failed in part because donors clung to resource envelope im-
posed policies and also drove the monitoring process (OED 1999: 4). As 
such, the model’s second pillar calls for a ‘partnership’, which is expected 
to tackle this predicament, as it would guide all development actors to-
ward a greater efficiency in poverty reduction. 
Torn between the numerous bilateral projects, the public sector of 
countries under reform often proved incapable of managing and coordi-
nating the projects in an effective way. Such outcomes suggested the ne-
cessity to rethink the partnership between donors and local govern-
ments. Here, the new framework proposed to harmonise all aid practices 
by forging strategic alliances with donors in order to reach a consensus 
on the appropriate political changes and the capacity building required by 
the country. All donors would therefore link their respective manage-
ment plans to the national strategy of the developing country. But this 
conclusion also implies that in order to foster genuine ownership, donors 
have to rethink ‘conditionality’. Too often perceived as an instrument for 
donors to impose their own objectives on recalcitrant governments, 
conditionality was now to be used as a mere indicator of a partnership 
towards the realisation of agreed development objectives (OED 1999: 
26). Such partnership suggests a new framework, where conditionalities 
are ‘flexible’ rather than ‘coercive’. Crucially, aid programmes are ex-
pected to be based on the development plan proposed by the beneficiary 
government and the conditional character of this aid would merely be 
used to define the parameters of the foreign support. 
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The Ownership Imperative 
The new model’s third pillar is the need for a local ownership of devel-
opment initiatives or, as stated by Wolfensohn, to put the country back 
‘in the driver’s seat’ (1999a: 9). After twenty years of structural adjust-
ment, the Bank now recognises that national governments of countries 
under reform are the most legitimate actors to define a national devel-
opment policy and poverty reduction programmes: ‘Projects have 
tended to perform poorly when they were prepared by outsiders, did not 
engage stakeholders and beneficiaries, exceeded local implementation 
capacity, and did not engender borrower commitment’ (OED 1999: 3). 
Furthermore, ownership of development strategies would be imperative 
to ensure reform sustainability. The new framework therefore advocates 
a global strategy and the management of development objectives by the 
national government itself. In the elaboration of this strategy, govern-
ments would try to coordinate the interventions of the internal and ex-
ternal actors towards common objectives. This implies that govern-
ments would have to construct an internal consensus on the strategies to 
be pursued by the country together with political structures, civil society 
and the private sector. From this consensus, priorities would be defined 
by the state, in collaboration with donors, in order to attain develop-
ment objectives on a long-term basis. 
A Result Base Approach 
Finally, the new aid framework states that development efforts must 
yield results. According to the Bank, aid fragmentation as well as the lack 
of consultation between development actors, have undermined the ca-
pacity of local government to establish a sustainable development strat-
egy. As such, donors are rethinking the traditional project approach. On 
the one hand, donors deplore the lack of consultation between the dif-
ferent actors, which leads to a waste of resources. Furthermore, some-
times more than two years elapse between the identification and the im-
plementation of a project causing donors to conclude that budgets and 
time frames linked to the project approach are often disproportionate. 
On the other hand, governments also question the project approach as it 
often excludes them from the process altogether. The new aid model 
thus advocates a more harmonious development strategy that would an-
swer to the global needs of the country as a whole, such as the Sector 
wide approach’ (SWAp).  
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Approved by the IMF, the G-7 and the OECD and now imple-
mented by most bilateral donors, PRSPs are currently on the agendas of 
about seventy low-income countries around the world, as listed in Table 
2.2.  
Table 2.2 
Countries Engaged in a PRS Process 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, DRC 
Congo, Republic of 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Djibouti  
Dominica 
Ethiopia 
The Gambia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao P.D.R. 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Macedonia, FYR 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Senegal 
Serbia & Montenegro 
Sierra Leone 
Sri Lanka 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Timor-Leste 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Source: List on the World Bank website. Available at http://go.worldbank.org/FXXJK3VEW0 
(accessed July 5, 2007) 
 
The Wolfensohn presidency was, at least officially, marked by impor-
tant transformations within the traditional aid package, both in its con-
tent and in its delivery schemes. Such changes at the Bank, under the 
Wolfensohn presidency, are referred to within the greater thesis as the 
Integrated Development Model (IDM)27.  
Conclusion 
Sixty-five countries28 and an estimated one billion and a half people are 
involved in the new aid model proposed by Wolfensohn. Officially, such 
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an agenda would be based on partnership, ownership and participation 
and would acknowledge that development is much more than pure mac-
roeconomics. Suddenly, we saw the Bank’s narrative shift towards pov-
erty reduction and the institution multiply the outreach to civil society 
movements. There is no doubt that the Wolfensohn era has changed the 
Bank. 
However, beyond the heart-warming objective of reaching the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, the 1990s had plunged the Bank into a 
legitimacy crisis. Ironically, the model was being criticised both from 
within and from outside. While the Bank’s technocratic and apolitical 
culture clearly gives it its own rational, the end of the century forced the 
institution to embrace a change – the IDM. The failure of conditionality, 
the tumbling economies of countries under reform, the poverty pre-
dicament and the apparition of a stronger, more organised international 
critic, had plunged the Bank into a legitimacy crisis it could no longer 
ignore.  
While this review has addressed the historical roots of the current 
transformation of the Bank towards ‘a new way to do business’, the con-
tent of the IDM remains to be studied. In other words, if we now under-
stand why the Bank was forced to change, the actual solution proposed by 
the Bank to address the escalating setbacks of the Washington Consen-
sus remains to be analysed. It is indeed still not clear if the IDM will be 
able to mend the challenges that the Bank was facing at the turn of the 
century or whether it will be overturned by various vested interests. 
As studied in the next chapter, the IDM needs to be analysed in light 
of its theoretical framework in order to challenge its main narrative cen-
tred on poverty reduction and participatory objectives. Building on the 
different historical international elements that led the Bank to its legiti-
macy crisis at the end of the 1990s, as presented in this chapter, it will be 
argued that these events and the Bank’s response, are symptoms of a 
greater crisis: the crisis of the neo-liberal model. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Adapted from IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article I ‘Purposes’. 
2 On the subject, see Miller-Adams 1999; Harrison 2004, 2006; Mallaby 2004. 
3 The votes include a specified number of membership votes (which is the 
same for all members) and additional votes based on the number of shares of the 
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stock held. The main complaints emerging from countries under reform on such 
practices is that on the one hand, it fails to acknowledge the size of populations 
and economies of members and on the other hand, it seriously misrepresents 
borrowing countries – which are the borrowers and thus the ones mainly affected 
by the decisions. 
 The shareholders are represented by a Board of Governors, which usually are 
member countries’ ministers of finance or of development. They meet once a 
year at the Annual Meeting of the World Bank Group and the IMF. As the gov-
ernors only meet annually, they delegate specific duties to the Executive directors. 
4 This is indeed a good point for no one will deny the over arching influence 
of the US within the IFI. This is argued by Wade (2001b) who lists the different 
tools of influence used by the US on the Bank. Wade further points out that 
since the US Congress, alone among member legislatures, has to approve not 
only the tri-annual pledges to the Agency but also the annual release of pledged 
funds, there are unique opportunities for American legislators and their friends 
to impose conditions of their own. In addition, it is American thinking about 
the roles of governments and markets that sets the conceptual centre of gravity 
for World Bank debates, rather than that of Europe, Japan or the developing 
countries. The author goes on and points out that the vast majority of Bank 
economists, whatever their nationalities, have a postgraduate qualification from 
a North American university (See Wade 2001b: 127). 
5 For a detailed debate on the subject see Wade’s article ‘Making the World De-
velopment Report 2000: Attacking Poverty’ (2001a). 
6 The International advocacy NGO Third World Network concludes: ‘To many, 
the first draft of the report raised uncomfortable questions about the impact of 
adjustment and globalisation on the poor, questions which suggested that eco-
nomic liberalisation - long considered by both the Bank and the IMF as an indis-
pensable to restoring growth and reducing poverty - may have devastating effects 
on the most vulnerable sectors’ (Lobe 2000). 
7 Interestingly, according to World Bank insiders cited in The Nation, Summers 
would have reportedly pressured Wolfensohn to let Stiglitz go if he wanted an-
other term at the presidency of the World Bank (Henwood 2000). 
8 Summers, who served as Chief Economist of the World Bank from 1991 to 
1993, would have re-written the globalisation sections of the WDR. On the sub-
ject, also see Mosley (2001). 
9 See for example Easterly 2002; Mallaby 2004; Miller-Adams 1999; Wade 1996, 
2001a, 2001b. 
10 Wade argues that: ‘The Organization's few non-economist social scientists 
are employed on marginal issues like resettlement and participation, like an-
thropologists by colonial administrations before them’ (Wade 1996: 30). 
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11 Geo-political interests have always influenced the Bank’s policies. As such, 
the Bank’s first policies towards ‘under-developed’ countries were influenced by 
the two great questions of the time: how to ensure that the ex-colonies would 
not follow the communist path and how these countries would copy the West-
ern development model in order to reach development. Coincidently, the first 
aid model espoused by the World Bank – the planning paradigm – significantly 
tapped into Walt W. Rostow’s modernisation theory. It indeed conveniently 
combined clear anti-communist objectives with a straightforward plan for any 
stagnating countries to reach economic maturity – here understood as a mass-
consumption society (Rostow 1960). This was quite appealing to governments 
and aid practitioners and gave tremendous power to ‘western experts’ here per-
ceived as both guides and advisers to so-called ‘less-developed’ countries (Toye 
1987: 11). Throughout the period, the Bank’s loans closely followed the model, 
which viewed developing countries’ institutions as being too poorly equipped 
to face the developed world infusion of capital, technology and knowledge 
(Goldman 2005: 14). As such, loans were mainly directed to providing physical 
infrastructure as engine of economic growth.  
 Critics of modernisation theory argued that the international system, far 
from being a guarantor of Southern countries’ prosperity, actually constrained it 
in a state of dependency or, as coined by Andre Gunder Frank a processes 
characterised by ‘the development of underdevelopment’. The Neo-Marxists 
and Dependentista movement could indeed point to the ongoing failure of 
growth in countries with close economic ties to the metropolitan economies 
and cast doubt on orthodox economic solutions based on market liberalisation 
via the systematic promotion of exports. Reaching its apogee in the 1960-70s, 
structuralist proposals led to a wave of protectionism and attempts to substitute 
imports. 
12 Let us not forget the role of the Bank itself in enticing developing countries 
to borrow as well as the institution key position to encourage private and public 
lenders to loan more, especially during the McNamara presidency. According to 
Caufield, from less than a billion US$ in 1968, the McNamara presidency 
brought the Bank’s loan to 12 billion US$ in 1981, totalling 77 billion US$ of 
loans in thirteen years (Caufield 1997: 104). 
13 McNamara, the President of the Bank at that time, tapped the sudden sur-
feit of capital flowing from the surges in oil prices and expanded the Bank’s 
projects, a move that: ‘[...] transform[ed] the institution into a global player’ 
(Goldman 2005: 15). 
14 As observed in the SAPRIN report, the magnitude of the debt particularly 
in Latin America was also the result of governments’ decisions to take: ‘on the 
added responsibility of repaying not only their own debts but also those of pri-
vate companies, including many loans that they had not guaranteed’ (SAPRIN 
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2004: 1). 
15 In The World’s Banker, Mallaby (2004) successfully depicts the tensions within 
the Bank to address the tarnishing image of the Bank’s work. 
16 Clausen was president at the Bank from 1981 to 1986. 
17 Founded in 1994, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of 
the World Bank and IMF, 50 Years Is Enough is a U.S. Network for Global Eco-
nomic Justice, a coalition of over 200 U.S. grassroots, women's, solidarity, faith-
based, policy, social- and economic-justice, youth, labor and development organi-
zations dedicated to the profound transformation of the World Bank and the 
IMF. Available at http://www.50years.org 
18 The OED is the independent branch of the World Bank which is now called 
the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). 
19 The key recommendations of the Wapenhans Report were: 1) that portfolio 
management requires more sustained management attention; 2) that problem 
projects should be addressed more expeditiously; 3) that the quality of projects 
entering the portfolio must be improved; 4) that Bank staff must provide sup-
port for projects without relieving the borrower of responsibility; 5) that 
OED’s evaluation role should continue, and the Project Completion Reports 
should be replaced by Implementation Completion Reports; 6) The Bank’s cul-
tures should be become more attuned to on-the-ground net benefits as the 
measure of success rather than loan approvals (World Bank 2005: 222). 
20 See the Special Edition of the Cambridge Journal of Economics on the 
Asian Financial Crisis (1998, No. 22, Vol. 6). For a review of the orthodox 
standpoint, see East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One? (Mcleod 
and Garnaut 1998). 
21 ‘No temporary financial turmoil can or should detract from these achieve-
ments, which include not only large increases in per capita GDP, but also ex-
tended life spans, widespread education, and dramatically reduced poverty’ 
(Stiglitz 1998a: 2). 
22 Stiglitz has been quite vocal on the subject and suggests that: ‘The more dog-
matic versions of the Washington Consensus does not provide the right frame-
work for understanding both the success of the East Asian economies and their 
current troubles. Responses to East Asia's crisis grounded in this view of the 
world are likely to be, at best, badly flawed, an at worst, counterproductive’ 
(Stiglitz 1998a). See also Stiglitz (2001). 
23 For Stiglitz extensive analysis of the East Asian crisis, see ‘Some Lessons from 
the East Asian Miracle’ (1996). 
24 These are: Good and Clean Governance; Justice System; Financial System; 
Social Safety Net and Social Programs; Education and Knowledge Institutions; 
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Health and Population; Water and Sewerage; Energy; Roads Transportation 
and Tele-communications; Environmental and Cultural Issues; Rural Strategy; 
Urban Strategy; Private Sector Strategy and Country Specific issues. 
25 A HIPC by definition faces ‘an unsustainable debt situation’ after the full 
application of traditional debt relief mechanisms (Naples terms under the 
Paris Club agreement). According to the World Bank, a country's debt level 
is considered unsustainable, ‘if the country's debt-to-export levels are above 
a fixed ratio of 150%; or if the country has a very open economy and exclu-
sive reliance on external indicators may not adequately reflect the fiscal bur-
den of external debt, the debt-to-government revenues are above 250%’. See 
‘The Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative’ on the World 
Bank’s website. Available at http://go.worldbank.org/85B908KVE0 (ac-
cessed March 2008) 
26 The MDG were adopted at the 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit as 
a tool by which the international community would measure progress on key 
dimensions of development. Officially, the MDG represent a global ‘partner-
ship’ to reduce extreme poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets - 
with a deadline of 2015. The MDG are: to eradicate extreme poverty and hun-
ger, to achieve universal primary education; to promote gender equality and 
empower women; to reduce child mortality; to improve maternal health; to 
combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustain-
ability; and to develop a global partnership for development. Available at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals 
27 Such a term readily encompasses both the Bank’s new narrative and the new 
aid allocation mechanisms – such as the CDF and the PRSP. Within this thesis, 
we use the terms IDM, new aid paradigm, new aid model and new aid architecture in an 
interchanging way. 
28 As of 2007. 
  
3 
The New Institutional Economics and 
the Politics of the Post-Washington 
Consensus 
 
 
History may not repeat itself, but sometimes it rhymes. 
(Mark Twain) 
 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Second World War, the different conceptualisations 
of ‘development’ have been closely linked to theories of the state, to the 
problem of how governments should relate to markets, and to what the 
right degree of interventionism should be. While the 1960s and 1970s 
were defined by the central role of state planning within Keynesian poli-
cies, the disillusions with such forms of interventionist state gave way to 
market fundamentalism in the early 1980s and to the vision of the state 
as a clear obstacle to economic – and social – development.  
However, as explored in the previous chapter, the 1990s progressively 
saw a retreat from the structural adjustment model in its more extreme 
form. The East Asian experience was one factor that led to much soul-
searching amongst those who had previously advocated the strict imple-
mentation of the Washington Consensus. Not only was the highly suc-
cessful East Asian miracle the product of unorthodox policy, the follow-
ing Asian financial crisis also went a long way to discredit the 
Washington Consensus principles of unconstrained markets. Further-
more, and to the great dismay of the multilateral organisations, the diffi-
culties that former communist countries experienced in their transition 
to markets raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of market-based 
shock therapies as an effective prescription for change. 
These experiences gave momentum to new conceptualisations of the 
state as a facilitator of markets and to new ideas about the role of society 
in supporting market policies, now commonly packaged under the all-
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encompassing post-Washington Consensus (PWC). However, there re-
mains much confusion about the new consensus: who defined it, what it 
is and more importantly, what it actually does. Furthermore, a common 
misunderstanding about the aid reform – and more generally the PWC – 
is linked to the novelties that it actually brings forth. On the one hand, it 
remains grounded in the idea that market reforms are the way to achieve 
growth and prosperity. On the other hand, it encompasses a tactical shift 
in order to tackle the socio-political challenges that are produced by 
markets and sometimes obstruct market reforms. 
While the World Bank has been a key part of the PWC, the institu-
tion’s specific role in conceptualising, laying the foundations and actively 
promoting the PWC will be studied in the following chapter. In this 
chapter, the central claims of the PWC and its theoretical foundations 
are analysed. 
Stiglitz’s work has undeniably had a great influence on defining the 
PWC itself, and as such, a great deal of the analysis is focused on his 
work. Yet, the ‘Stiglitzian Post-Washington consensus’, as coined by Car-
roll (2007), fails to render a complete picture of the new aid agenda pro-
posed by the Bank and the ideas that sustained it. In fact, while the for-
mer Chief Economist did have an unmistakable influence in drawing the 
blueprints of the new aid framework, the reform has a range of wider 
influences from the greater academic stronghold of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE). 
This chapter investigates the theory behind what is now known as the 
PWC. It is crucial to clarify the confusion between narrative, assump-
tions and methods. As such, the clear dichotomy in the PWC between an 
emphasis on the regulatory state and a narrative revolving around par-
ticipation and social development is emphasised in this chapter. It aims 
to demonstrate how a focus on the pivotal role of institutions in eco-
nomic development involves the absence of the idea of power in the 
theoretical framework of the PWC. Such an exercise, it is proposed, will 
shed light on the political underpinning of the new consensus and allows 
us to re-locate its framework within the larger context of the consolida-
tion of neo-liberalism. The key point here will be to demonstrate that the 
PWC is about addressing the tensions of the Washington Consensus 
without actually challenging its fundamental assumptions and goals or un-
dermining crucial aspects of power. This is done by directly entering the 
realm of politics, pushing the reforms further into the political fabric of 
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society. It will therefore be argued that the PWC carries a political project 
which seeks to free the state from what is perceived as the ‘debilitating 
effects of political bargaining’ (Jayasuriya 2001: 1). 
This is a necessary step prior to reverting to our main object of study: 
the World Bank and its new aid allocation mechanism, which is the sub-
ject of the following chapters. 
3.1 Stiglitz’s Post-Washington Consensus and New 
Institutional Economics: Building the Case for the 
State 
In direct contradiction to the ideas that reigned over aid reform for two 
decades, Stiglitz argued that markets alone couldn’t bring forth economic 
development. In a series of lectures and papers, Stiglitz criticised ‘market 
fundamentalism’ at the core of the Washington Consensus and presented 
a new framework to replace it; popularly known as the PWC. By ending 
the dichotomy between state and market which prevailed for two dec-
ades, Stiglitz’s PWC emphasised the key role played by institutions while 
also shedding a new light on non-market actors. 
This focus on institutions has more fundamentally been the credo of 
New Institutional Economics and the work of authors such as George 
Akerlof, James Buchanan, Claude Menard, Douglass North, Gordon 
Tullock and Olivier Williamson. They seek to explain the history of insti-
tutions according to the assumptions of the neo-liberal economic theory 
(Hadiz 2004: 697). In other words, NIE addresses the gaps of neo-
classical economy by expanding its reach to social and legal dimensions 
of development. In this sense, ‘institutional’ deficiencies are described as 
the reason for the failure of structural adjustment reforms1. 
For Douglass North, the 1993 Nobel Prize winner for Economics, 
institutions are the rules ‘of the game of a society’ (North 1995: 23). In-
stitutions are here defined as formal legal rules, informal social norms 
that govern individual behaviour and structure social interactions. NIE’s 
given originality is to focus on transaction costs – the costs of making an 
economic exchange – and to postulate that institutions can minimise 
such costs. On the one hand, the school keeps in line with neo-classical 
economic assumptions of scarcity and hence competition; but on the 
other hand abandons instrumental rationality: ‘the assumption of neo-
classical economics that has made it an institution-free theory’ (North 
1995: 17). In so doing, NIE acknowledges that institutions are necessary; 
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that ideas and ideologies do matter, and that efficient markets – both 
economic and political – do not, in fact, characterise economies (North 
1995). This is derived from the recognition that information is imperfect 
and that human beings have a limited mental capacity to process this in-
formation. Such obstacles create the need for institutions to minimise 
the risks incurred by transacting on the market. 
The new public choice view of society and politics indicates that indi-
viduals are seeking their own interests and are prone to ‘rent-seeking’, 
which by definition – and as studied later in this section – undermines 
markets. Institutions therefore, are seen as necessary to constrain behav-
iour, to address the problems of transaction costs and ensure the collec-
tive interests of capital. While market fundamentalists saw the state as an 
obstacle to be removed, the new public choice school sees governments 
and state authority as necessary to protect the markets from the naturally 
predatory nature of politics. Crucially, public choice advocates see the 
state in terms of a technocratic instrument outside the irrationalities of 
politics. 
The problem is, of course, to determine where institutions come 
from. This sprang from Ronald Coase’s (1937) pioneer thesis on transac-
tion costs in which he asks ‘why a firm emerges at all in a specialised ex-
change economy’ (1937: 390). He argues that it is profitable to establish a 
firm in order to address the costs of using the price mechanism (1937: 
390). In fact, the author’s work was groundbreaking in suggesting that in 
the real world, the transaction for obtaining a given good does not corre-
late directly to the price of the good itself. Coase indeed observes that 
prices are affected by using the market as diverse transaction costs 
emerge – such as search and information costs, bargaining costs, policing 
and enforcement costs, etc. In other words, he argues that contrary to 
the beliefs of the classical orthodoxy, the price mechanism does not al-
ways ‘works itself’ out in the economic system (Coase 1937: 287). The 
author thus concludes that firms emerge to minimise these transaction 
costs. 
Douglas North (1997) states that institutions matter when it is costly 
to transact, and: ‘it is costly to transact’, states the author (1994: 360). 
Institutions form the incentive structure of a society, and the political 
and economic institutions, as a result, are the underlying determinants of 
economic performance2. There is here a distinction to be made between 
such institutions as the rules of the game and institutions as ‘organisa-
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tions’ which may be defined as an area of activity within which the mar-
ket does not coordinate the activities of the participants (such as gov-
ernments departments, state enterprises, banks, armies, etc. (Arkadie 
1990: 154-5). 
Deeply rooted in NIE, Stiglitz’s proposal for a PWC revolves around 
two fundamental problems: the efficiency of the market economy, and 
the appropriate relationship between the market and the government 
(Stiglitz 2001: 472). The solution would be two-fold: bringing the state 
back in and expanding development goals. 
In his paper presented on the tenth anniversary of the MITI Research 
Institute in 1998, Stiglitz dissects the successes and failures of the South 
East Asian model in order to provide a framework for re-examining the 
role of the state. Such a framework not only looks at what the govern-
ment should be doing, but also how it should do it, and perhaps most 
importantly, how these decisions are made (Stiglitz 1998b: 30). The an-
swer to these questions, argues Stiglitz, can be found in Information 
Economics. The author has long been arguing that information prob-
lems are central to understanding not only market economics but also 
political economy. In this respect, he refutes Adam Smith’s theory and 
argues that there is no such thing as perfect information: ‘[…] the reason 
that the hand may be invisible is that it is simply not there – or at least 
that if is there, it is palsied’ (Stiglitz 2001: 473). Stiglitz does challenge the 
main orthodoxy by suggesting that just as markets strive to overcome 
asymmetries of information, there is also a need to address these asym-
metries in political processes as well (2001: 474). This is in fact the sub-
ject for which he, along with George Akerlof and Michael Spencer, won 
the Nobel Prize for Economics, in 2001.  
Crucial to the PWC and the World Bank’s new aid agenda, Stiglitz 
concludes that as market failures are a general feature of any economy 
with imperfect information and incomplete markets – even more so in 
countries under reform – the state has to step in. Stiglitz does address 
the ‘rent-seeking’ argument at the core of New Political Economy 
(NPE). Indeed he concedes that the existence of imperfect information 
and incomplete market alone does: ‘not automatically mean that gov-
ernment intervention can improve upon matters’ (Stiglitz 1998b: 6).  
It is vital to note here that it was the NPE that fed the core frame-
work of the structural adjustment model. NPE is about the interactions 
of economics and politics or, in other words a neo-classical theory of 
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politics (Meier 1991: 5). It applies the same concepts and principles of 
neo-classical economy to market and political realms – i.e. the unit of 
analysis is the individual, which behaves rationally. NPE emerged out of 
the troubled waters of the late 1970s when economists, bewildered by 
what appeared to be developing countries’ irrational behaviour in regards 
to development economics, started tackling the issue of politics. NPE 
tried to develop a neo-classical economic theory of politics that would 
serve to explain what it saw as an ‘economically irrational policy’. This 
came to challenge the basic assumption within the ‘planning paradigm’ 
that the policy makers’ conception of public interest corresponded to the 
economic notion of maximisation. Looking back on the planning devel-
opment era Nicholas Stern, the Senior Vice President of Development 
Economics and Chief Economist of the World Bank, observes that: 
On the empirical side, evidence mounted that government failure was in-
deed important in the developing world. Central planning was undermined 
both by its colossal failures (white-elephant projects for which there 
turned out to be no demand) and by the smaller day-to-day disturbances 
and wastefulness that stemmed from the lack of price signals. And al-
though import substitution contributed to impressive growth in some 
countries, support for that approach waned as its costs in terms of rent-
seeking and difficulty competing in international markets became more 
and more apparent (Stern 2002: 4). 
The idea of ‘rent seeking’ was propelled as a porte-étandard to explain 
the ‘use of the state to maximise economic gains for specific self inter-
ests’ (Grindle 1991: 46). The term ‘predatory state’ was also coined, the 
latter describing a state seeking to maximise short term revenues and 
pursue a variety of forms of taxation that allow it to increase its wealth 
(Grindle 1991: 49). NPE argues that allocating rents to powerful groups 
is part of the art of governing. The shift toward this neo-liberal frame-
work appeared to explain why many developing states, with their expan-
sionist bureaucracies, corrupt leaders and oversized projects, failed to 
capitalise on development opportunities. At the Bank, this turn toward a 
fundamental ‘market only’ model was led by Anne Krueger, the World 
Bank’s Chief Economist at the time, who coincidently had coined devel-
oping government irrational behaviour as ‘rent-seeking’ (Krueger 1974).  
In this respect, structural adjustment reforms aimed for a minimalist 
state, which does not intervene in the economy – if only to set the rules 
of the social game and arbitrating disputes (Preston 1996: 253). Reforms 
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pushed by the Bank reflected the unshakeable idea that free markets 
alone would maximize welfare. As argued by Friedman (1962), free mar-
kets would be nothing less than a precondition for political freedom. Ta-
ble 3.1 gives an over-view of the main points respectively advocated by 
the planning and the structural adjustment paradigms. 
Table 3.1 
The World Bank’s Development Paradigms in Comparison 
Planning Paradigm Structural Adjustment Paradigm 
 Pervasive market failures 
 Government-led development 
 Centrally driven; detailed blueprints 
 Industrialisation with import substi-
tution 
 Pervasive government failures 
 Market-led development 
 Short-term adjustments 
 Liberalisation and privatisation 
Source: Adapted from OED 1999: 4. 
 
The failed attempt to see markets flourish simply through policy re-
form drew attention to the need for some regulation by the state and for 
effective institutions. As such, the aftermath of the 1980s gradually 
forced neo-liberal policy-makers to recognise the pivotal role of the state 
in determining the success or failure of such reforms. As observed by 
Robison: ‘it was only through the state that neo-liberals, ironically, gained 
the foothold that enabled them to enforce their policies’ (2006b: 4). 
Stiglitz emphasises this by suggesting that while rent-seeking is indeed 
important to consider, the ‘general theory of partnership’ is better suited 
to address the problem. He points out that government can change the 
‘game’ that the private participants are playing in ways which are welfare 
enhancing (Stiglitz 1998b: 9): 
While older literature focused on dissipative rent seeking, this newer work 
has emphasized how governments can create rents which enhance incen-
tives for, say, prudential behavior in the financial sector, or more generally 
for wealth creation. […] Not only can government actions thus improve 
the behavior of market participants, but the government actions them-
selves can be shown to be ‘incentive compatible,’ that is, under plausible 
hypotheses concerning government objectives, such actions can be shown 
to be in the interests of the government itself (Stiglitz 1998b: 10). 
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Therefore, Stiglitz proposes to bring the state back in, which is a fun-
damental element of the PWC. A word of caution however, Stiglitz does 
not advocate an interventionist state which would be substituting itself to 
the market: 
There is a growing consensus that governments can play a vital role in 
successful development efforts, but we also recognize that the wrong kind 
of government intervention can be highly detrimental. We have recog-
nized that the scope and effectiveness of government activities, rather than 
simply the size of the government’s budget or personnel, is the key issue. 
Within a given size range, governments’ effectiveness can vary widely with 
the scope of its activities: they can do too much of some things and too lit-
tle of others, and redirecting the State’s efforts could produce benefits on 
both accounts (Stiglitz 1998b: 2). 
Stiglitz insists on the importance of getting government to focus on 
what he calls the ‘fundamentals’ – i.e. economic policies, basic education, 
health, roads, law and order, environmental protection. For example, he 
states: ‘I agree that government should focus on what it alone can do, 
and it should leave the production of commodities like steel to the pri-
vate sector’ (Stiglitz 1998a: 2). In this regard, Stiglitz further argues that 
governments and markets should act in a complementary fashion. The 
obvious dilemma with such emphasis on institutions relates to the defini-
tion of what ‘good institutions’ entail and more importantly, how to cre-
ate them. Here Stiglitz points towards a growing consensus on the need 
to address corruption (2002: 3). This brings the economist to highlight 
the importance of institutions: ‘it is not just economic policies and hu-
man capital, but the quality of a country's institutions that determine 
economic outcomes’ (Stiglitz 1998a: 17).  
The central point to be made is that institutions are designed to alter 
behaviour by imposing specific incentives and penalties. Thus institu-
tionalism is intertwined with the idea of governance. The New Public 
Management for example, offers a method of ensuring competition and 
protecting property rights through new forms of governance. 
3.2 The Politics of the PWC 
While the PWC represents a clear adjustment from the previous model, 
its theoretical roots do not encompass a departure from orthodox eco-
nomics. A common misunderstanding about the current aid reform – 
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and more generally the PWC – is linked to the novelties that it actually 
brings forth. On the one hand, the new agenda indeed remains grounded 
in the market model. On the other hand, however, and this is the crucial 
argument of the following section, it also encompasses a tactical shift in 
order to tackle the socio-political challenges encountered during the last 
decade. The institutional turn that it brings forth specifically extends the 
idea of structural adjustment to the political and social realm. In other 
words, far from dissociating itself from the basics of the Washington 
Consensus fundamentals, the new agenda ventures a step further to-
wards socio-political engineering and as such represents the achievement 
of the rationality of the market. As it will be seen throughout the greater 
thesis, such rationality raises key concerns relating to the distribution of 
power and liberal democracy. More importantly, it raises the question as 
to which interests are served with the promulgation of the new frame-
work. 
There is a pressing need to acknowledge the political dimensions of 
the reform process. Ideas that institutions are forged in conflicts over 
power and its distribution are useful in disaggregating some of the basic 
assumptions of NIE. Researchers from the Asia Research Centre3, for ex-
ample, propose a ‘political diagnosis exercise’ which comprise of map-
ping out: ‘the interests and conflict associated with class relations and 
global capitalism that give rise to specific complexions of social struc-
tures’ (Rodan, Hewison and Robison 2001: 86). The central argument 
here is that institutions are socially constituted structures that allocate 
power in an asymmetric way. As such, and contrary to NIE assumptions 
which are formulated in apolitical administrative terms, institutions and 
policy are understood to be embedded in different amalgams of social 
and political power. While NIE’s centrality is focused on efficiency, the 
social conflict approach argues for the need to transcend individualist 
methodology and to specifically identify who would benefit from such 
efficiency and for what purposes. As argued by Rodan, Hewison and 
Robison: 
Power, in turn, influences the composition of individual institutions and 
institutional matrices. The broader argument here is that this relationship 
is often dramatically unequal, with specific groups being able to garner re-
sources via particular sets of institutions to the detriment of other groups. 
Here, class divisions are essential lines of demarcation in explaining the 
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capacity or lack thereof to shape institutions and also benefit from their 
output (2001: 87). 
The power variable allows for the PWC – and therefore the World 
Bank’s reform, as analysed in the following chapters – to be located 
within the transformation of the neo-liberal framework. Neo-liberalism 
is here defined as ‘a political project of embedding market values and 
structures not just within economic, but also within social and political 
life’ (Rodan 2006: 197). If neo-liberals have been keen to shift power re-
lations in order to embed the market since the counter Keynesian revolu-
tion, the more recent institutional framework proposed by NIE, Stiglitz 
and the World Bank reflects the ongoing division within neo-liberalism 
on how to achieve such goals4. On the one hand, there is the laissez-faire 
camp, which believes that market should be free of any obstacles in or-
der to perform efficiently. The other strand of neo-liberalism – to which 
Stiglitz is associated – advocates the idea of a ‘social market’ which sug-
gests that the full potential of the market may be achieved with an active 
state5. Of great importance is the fact that both these branches of neo-
liberalism require the intervention of the state. While the proponents of 
the first strand of neo-liberalism believe that the state’s role should be 
limited to removing obstacles to the market efficiency, the second strand 
suggests that it should intervene in order to create the right kind of insti-
tutional settings for market to function (Gamble 2006: 21). Novel to the 
advent of the PWC is the idea that the state must be brought back in or-
der to correct market imperfections. In other words, it is about correct-
ing the implementation problems of the neo-liberal framework. As ar-
gued by Stiglitz: ‘the choice should not be whether the state should or 
should not be involved. Instead, it is often a matter of how it gets in-
volved’ (Stiglitz 1998a: 15). 
This current shift in focus from ‘if’ to ‘how’ in relation to state inter-
vention is quite important for the new framework and the political bag-
gage that it brings forth. The momentum recently gained by the institu-
tional strand is by no means a warning sign of the retreat of neo-
liberalism. As argued by Fine (1997), it is ‘wishful thinking’ to suggest 
that the neo-classical orthodoxy is in crisis on its traditional analytical 
patch: 
[…] fortress economics is as strong as ever and is not suffering at the ex-
pense of colonisation. Indeed the two have a positive synergy irrespective 
of the long standing recognition of the weakness of heterodox alternatives 
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that have vacated the space of the orthodoxy to expand its scope without 
intellectual embarrassment. 
 This no doubt is connected causally to the ideological triumphalism of 
the market over the past twenty years. As policy stance have again and 
again emphasised the virtues of extending market forces to as many areas 
of activity as possible, it is hardly surprising that this should induce the 
economics of the market to tread where previously methodological indi-
vidualism had been unable to obtain a foothold (Fine 1997: 147). 
What is particularly evident at this junction is that the PWC repre-
sents a shift intended to consolidate neo-liberalism. Gill’s work on ‘disci-
plinary neo-liberalism’6 shows that there exists a change in the form of 
discipline being exercised over economic and political behaviour by the 
logic of markets. In fact, during the 1980s and 1990s neo-liberals often 
faced political backlash against market reforms. It was thus increasingly 
recognised that a change was required to clear the way for markets 
against theirs opponents and those who use them for predatory pur-
poses. Robison refers to ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’ (2006b: 5) to depict 
the recent acknowledgment by the neo-liberals that a form of state au-
thority was actually necessary to protect the markets from the 
(ir)rationality of politics. In other words, neo-liberal institutionalism 
represents a shift towards a technocratic form of state. 
NIE was therefore the key in opening up new opportunities for neo-
liberals to enter the political realm of reforms. In positioning investor’s 
confidence and contract security as the corner stone of the success of 
economic development process, what is described as ‘efficient institu-
tions’ indeed become pivotal. Such institutions would lessen insecurity 
and in the process, motivate investors. Although often predatory, the 
state is acknowledged to be the only one who has the authority – via the 
executive, legislative and judiciary branches – to offer contract security. 
In this light, the language of NIE should be analysed in terms of being 
‘pro order’ rather than being ‘pro state’ (Cartier-Bresson n.d.: 6). What 
this implies, as Gill (2000) notes, is that the state itself is increasingly sub-
jected to market discipline, governments now actively seeking to inspire 
the confidence of investors. Thus disciplinary neo-liberalism: ‘[…] in-
volves the ways that public policy has been redefined so that govern-
ments seek to prove their credibility, and the consistency of their policies 
according to the criterion of the confidence of investors’ (Gill 2000). 
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The PWC is viewed as a strategy which aims to lock-in market-
enabling policies, here defined as policy whose primary aim is to liberal-
ise and stabilise markets such as internal/external trade policy and mone-
tary policy (Harmes n.d.: 25). Crucially, such objectives are set into a 
long-term framework, the idea being to prevent a policy reversal by the 
political apparatus of a given country. This closely relates to what 
Jayasuriya calls ‘economic constitutionalism’, which he defines as: ‘the 
attempt to treat the market as a constitutional order with its own rules, 
procedures, and institutions operating to protect the market order from 
political interference’ (Jayasuriya 2003: 3). Whilst traditional notions of 
constitutionalism emphasise political rights, obligations, freedom and 
procedures that give institutional form to the state (Gill 1995: 9), new 
constitutionalism seeks to insulate technocratic decision making from the 
influence of politicians and citizens: 
[…] the constitutional aspect of the contemporary global political econ-
omy shows that the issues are much more long term – both in terms of 
the deep structural transformations in economy, state and society that are 
underway and because constitutions are generally very difficult to change 
(Gill 2000). 
Set within such framework, the PWC clearly promotes political objec-
tives. This is to say that the politics of this anti-political project at the heart 
of the PWC are about – and this is not without irony – acknowledging 
politics but only to identify and promptly close the gates to what is con-
sidered political intrusion. Jayasuriya’s extensive work on the PWC is 
here key to the understanding its political ramifications. He argues that 
the current shift is in fact a political and an economic project that aims 
to create new forms of statecraft – what he calls the ‘new regulatory neo 
liberalism’ (Jayasuriya 2006). Crucially, the PWC is a framework that 
seeks to enshrine the policies of the former model (Jayasuriya 2003: 2). 
With such insights in mind, the shift in neo-liberalism should not be por-
trayed as ill-defined. In fact, it represents a consolidation of neo-
liberalism by ways of securing the economic achievements of the last 
decade on the one hand, and on the other hand, by pursuing a greater 
expansion of markets via the colonisation of the realm of political soci-
ety. If the means to achieve such objectives have been fine tuned, the 
objectives of the framework have not changed. The current shift recog-
nises the importance of the state to secure the market order: 
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A free economy requires a strong state, both to overcome the obstacles 
and resistance to the institutions of a free economy, which constantly re-
cur, and also to provide the non-market institutions, which are necessary 
for the market to be successful and legitimate. The necessity for the econ-
omy to be free and the state to be strong is perhaps the chief hallmark of 
neo-liberal thinking, but also one of the main sources of its contradictions 
(Gamble 2006: 22). 
Although the impact of these contradictions are the specific subject 
of the following chapters, it is relevant to note here that the World Bank 
has been pivotal in conceptualising, laying the foundations and actively 
promoting neo-liberal institutionalism in the last decade and more im-
portantly, with the recent advent of the IDM. The Bank’s concept of 
governance has been the perfect narrative and tool to promote the po-
litical project, most importantly because the concept is so malleable. As 
studied in the following chapter, the governance umbrella, which has 
been conceptualised in key publications such as the WDR The State in a 
Changing World (1997) and Building Institutions for Markets (2002), has been 
key in instigating legal-juridical mechanisms in countries under reform in 
order to isolate market-enabling policies from the political realms. 
This shift in neo-liberalism, which is spurred by NIE rationality, 
means that the old taboo of multilateral organisations addressing politics 
within countries under reform is no longer relevant. Indeed the rationale 
that institutions are key to sustaining the neo-liberal framework opens 
the political apparatus of the state to the reform agenda while simultane-
ously providing the explanations for the past failures of the reforms. The 
ensuing model is thus tautologically striking as it gives permission to en-
ter the political terrain in order to depoliticise it in the name of market 
efficiency, i.e. to ignore the political conflicts at the heart of the frame-
work. Crucial to such internal logic, the neo-institutional model becomes 
impervious to historical, social and political arguments which ground the 
majority of social sciences. As summarised by Fine, Lapavitsas and Pin-
cus: 
[…] the analytical basis for the postWashington consensus is extremely 
narrow and weak, especially from the perspective of anyone not wedded 
to mainstream economics. Indeed, it is seen as resting upon two funda-
mental characteristics, which can both be understood as reductionist or 
the interpretation of economic and other social relations through the nar-
rowest of explanatory prisms. On the one hand, there is the reductionism 
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to individual behaviour. On the other hand, there is the reductionism to 
market imperfections based on informational imperfections. Essentially, 
the capitalist economy is seen as a construct of 'imperfectly informed indi-
viduals, imperfectly co-ordinated through the market place (2001: 6). 
The simplified framework hence opens the field of orthodox econ-
omy to institutional structures while conveniently ignoring any reference 
to class and power. The instrumentality of the framework thus resides in 
its perfect tautology: while hermetic to alternative analysis, it simultane-
ously allows itself to be extremely open to public scrutiny of all kind. 
Participation, empowerment, social capital, partnership and the like, have 
indeed all become buzzwords at the core of the neo-institutional frame-
work, as analysed in the following section. 
3.3 The New Social Development Narrative 
While political institutions have overwhelmingly taken the centre stage of 
the analysis presented so far, the role assigned to social institutions 
within the PWC remains to be studied. Non-market and non-state insti-
tutions indeed have a pivotal role to play in the new consensus. This en-
thusiasm for social institutions represents a fundamental change from 
the Washington Consensus to the new model. This sudden interest in 
social institutions signals a recognition that neo-liberalism requires spe-
cific forms of change within the very fabric of society, or as Stiglitz for-
mulates it ‘catalysing change and transforming whole societies’ (1998c: 
59). As it will become clear in this section, this transition serves two dis-
tinct yet complementary objectives: to ensure market efficiency and to 
secure its long-term sustainability. 
The following analysis of Stiglitz and other NIE authors suggests that 
as it is the case for state institutions, the PWC assigns a strict depoliti-
cised role to the social realm. The apparent paradox of the rise of a tech-
nocratic mode of governance meeting the sudden interest in participa-
tory approaches to a more social agenda is then resolved. This is to say 
that both agendas, while apparently contradictory, are actually comple-
mentary means to serve the objective of implementing regulatory neo-
liberalism. 
Stiglitz’s enthusiasm for social institutions is rooted in his emphasis 
on the existence of information asymmetries. He concludes that social 
relations are pivotal for information sharing and in so doing, in reducing 
transaction costs. Here non-market actors are argued to facilitate the 
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creation of formalized institutions representing plural interests. This is to 
say that one of civil society’s pivotal roles is to disseminate information 
and in so doing, to minimise transaction costs. In this respect, as ex-
plained by Rodan (2006), what distinguishes the PWC from the previous 
orthodoxy is not only the acknowledgment that some degree of state in-
tervention is necessary to redress market failures, but also that a host of 
governmental and non-governmental institutions are crucial to market 
efficiency and sustainability. Stiglitz’s dedication to the field of micro-
economics allows for the expansion of methodological individualism to 
the social realm. Here the PWC interest in social relations, participatory 
schemes, and emphasis on concepts such as social capital, reflects a 
move by neo-liberals to create a framework which ensures the sustain-
ability of markets at the level of society. 
This framework merges two distinct dilemmas that the neo-liberal 
agenda was facing at the end of the 1990s. As analysed in the previous 
chapter, the former consensus was entangled with a legitimacy crisis; one 
emerging from the illiberal actions of state officials in charge of carrying 
out the reforms and one from the political backlash resulting from the 
negative effects of the reforms on certain segments of society. 
The consolidation of private interests throughout the last decade has 
been met with growing frustrations within the neo-liberal camp, as ob-
served by Robison: ‘the deepening of market reform has appeared in im-
portant instances to offer new opportunities for populist oligarchies and 
political cronysm or the consolidation of various forms of illiberal poli-
tics’ (2006a: xii). This is what Harrison (2006) refers to as ‘neo-liberal 
clientism’, a new political class that emerged out of the advance of mar-
kets in countries under reform and expropriated the state itself. Institu-
tions have been emphasised as the remedy to counteract such predatory 
behaviour by penetrating not only the political realms but the social 
realms as well. In addition to being viewed as accountability providers, 
social institutions are presented in the PWC narrative as the key to pro-
viding legitimacy – and hence support – to the policy reforms in the 
long-term. 
Furthermore, as argued in the previous chapter, by the end of the 
1990s, social and environmental instability resulting from the reforms 
carried out under the former consensus, gave rise to the formation of 
increasingly vocal international advocacy groups claiming to be repre-
senting the plight of the poor in indebted countries. If the success of 
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markets is conditional to the degree of stability that a given country of-
fers its potential investors, as argued in the NIE framework, popular 
support becomes pivotal for the renewed neo-liberal strategy. This obvi-
ously gave momentum to the new roles assigned in the PWC to grass-
root participation and other overwhelming social emphasis. 
Such insights have generated great interest in various ‘Third Way’ 
schemes, including microcredit projects, and have also generated an 
overwhelming enthusiasm for the idea of social capital. The need for 
market sustainability echoes the growing concern of economists regard-
ing the unpopularity of strict economic reforms. Although the World 
Bank’s social narrative is the particular subject of chapters five and six, it 
is here relevant to point out that the Bank’s renewed emphasis on pov-
erty – with its flagship publication (the World Development Report) 
dedicated in 2000 to this very topic – is a direct product of this need for 
neo-liberal economists to gain legitimacy for the reform process. The 
underlying idea behind the Bank’s social agenda suggests that associa-
tional linkages facilitate governability through cohesion. This is to say 
that an expansion of the Bank’s focus to social institutions may be quite 
useful. Indeed, it may prove to prevent a policy reversal by governments 
coming under fire from opposition but also further advance the reform 
process. 
However, there is a contradiction rooted at the core of NIE thinking 
which emerges when one considers the clear need to manage popular 
resistance to reforms if markets are to proceed with their expansion. 
Here, Rodrik observes that as ‘every politician knows, the clamour for 
controls and restrictions overcome markets when markets produce out-
comes that are not endowed with popular legitimacy’ (Rodrik 1998, cited 
in Ahrens 2004: 11). The logic behind this statement – which is key to 
NIE thinking – calls for a better understanding of the collective response 
of different segments of society affected by certain policies. Neglecting 
to assess the emergence of powerful coalitions resisting the reforms in 
light of their social impacts arguably accounts for part of the failures en-
countered by the former consensus. If as NIE proponents argue, market 
reforms benefit the entire society in the long-term, it then becomes im-
perative to insulate policy decision hubs in order to protect those from 
popular influences.  
The problem with such contradictory logic is the obstinate refusal of 
the PWC to acknowledge the very political nature of the inequalities that 
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will undeniably emerge out of the neo-liberal reforms. This is to say that 
popular pressures in favour of market inhibiting policy capabilities – 
whose primary aim is to regulate markets such as environmental, labour 
and social policy as well as to redistribute income and wealth through 
various forms of fiscal policy (Harmes n.d.: 25) – may be minimised to 
the benefit of technocrats prioritising market enabling policies. As stated 
by Carroll, it implies that ‘society can be changed via a concerted process 
of institutional engineering, largely without political conflict’ (2007: 17). 
There is a parallel shift developing along side this narrative advocating 
a technocratic turn. Indeed the need to insulate political centres from 
popular demands has curiously been jammed with a seemingly paradoxi-
cal narrative advocating a socially inclusive agenda. According to Stiglitz, 
there is a need to broaden development objectives to include social goals 
– such as sustainable development, egalitarian development and democ-
ratic development (1998a: 1): 
We seek increases in living standards – including improved health and 
education – not just increases in measured GDP. We seek sustainable de-
velopment, which includes preserving our natural resources and maintain-
ing a healthy environment. We seek equitable development, which ensures 
that all groups in society enjoy the fruits of development, not just the few 
at the top. And, we seek democratic development, in which citizens par-
ticipate in a variety of ways in making the decisions which affect their lives. 
Knowledge has not kept pace with the proliferation of our goals. We are 
only beginning to understand the relationship between democratization, 
inequality, environmental protection, and growth. What we do know holds 
out the promise of developing complementary strategies that can move us 
toward all of these objectives (Stiglitz 1998a: 18). 
Stiglitz has been questioning trickle down economics – at least in 
terms of increasing the income of the poorest – a point that has led the 
economist to insist on broadening development objectives and a partici-
patory agenda. It is here argued that such obvious contradictory objec-
tives within the new consensus are key in legitimising and consolidating 
the neo-liberal shift. The point here is that these two contradictory agen-
das – the rational for insulating policy making decisions and also pushing 
a participatory agenda – may lead to false conclusions on the reality of 
the PWC. Crucially, and this has been argued by Carroll, the PWC narra-
tive does not necessarily equate to what it does in practice: 
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[…] the inclusion of notions of participation, democracy and egalitarian-
ism are contradictory elements as they exist within Stiglitz’s framework sit-
ting uneasily alongside the anti-pluralist institutional straightjacket that is 
actually implied by his emphasis upon the ‘role of the state’ and its rela-
tionship to the market. Such institutional ‘blueprints’, which is still a rea-
sonable term for such agendas despite Stiglitz’s discomfort at its use, 
would seem to rationally entail highly circumscribed conceptions of de-
mocracy and participation, where certain institutions are ‘out of bounds’ to 
popular political influence because they are not seen as efficient for the 
market (Carroll 2007: 17). 
This straddling of two contradictory agendas is however quite useful 
in terms of legitimising the new consensus. Here Rodan’s (2006) under-
standing of the conceptualisation of neo-liberalism is helpful. The author 
argues that neo-liberalism cannot in fact be seen as a strict set of histori-
cally fixed policy prescriptions but rather aims to establish a political or-
der that maximises support for market relationships. Such a process, fur-
ther argues Rodan, necessarily involves attempts to insulate neo-liberal 
interests from effective contestation and challenge (2006: 200). Viewed 
in this way, neo-liberalism is argued to be a project that permits or even 
requires dynamic policy agendas and strategies for its realisation, even if 
some policy ideals such as economic liberalisation remain constant (Ro-
dan 2006: 200-1).  
This idea of a flexible framework to carry out the objective of ex-
panding economic neo-liberalism is key to the PWC. It indeed explains 
the awkward marriage of both agendas – where technocracy meets a par-
ticipatory narrative. Crucially, the theory feeding the new agenda can be 
argued to seek nothing less than shaping social relations, or what Cam-
mack (2004) refers to as a transition from a ‘shallow neoliberalism’ em-
phasising a minimalist state to a ‘deep neoliberalism’. It seeks to mend 
the acknowledged flaws of the former consensus by tackling the realms 
of possible contestations to economic reforms wherever they might arise 
– whether at the heart of the government or within civil society. In such 
light, the participatory agenda aims to rally those coalitions of interests 
amenable to the project and should be viewed, as observed by Carroll, 
as: ‘a political strategy of depoliticisation that attempts to marginalise 
representative politics’ (2007: 6). 
Significantly, such endeavour is argued to be a conscious effort to 
shift power relations between the state, civil society and the market. This 
political project has found a technocratic narrative to justify intervening 
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directly into the realm of political society, which is here defined as: ‘[...] 
an intermediate realm of actors (political parties) and institutions (elec-
tions, legislature), mediating, articulating and institutionalizing the rela-
tions between the State and civil society’ (Biekart 1999: 58). Key to our 
study, the World Bank has had a fundamental role to play in framing and 
implementing policies, which actively seek to redefine political society in 
countries under reform.  
Conclusion  
The role of the state has never been the subject of a consensus in any 
variety of development theory. While there is now the suggestion that a 
new consensus is emerging in which a wise equilibrium between inter-
ventionism and laissez-faire has been reached, the analysis of NIE and 
Stiglitz’s ideas suggest otherwise. This is to say that the PWC is an at-
tempt to mask a clear political agenda in terms of a techno-managerial 
narrative. A close analysis of the theoretical roots of the PWC, it is ar-
gued, demonstrates that it should by no means be seen as a new devel-
opment paradigm, but rather as a new method to implement the same 
objective: securing the neo-liberal advancement of the 1990s and push-
ing forward the reform process. 
This chapter has also pointed out the new players introduced by the 
new agenda: social institutions. This is about legitimising the reform 
process and creating a politically stable environment to secure the gains 
of neo-liberalism in countries under reform. Interestingly, many methods 
have been suggested to carry out such objective. On the side of legiti-
macy, it has been suggested by Stiglitz to expand development goals to 
the social realm and to increase participation; while on the side of ac-
countability, NIE insists on the importance of local participation – in a 
depoliticise manner that is. 
These dual agendas – one pertaining to the technocratic state and the 
other, to the depoliticised civil society – have so far only been studied in 
their theoretical settings. The analysis has been restricted to the theoreti-
cal roots of the PWC and to an applied framework which introduced the 
concepts of power and class. This has led to the importance of reposi-
tioning the new debate in the changes which neo-liberalism itself is un-
dergoing. The search to consolidate regulatory neo-liberalism has how-
ever brought neo-liberals increasingly to meddle in the realm of 
representative politics. 
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Such a process brings up the urgency of addressing questions linked 
to the very future of issues such as national sovereignty, democracy and 
citizenship. As Robison (2006b) concludes, the Neo-liberal’s interest in 
new forms of social contracts extend beyond the need to address the 
opposition to reforms. It aims at nothing less then to: ‘redefine citizen-
ship in terms of the right to participate in the market and equality as ac-
cess to the market rather than redistribution of income’ (Robison 2006b: 
5). 
While specifically focusing on the role of the World Bank, the remain-
ing chapters of the thesis seek to investigate how such crucial issues have 
been planed, carried out and met in countries undergoing Bank advo-
cated reforms. Pivotal to such investigation is to look at how the World 
Bank has been dealing with the rooted contradictions at the core of the 
new agenda. Interestingly – and as emphasised by Gill – such contradic-
tions entrenched within the new framework actually suggest that the pro-
ject might simply be unachievable in practice: ‘It is therefore unsustain-
able politically, not least because different social movements and classes 
resist the destruction of their livelihood and the intensified discipline of 
capital that is central to neo-liberal globalization’ (Gill 2000). 
 
Notes  
 
1 North explains that: ‘[…] the new institutional economics builds on, modifies 
and extends neo-classical theory to permit it to come to grips and deal with an 
entire range of issues heretofore beyond its ken’ (1995: 17). 
2 It is interesting that North proposes that the state must impose institutions in 
comparison to Coase who argued that rational individuals would do this. 
3 See for example the work of Hewison, Robison and Rodan (2001); Chaudhry 
(1994); Jayasuriya (2001, 2003, 2006); and Higgott, and Robison (1985). 
4 As further argued by Rodan: ‘Neoliberalism is a dynamic and at times prob-
lematic amalgamation of interests and ideologies’ (2006: 1). 
5 For a review of the debate see Robison (2006b). 
6 Neo-liberal forms of discipline are institutionalised and bureaucratised, op-
erate both in public and private spheres (state and civil society), they are part of 
a ‘discursive formation of global capital power associated with the interests and 
forces of the historical bloc of transnational capital (Gill 1995: 8). 
  
4 Politics as Anti-Politics 
 
 
Governments must do well those things that governments must do. 
(World Bank 1998a: 83) 
 
Introduction 
As argued in the previous chapter, the post-Washington Consensus 
(PWC) represents a political endeavour which aims to restructure the 
political arena of reforming countries. The remaining chapters of this 
study examine the specific role of the World Bank in carrying out the 
PWC. 
Under James D. Wolfensohn, the Bank proclaimed that the new cen-
tury would be marked by a new development paradigm which would re-
place the old and dépassé Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and re-
focus the objectives of international aid onto poverty reduction. How-
ever, and as it was the case for the PWC itself, the Bank’s new model has 
been the subject of much debate, definition and confusion in the recent 
years. This is manifest in the dual objectives of the new aid allocation 
mechanisms which are characterised by on the one hand, a stricter con-
ditionality model and on the other hand, a new social narrative loosely 
attached to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
In this thesis, the Bank’s own contribution to the new international 
aid architecture is referred to as the ‘Integrated Development Model’ 
(IDM). This allows for the disentanglement of the Bank’s specific con-
tribution from the other actors and initiatives within the new aid archi-
tecture which are freely associated to the overall PWC narrative and 
practices. Furthermore, the IDM is here defined as comprising both the 
Bank’s narrative and its new aid allocation mechanisms. Such a term thus 
takes into account the existing contradictions within the Bank’s new aid 
paradigm wherein a social development narrative often clashes with geo-
94 
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political realities and pro-market objectives. The IDM is thus an impor-
tant tool to differentiate the Bank’s narrative from what is actually being 
carried out in countries under reform. As such, the aid reform is on the 
one hand, far more than a mere discursive shift at the Bank and on the 
other hand, cannot be assessed solely by its aid allocation mechanisms. 
In other words, the IDM is both a theory – which is primarily rooted in 
NIE; a social narrative seeking legitimacy both for the Bank itself and for 
its policies; and finally, a method to carry out the ideas of the PWC as 
defined in the previous chapter. 
While the IDM is the subject of the rest of this contribution, this spe-
cific chapter addresses the changes the model brought forth in terms of 
aid allocation mechanisms. Key to the argument in the last chapter was 
the idea that the PWC represents an effort to redefine the political rela-
tionship between the state and donors, between the state and civil society 
and finally, within the state architecture itself. In this chapter, the chang-
ing role of the state is analysed in light of the new aid allocation mecha-
nisms of the IDM. It will be argued that the transformation of condi-
tionality brought forth by the IDM serves the objective of consolidating 
the ‘self-restraining state’. PRS, CAS and CPIA mechanisms therefore 
represent a consolidated attempt to impose a revised neo-liberal frame-
work which is better served by the self-restraining state. 
Such a thesis entails a close study of the transformation of the condi-
tionality model and how it relates to the overall attempt to redefine po-
litical spaces in countries under reform. The argument is divided into 
three sections. In the first part, the conditionality crisis is studied in order 
to tease out the pressures that compelled the Bank to adopt new aid allo-
cation mechanisms. The actual aid mechanisms of the IDM are in turn 
analysed – the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), the 
Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), the Country Assistance Strategy 
(CAS) and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). In 
the third part of this chapter, the political significance of the governance 
agenda embedded at the core of the aid allocation mechanisms is ana-
lysed. Such steps will allow for the analysis of the Bank’s contribution to 
enforce a system of neo-liberalism with all its implications for the con-
figuration and exercise of power.  
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4.1 Re-Thinking Conditionality: the World Bank and the 
New Aid Allocation Mechanisms 
As early as the 1980s – and throughout the 1990s – the Bank was forced 
to address the escalating economic and political problems faced by coun-
tries even where structural adjustment were carried out. It did so by mul-
tiplying its programs and conditionalities, gradually entangling itself with 
the complexities linked to aid allocation. This process escalated to such a 
point that a single loan could be subjected to more than one hundred 
conditionalities1 (Harrigan, Mosley and Toye 1995: 43). As argued in 
chapter two of the thesis, this also reflected the organisational culture of 
the Bank. In this respect, Boas and McNeill argue that: ‘the problem was 
that once SAPs were negotiated, it was very tempting for each different 
division of the World Bank to add additional conditionalities that re-
flected their internal priorities’ (2003: 67). Between 1980 and 1989, 241 
structural adjustment programmes were imposed on 36 African countries 
(Harrison 2004: 6). Beyond such an ‘overload problem’, to quote Boas 
and McNeill (2003: 67), lays the fact that according to the Bank itself, 
only 53% of conditionalities would actually be respected (World Bank 
1998a: 52). The 1999 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness bluntly ob-
serves that fewer than half of the Bank’s projects in the 1998-99 fiscal 
year had the potential to achieve sustainable results, a performance that 
would inscribe itself in the statistical trend of the entire decade (OED 
1999: 17). 
What is interesting to note is that during the SAP period, the Bank 
found great allies in the technocrats of many reforming countries. Por-
trayed as neutral policy-makers and officials who were unencumbered by 
vested interests, technocrats often backed the Bank against predatory 
politicians and reformists. However, the SAP experience clearly showed 
the Bank that politics – and therefore predatory behaviour coupled with 
ignorance of what the institution perceives as the ‘right economics’ – 
often prevailed.  
An insightful example is the Nigerian case where the attempts to im-
plement policy reform supported by local technocrats and the Bank were 
constantly derailed by the government2. The Bank observes that the 
overall popular distrust of IFIs led to the Nigerian government’s strategy 
of denying that it was adopting an IMF-type program (2000: 666). The 
key point is that in a technocratic world ‘there is little room for political 
parties or élitist states’ (Bryld 2000: 703). Political issues are addressed in 
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terms of efficiency through the use of economic techniques. As pointed 
out by Bryld, the technocratic approach files sensitive political issues 
within macro-economic boxes: ‘Hence, politics is not seen as a part of 
the state’ (Bryld 2000: 703). 
It is clear that the poor scorecard for conditionality performance by 
the end of the 1990s led the Bank to search for new strategies to insulate 
its technocratic allies of political interference within countries under re-
form. In other words, it needed to rethink conditionality in order to en-
sure that local governments would have the incentives to actually imple-
ment the advocated reforms. 
The Bank’s IDM was the answer to this conundrum. The introduc-
tion of the IDM’s key aid allocation mechanisms – the PRS but also the 
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessment (CPIA) – were presented in terms of enhancing ‘aid 
effectiveness’, partly by rethinking conditionality. Such a process has re-
quired re-thinking the relationship between the major donors themselves 
and between donors and local governments. In other words, it has called 
for a ‘new partnership’ where donors would strive for aid coherence and 
promote reform ownership. 
The idea of ‘partnership’ strongly emerged in the Development Assis-
tance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (DAC-OECD) 1996 report Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Co-operation. The Report sets out to evaluate the 
success of the last fifty years of development assistance and to identify 
strategies for the next quarter of century. In so doing, the Report argues 
that the failure of structural adjustment was relative as some countries 
had in fact, benefited from it and managed to ‘develop’ themselves 
through international aid. Shaping the 21st Century concluded that the 
overwhelming causes of aid failure were civil wars and bad public man-
agement (DAC-OECD 1996: 1). 
In order to address this governance predicament the DAC proposes a 
global development partnership which would rest upon an open dialogue 
(DAC-OECD 1996: 9). The new partnership would seek to harmonise 
aid practices by forging strategic alliances between bilateral donors in 
order to reach a consensus on the appropriate political changes and the 
capacity building requirements of a given country. All donors would 
therefore link their respective management plans to the national strategy 
of the developing country for addressing governance and political prob-
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lems. Crucially, aid programmes would be based on the development 
plans proposed by the beneficiary government. In fact, the report de-
plores that conditionality has too often been perceived as an instrument 
for donors to impose their own objectives on recalcitrant governments. 
Conditionalities would therefore become ‘flexible’ rather than ‘coercive’ 
and they would be a mere indicator of a partnership towards the realisa-
tion of agreed development objectives (OED 1999: 26). Endorsed by all 
the G-7 members, the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank and 77 
developing nations, the ‘new Partnership’ agenda has been key in fram-
ing the narrative for the promotion of new aid allocation mechanisms3.  
The challenge to the old conditionality model was further deepened 
via a key World Bank publication. Assessing Aid: What Works, What 
Doesn’t, and Why (World Bank 1998) – along the lines of Burnside and 
Dollar’s publication on the same theme (1997) – strongly positioned the 
idea of ‘aid selectivity’ and in so doing, gave donors a virtual free pass to 
openly enter the political arena of countries under reform. The Report 
argues that in order to improve life quality in poor countries, it has be-
come imperative to rethink the way development aid is managed. Assess-
ing Aid gives centre stage to institutions as a determinant of aid effec-
tiveness (World Bank 1998a: 13). Divergence in economic performance 
of countries receiving financial assistance resulted in a ‘selectivity’ argu-
ment, suggesting that development assistance is more about supporting 
good institutions and policies than providing capital (World Bank 1998a: 
13). Crucially, the Report argues that there is no relation between finan-
cial development assistance and economic growth, unless a differentia-
tion is made between countries exercising good governance and those 
who do not (1998a: 37). Assessing Aid concludes that: ‘Foreign aid in it-
self is neutral with respect to development, for its positive or negative 
effects depend on government policies’ (World Bank 1998a: 37). This is 
to say that when two countries have the same poverty level, financial aid 
should be allocated with ‘strategic selectivity’ – i.e. offered to the coun-
try exercising good governance. What is significant here is how the nar-
rative suggests that governance would be the linchpin of development 
effectiveness. With such logic in mind, what Assessing Aid was in fact 
about was that financial aid would be wasted on governments not dedi-
cated to address what is presented as the causes of their own underde-
velopment4. 
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While over time the concept of governance emphasised reforms fo-
cussing on public sector management, accountability, the legal frame-
work for development, information and transparency, the actual recipe 
to implement such reforms had remained quite blurry until the late 
1990s.  
By the late 1990s, the Bank was clearly creating a new framework 
which aimed to establish governance as the key determinant for donors 
to allocate financial aid. The challenge for the Bank was however to find 
concrete methods by which to effectively persuade borrowing govern-
ments to implement reforms they wouldn’t have undertaken otherwise. 
The idea of governance as the linchpin of aid effectiveness was a key 
element in the transformation of the aid architecture, notably through 
the introduction of new aid allocation mechanisms, such as the PRS. It 
also gave way to changes within other aid allocation mechanisms such as 
the CAS and the influential CPIA. 
Since the turn of the Century, PRS are officially the basis for all for-
eign aid to poor countries. While the strategies have been presented as 
being centred on poverty reduction and participation, any access to the 
IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Bank’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits5 (PRSCs) is contingent upon a coun-
try completing a PRSP6. Furthermore, any access to debt relief under the 
Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative7 (HIPC II) is also 
conditional to the production of a PRSP. As observed in the following 
section, there appears to exist a strong contradiction between the Bank’s 
narrative centred on participation and ownership and the pre-eminence 
of the governance imperative of the new aid allocation mechanisms. 
The centrality of CPIA within the IDM gives a first insight into the 
clashes between the reform’s participatory narrative and the governance 
agenda being promoted. CPIA are an annual scorecard which assess the 
quality of a borrowing country’s policy and institutional framework for 
International Development Association (IDA)8. Crucial to the argument 
is that the Bank defines ‘quality’ in terms of: ‘how conducive that frame-
work is to fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effec-
tive use of development assistance’ (World Bank 2006a: 1). If the Bank’s 
IDA has been assessing countries since the late 1970s, the performance 
rating framework has been substantially revised in 19989 to include a 
given set of indicators which cover four clusters: economic management; 
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structural policies; policies for social inclusion and; public sector man-
agement and institutions10. 
While PRSPs are defined as the ‘full-fledged strategic document of 
the country’, it is CPIA criteria which in practice overwhelmingly influ-
ence the content of strategies11. Prepared by the Bank’s country teams 
and then subjected to a process of internal review, CPIA are indeed cru-
cial in determining a low-income country’s allocation of grants and low-
interest loans. As stated by Bretton Woods Project, a think thank usually 
critical of neo-liberal approaches: ‘It would appear that the CPIA ratings 
set the framework for the writing of the PRSP and not the governments’ 
(2006). Officially, it is via the CPIA that the Bank allocates loan and 
grant resources to borrowers and determines the policy direction of new 
operations, and establish debt relief targets12. Furthermore, the level of 
grants and loans allocated to countries will also be influenced by an 
overall ‘governance’ factor, which derives notably from the five criteria 
in the CPIA’s governance cluster13. The country’s overall rating is then 
multiplied by this factor, resulting in an increase (or decrease) of the 
overall Country Performance Rating, depending on the degree to which 
the country’s governance rating is strong – or weak. 
What is pivotal to note is that a country’s policy and institutional per-
formance is the dominant determinant in the allocation of IDA’s scarce 
resources amongst the organisation’s 80 eligible borrowers. The Bank 
indeed states that twice as high a score in relation to policy and institu-
tional performance results in the country receiving four times the alloca-
tion (World Bank 2008e: 3). 
What is further enlightening about the importance of the governance 
factor within the IDM is the fact that the country performance rating 
also has a pivotal influence on Country Assistance Strategies (CAS). Key 
to the IDM, CAS are the Bank’s main instrument to indicate the level 
and composition of assistance to be provided to a given country. While a 
CAS is in officially argued to take the country’s PRSP as ‘its starting 
point’ – and to be developed in consultation with civil society organisa-
tions, development partners and other stakeholders – it is in practice 
firmly based on a given country’s performance rating14: 
As the PRSP becomes a full-fledged strategic document of the country, 
the CAS becomes in essence IDA’s business plan in support of the coun-
try’s PRS, selectively supporting country poverty reduction goals on which 
IDA agrees and is best placed to make a contribution. The selection of the 
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IDA-supported program from that of the PRSP will increasingly be influ-
enced by IDA’s performance assessment in two ways. First, the implemen-
tation of the PRSP’s policies will be expected to be reflected in the IDA 
CPRs, and thereby in the base-case IDA allocation envelope. Second, as a 
diagnostic tool, the CPIA can indicate areas where attention needs to be 
focused and thereby influence the focus of the IDA-supported program 
(World Bank 2008f: 6). 
In a brief on CPIA, Nancy Alexander, Director of the international 
advocacy NGO Citizens’ Network on Essential Services15, observes that the 
Bank is selective about what PRSP-endorsed policies are integrated into 
its CAS and therefore, the Bank may have different priorities than a gov-
ernment has put forth in a PRSP (Alexander 2004: 20). The organisation 
Bretton Woods Project further concludes that while in theory policy targets 
and actions defined in the PRSP should be the basis of IMF and Bank 
conditions, PRSPs seem ‘to build on loan agreements rather than vice 
versa. […] Loan negotiations are still conducted behind closed doors 
within Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, and lack disclosure, pub-
lic involvement and oversight’ (Bretton Woods Project 2003). 
In practice, CPIA performance ratings remain key in determining the 
CAS triggers by which governments will be evaluated. What is critical 
here, is that if a government was to not comply with its CAS it would 
risk of loosing access to loans, and in some cases: ‘the World Bank may 
terminate assistance to an entire sector or country and, with the IMF, 
suspend debt relief’ (Alexander 2004: 20).  
There exists a clear consensus amongst bilateral and multilateral do-
nors in favour of an aid system that allocates funds toward the countries 
with a relatively good institutional environment. However, political and 
economic interests of donors are still influencing the aid flow. Hout’s 
(2007) findings suggest that although actual lending commitments by the 
Bank’s soft-loan window IDA are not keeping pace exactly with the out-
comes of the aid allocation mechanism: ‘it [is] clear that actual loans and 
grants still benefit mostly those countries at the upper end of the distri-
bution’ (2007: 48). The OED’s 2003 Annual Review of Development Effective-
ness clearly states that in the absence of a ‘relatively good policy environ-
ment’16, donors should limit or postpone lending until there are ‘clear 
signals that reform is under way’ (OED 2004: x). For the fiscal years 
2003-2005, the Bank established resource allocations that were nearly 
five times higher for the governments in the top-performing quintile 
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than for those in the poorest-performing quintile (Alexander 2004: 17). 
It is important to note here that there still exist a gap between the 
narrative over the so-called consensus on selectivity and the aid actual 
envelope assigned to reforming countries17. Easterly (2002) illustrates this 
contradiction between narrative and practice by observing that well after 
its new emphasis on the imperative of selectivity, the Bank announced 
new adjustment loans to President Daniel Arap Moi’s government in 
Kenya: ‘despite 22 years of economic mismanagement during 19 previ-
ous adjustment loans to this same government’ (Easterly 2002: 36). Hout 
further observes existing contradictions between CPIA ratings and actual 
aid allocation (2007: 47). While the ‘ex post conditionality’ – which im-
plies that aid allocation would be based on past performance – is firmly 
entrenched within the IDM’s overall narrative, evidence does demon-
strate that some bias based on the geo-strategic and economic interests 
of donors continue to influence the aid envelope. 
These discrepancies however, do not suggest that the governance fac-
tor is not given a very high weight relative to other criteria. Indeed in 
recent years, the application of a governance factor has reduced the re-
source allocation to some countries by as much as 50% (Alexander 2004: 
18). The Bank’s own record between 1999 and 2003, does suggest a 
higher concentration of aid toward countries with a good – or improving 
– policy environment (OED 2004: 13). During this period, the Bank’s 
lending was concentrated in countries that had ‘relatively good’ policy 
environments, with 89.4 per cent of Bank lending going to countries 
with a CPIA ranking of 3.0 or better in 1999 and 96.6 per cent going to 
such countries in 2003. Crucially, the ongoing transformation of the 
conditionality model towards a greater emphasis on governance enables 
donors to select recipients on the basis of certain eligibility criteria (Hout 
2007: 23), a fact that undeniably influences the internalisation process of 
a specific policy framework in reforming countries, as argued in the fol-
lowing section. 
4.2 Flirting with Politics: the Bank and Governance 
The argument by which the IDM is embedded in the old consensus has 
already been made in the first chapters of this thesis. Not surprisingly, 
the performance-based criteria of aid allocation are primarily based on 
orthodox economics. However the new framework brings forth a nov-
elty in the nature of conditionality itself. It is here argued that PRS, CAS 
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and CPIA mechanisms represent a consolidated attempt to impose a 
revised neo-liberal framework. This is what Campbell (2005) refers to as 
strategies to ‘anchor’18 institutional reforms. 
There is indeed an attempt under the new conditionality model, to 
circumscribe aid to borrowing states which are deemed truly committed 
to a pre-defined governance framework. Recipient governments are ex-
pected to embrace good governance reforms in order to demonstrate 
their commitment to ‘efficiency’. While the idea that such practice 
should be regarded as ‘ownership’ remains questionable, the process cer-
tainly translates the Bank’s clear attempt to have borrowing govern-
ments internalise a governance framework. 
Key to the IDM, the concept of ownership implies that donors would 
be willing to stop imposing the old paternalistic conditionality model on 
reforming countries. It also implies however, that recipient countries are 
expected to take ‘responsibility’ for their own development. The IDM 
was indeed introduced as a framework to allow governments to be ‘in 
the drivers seat’ (Wolfensohn 1999a: 9). The case for reforming coun-
tries – not donors – to be the driving force of development initiative is 
readily made. The problem however arises when ownership is solely de-
fined in terms of commitment to a set of reforms which happen to be 
the condition of any upcoming financial aid allocation. As observed by 
Robert Chase, Senior Social Development Economist in the World 
Bank’s Social Development Department: ‘How much do we really be-
lieve in the participatory process in the face of a country going bank-
rupt?’ (Interviewed October 10, 2006) Chase further admits that while 
everybody is on board the participatory process, it is the countries need 
for disbursement which will ultimately prevail. 
There thus appears to be a clear dichotomy between ‘ownership’, de-
fine as a bottom-up initiative, and ‘ownership’ defined as a commitment to 
carryout prescribed policies. This point relates to what Gore refers to as 
the ‘Double bind’ where officials preparing the PRSP cannot ‘win’ no 
matter what actions they might take19 (2004: 277): 
The commitment of the institutions which act as gatekeepers in access to 
official financial inflows to certain sound policy reforms leaves the officials 
preparing the PRSPs in a somewhat invidious position. First, they face an 
injunction to reduce poverty. Second, they face an injunction to maintain a 
tight macroeconomic policy and deepen structural reforms and liberaliza-
tion. Third, they face an injunction to own their national policies. Fourth, 
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they know that the flip side of national Governments being responsible 
for poverty reduction and owning the policies is that if they fail it will be 
their fault. Finally, they know that they are highly dependent on both aid 
and debt relief and that from their own past experience and other country 
examples any interruptions to these real and virtual financial flows will cer-
tainly lead to worsening poverty and also possibly to political instability 
(Gore 2004: 281).  
Gore’s analysis resonates in the Bank’s early IDM documentation. As 
the Bank was starting to ground the foundations of the concept of ‘own-
ership’, which is now one of the main pillars of the IDM, the Bank pro-
posed four criteria to evaluate the level of government ownership (World 
Bank 1998b: 8): 
1. The focus of the initiative for the policy or the project must be 
in the government. 
2. The key policy makers responsible for implementation must be 
convinced intellectually that the goals to be pursued are the right on-
es20. 
3. There must be evidence that the government is building consen-
sus among the affected stakeholders and can rely on their sup-
port and cooperation. 
4. There must be evidence of public support from the top political 
and civil leadership. 
In light of such criteria however, it appears that governments should 
not only come up themselves with the policies to follow, they should 
also be ‘convinced intellectually’ (World Bank 1998b: 8) that the path 
ahead is the right one. Obviously, when combined with the idea of aid 
selectivity, one must wonder how a government faced with the burden 
of debt and seeking debt relief might try to demonstrate ‘ownership’ of 
policies not advocated by the major donors. In fact, the choice of bor-
rowing governments becomes quite clear: either to implement the re-
quired governance reforms and obtain financial assistance or defy do-
nors and get ‘ideological assistance’ (World Bank 1998a: 84). The Bank 
indeed states that: ‘The role of aid in difficult environments is to educate 
the next generation of leaders, disseminate information about policy, 
and stimulate public debate where possible’ (1998a: 48). 
The case against selectivity is made in two distinct arguments. Not 
only is there a growing body of empirical evidence contradicting the sug-
gestion that aid would be only efficient in a good governance environ-
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ment, there is also a greater debate over how exactly governance would 
be conducive to poverty reduction. 
Well beyond the claims made in Assessing Aid, the ‘science’ of selectiv-
ity has been firmly integrated in Bank’s narrative, notably on ‘Low In-
come Countries Under Stress’ (World Bank 2002b). It has further been 
reinforced over the years, notably with Burnside and Dollar’s work on 
the lack of correlation between aid and economic growth (1997; 2000), 
as well as by bilateral donors and, more noticeably, by the Bush admini-
stration through the Millennium Challenge Account. However, the rationale 
for selectivity has been the subject of numerous criticisms, ranging from 
its flawed methodology to its over simplistic approach to ‘development’ 
– strictly defined in terms of economic growth21. In direct contradiction 
to the Bank’s findings, multiple independent researches have concluded 
that aid could in fact be effective, irrespectively of the policy environ-
ment, not only in terms of poverty reduction but in terms of growth as 
well. For example, a EURODAD study (2002) concludes that: the im-
pact of aid on growth is positive irrespective of the policy environment; 
aid might not be directly effective in terms of growth, but in terms of 
poverty reduction; and finally, that even in post-conflict or war-affected 
countries, large amounts of aid can play a critical role in ending con-
flicts22. 
More importantly however, there does not exist – contrary to the 
mainstream argument – a consensus amongst the aid community on 
how the so-called ‘good policies’ will bring forth poverty reduction, if at 
all. In a brief on CPIA, the Bretton Woods Project argues that if ‘there is 
consensus that the mechanism is broken’, the ‘debate over the content 
of the conditions continues’ (Powell 2004). Indeed, if there is a consen-
sus on the necessity to implement reforms ‘conductive of pro-poor 
growth and widespread poverty reduction’ (World Bank 2004b: viii), the 
theoretical roots of the Bank’s prescribed reforms certainly remain 
highly contentious. They imply a debate on the role of the state, and the 
policies through which the state defines and promotes equity and equal-
ity (Inter Pares 2001: 13). 
The attempt to redefine the state in countries under reform is not 
new. Throughout the 1990s, neo-institutional ideas strongly positioned 
themselves at the heart of the Bank’s policies, overwhelmingly via the 
concept of governance. The malleability of the concept of governance 
conveniently gave the Bank the opportunity to address both the institu-
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tional requirements neglected by the Washington Consensus and the un-
foreseen disruptions created by the retreating state. 
The concept first appeared in the Bank’s main publications in 1989 in 
the World Development Report Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustain-
able Growth, in which the Bank described Africa’s state of affairs as a ‘cri-
sis of governance’ (World Bank 1989: 5). It was however in the discus-
sion paper Managing Development: The Governance Dimension (1991), that 
governance became the focus of a greater discussion within the Bank. 
The concept was then defined as: ‘the manner in which power is exer-
cised in the management of countries economic and social resources for 
development’ (World Bank 1991: i).  
Although the Bank’s definition of the concept has been in constant 
evolution throughout the 1990s23, the institution has remained adamant 
that it is solely in the name of efficiency that it promotes governance. 
This ‘efficiency’ argument at the heart of the governance agenda has 
given the Bank an opening into the political scene of countries under 
reform. It indeed solved the Bank’s main conundrum of the 1990s: how 
to tackle the institutional predicament of borrowing countries without 
overstepping its legal mandate. In fact, as soon as it started expressing 
interest in the concept of governance, the Bank began struggling to ex-
plain how such approach was not conflicting with its Articles of agree-
ment, which clearly states the institution’s apolitical mandate. As ana-
lysed in chapter two of this contribution, such apolitical restriction are 
said to protect the Bank’s: ‘reputation for technical excellence and objec-
tivity and its status as an international institution that is guided solely by 
its concern for economic development and not by any political agenda 
of its own’ (1991: 16). 
It is in The World Bank in a Changing World that Ibrahim Shihata 
(1991), the General Counsel and senior vice president of the World 
Bank from 1983 to 1998, addressed the Bank’s stance on governance in 
relation to the institution’s legal mandate: 
[…] the concept of governance in the sense of the overall management of 
a country's resources cannot be irrelevant to an international financial in-
stitution which at present not only finances projects but also is deeply in-
volved in the process of economic reform carried out by its borrowing 
members. Clearly, the concern here is not with the exercise of state powers 
in the broad sense but specifically with the appropriate management of the 
public sector and the creation of an enabling environment for the private 
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sector. It is a concern for rules which are actually applied and institutions 
which ensure the appropriate application of these rules, to the extent that 
such rules and institutions are required for the economic development of 
the country and in particular for the sound management of its resources24 
(Shihata 1991). 
The Bank does have a strong case for arguing that institutions are es-
sential for sustainable development. There is no doubt that the organisa-
tion had to address the questionable scorecard of aid efficiency. From 
local corruption to predatory states, donors are indeed faced with a sig-
nificant governance predicament. In his introduction to Gilbert and 
Vines’s book The World Bank: Structure and Policies (2000), Stiglitz ad-
dresses this quandary faced by the Bank: 
Earlier discussions of corruption would have been off limits for the World 
Bank, which was generally proscribed from engaging in political matters 
not directly related to development. But the new thinking argues that there 
is no bright line of demarcation: corruption, though a matter of politics, is 
at the heart of underdevelopment. But once that line has been broached, the limits 
of what should be in the Bank’s purview are no longer clear 25 (Stiglitz 2000: 3). 
Today, it is widely understood that the Bank did in fact, actively en-
gage in the political affairs of its country clients. As Caufield (1997: 193) 
bluntly observes, suggesting that the Bank is apolitical is both inaccurate 
and implausible. It is indeed important to note that in contradiction to 
Ibrahim Shihata’s recommendations, the IDM gave the Bank’s a point of 
entry to tackle issues directly linked to the exercise of state power. While 
the concept of governance answers many definitions, the Bank has cho-
sen the angle of efficiency in administrative and political affairs as a cor-
ner stone of its governance agenda26. As argued by Campbell (2000a) 
even when taken in the Bank’s narrow definition27 – as an ensemble of 
prescriptions on the efficient management of a country’s administrative 
and political affairs – the concept remains nonetheless ambiguous for at 
least two reasons: first, these sets of prescriptions suggest that there ex-
ists a consensus on the procedures of good management; and secondly, 
in spite of the use of such an administrative language presented as neu-
tral, the notion of governance: ‘entail a particular concept of the state, of 
its role, of its desirable evolution, of state-market relations, of the exer-
cise of power and of a particular political project’ (Campbell 2000a: 3). 
This leads Campbell to further conclude that the notion of governance 
may be shown to be ‘eminently political’ (2000a: 3). 
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In fact – and in the line of Campbell’s work – key theorists in the 
field of development have recently argued that the Bank is directly in-
volved in attempts to reorder power via the governance agenda. By fo-
cussing on issues of power and conflict as drivers of change, such key 
authors have provided important analytical insights, which as argued in 
this last section, are key in analysing the IDM’s new allocation mecha-
nisms28. 
4.3 Building the Self-Restraining State 
Armed with NIE theory and with new aid allocation mechanisms, the 
Bank of the turn of the century was able to construct a strategy that en-
abled it to restructure the political context of indebted countries while 
claiming that such a process was apolitical.  
In this final section, it is argued that the new aid allocation frame-
work promotes reforms that are necessary to consolidate the ‘self-
restraining state’. Such state overwhelmingly emphasises a ‘horizontal’ 
rather than a ‘vertical’ form of accountability. Horizontal accountability 
stresses an equilibrium between government organs as the central tool 
of democratic mechanisms, while the vertical form emphasises citizens’ 
control over the definition of policies and decision process, via the legis-
lative branch (Campbell 2005: 36). The consolidation of the self restrain-
ing state, which is closely linked to Gill’s notion of disciplinary neo-
liberalism (2000), is done by narrowing and shifting the political spaces 
in countries under reform, both between the state powers and between 
the state and civil society.  
While the case of civil society is studied in the following chapter, the 
remaining section provides an analysis of the new restraints mechanisms 
designed to re-distribute the political spaces within the architecture of 
the state.  
What clearly emerges from the foundations of the governance im-
perative is an agenda which seeks to address political regimes, separation 
of powers and mechanisms of restrains in countries under reform. As 
underlined by Robison (2006b) the neo-liberal interest in institutions is 
about securing the primacy of markets and property rights in constitu-
tional arrangements to insulate technocrats from the uncertainties of 
representative politics. In other words, it is about ‘replacing politics with 
governance’ (Robison 2006b: 5). 
It is in the 1997 World Development Report The State in a Changing 
 Chapter 4 109 
World that the Bank proposed a framework to address the underlying 
institutional predicament of reforming countries. Firmly grounded within 
NIE rationales, the ground breaking 1997 WDR laid the foundations of 
the IDM at the Bank; stating the institution’s interest in revisiting the 
‘basic questions about government: what its role should be, what it can 
and how best to do it’ (World Bank 1997: 1). It is no coincidence that 
such questions which have been central to Stiglitz’s work happen to ma-
terialise themselves in the World Bank Report. Not surprisingly, The State 
in a Changing World indeed sets out to answer these questions the same 
way Stiglitz its Chief Economist at the time did. In the Report, the Bank 
concludes that an effective state is central to development: ‘A clearer un-
derstanding of the institutions and norms embedded in markets shows 
the folly of thinking that development strategy is a matter of choosing 
between state and the market’ (1997: 38). It therefore proposes a new 
partnership which would translate the ‘symbiosis nature of the state and 
market relationship’, a partnership where ‘the state is a facilitator rather 
than as director’ (World Bank 1997: 18). 
What is pivotal to note at this point is that – in perfect synchronism 
with NIE foundations – the Bank of the 1990s was clearly creating a nar-
rative to justify a direct intervention in the political conditions by which 
reforms were to be implemented. As stated in the Sourcebook for Poverty 
Reduction Strategies – a compilation of chapters that details the Bank’s 
views on the PRS and aims to assist countries in developing and 
strengthening their strategies – the term Governance now refers not only 
‘to the exercise of power through a country’s economic, social, and po-
litical institutions’, it encompasses everything from ‘organizational rules 
and routines, formal laws, and informal norms that together shape the 
incentives of public policymakers, overseers, and providers of public ser-
vices’29 (Girishankar et al. n.d.: 271). 
Moreover, the political card attached to the governance imperative is 
further exposed by the Bank’s eagerness to map the actual incentives for 
a state to embrace the reforms. In fact, the Bank became specifically in-
terested in what incentives would overcome existing ‘deep distributional 
conflicts and constraints embedded in state institutions’ (World Bank 
1997: 13). In The State in a Changing World, the Bank thus eagerly explored 
the mechanisms of the regulatory state: 
Typically, changes in macroeconomic policy-dealing with exchange rates, 
fiscal policy, and trade policy-have come fastest. These reforms have po-
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litical implications but do not require the overhaul of institutions. They 
can be undertaken quickly, often through decree, by a small group of 
competent technocrats. All it takes is the political decision to make the 
change. 
 But other state reforms, dealing with regulation, social services, finance, 
infrastructure, and public works, cannot be accomplished so rapidly be-
cause they involve changing institutional structures established for differ-
ent purposes, to fit different rules of the game. This kind of institutional 
reform involves wrenching changes in the way government agencies think 
and act, and often a complete over-haul of long-established systems of pa-
tronage and corruption. But such change is absolutely essential if the ca-
pability of the state is ever to improve (World Bank 1997: 13). 
In this perspective, the ‘governance’ imperative embedded in the 
IDM clearly sets out to transcend the Washington Consensus traditional 
policy package to embark on the very political terrain of asking what 
kind of institutional policies would insure the long-term sustainability of 
the reforms. The IDM’s emphasised interest in the long-term sustainabil-
ity of the reform gives much weight to Gill’s argument that the World 
Bank plays a central role in promoting new constitutionalism. Gill fur-
ther argues that: ‘the crucial strategic significance of new constitutional-
ism is how it seeks to provide political anchorage for the power of capi-
tal in the long term’ (2000). 
This technocratic approach to governance depoliticizes social issues 
while reintroducing new norms that are restrictively redefining social and 
economical rights. The central aim of the reforms is to ‘protect’ the state 
from social pressures so that technocrats may be free to take decisions 
that are presented as neutral. As argued by the United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD): 
There is a growing trend to create autonomous public authorities that will 
check the discretionary powers of governments in key areas of policy mak-
ing. One set of these institutions includes central banks, finance and trade 
ministries, tax administration offices, and executive agencies in service de-
livery. A second set includes independent courts, electoral bodies and om-
budsmen. Although they share some characteristics in the promotion of 
horizontal forms of accountability, the two sets of institutions are differ-
ent. The first group may make policies that impact differently on social 
groups and individuals, while the second group is more likely to place con-
straints on behavior than to allocate resources or opportunities. In other 
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words, there are often hard choices to be made in the areas where new in-
dependent authorities are gaining influence (UNRISD 2000: 2). 
What is rather concerning about this particular type of state is the ex-
plicit intention to identify possible veto-gates and then proceed to isolate 
such specific areas from public interference. This endeavour is clearly 
rooted in the new aid allocation mechanisms, as underlined in the PRS 
Sourcebook: 
To bring about institutional change, government decision makers must be 
able to ensure the support and cooperation of other parts of government, 
which are critical to approving and implementing the reform project—for 
example, the legislature, bureaucracy, and judiciary. Assessing the strength 
of opposition to reform is important. It entails identifying the critical ‘veto 
gates’ or institutional junctures, at which particular actors can block the 
government’s reform initiative. Who within the government needs to ap-
prove the proposed reform for its enactment? Who might be opposed to 
the reform project and why? What change in the design of the reform 
might win their support? Which groups outside government are known to 
be opposed to the reform? (Girishankar et al. n.d.: 294) 
Moreover, in her analysis of the Bank’s Tool Kit: Commitment to Reform 
Diagnostic, Campbell (2002) demonstrates how the institution, under its 
role as a ‘Knowledge Center’ enters the political arena. She highlights 
that under such appellation, the Bank offers advises to assess the political 
desirability of proposed reforms, the political feasibility (including oppo-
sition to this project or to broader reforms inside or outside of the gov-
ernment), and the sustainability of reform, including potential changes in 
key stakeholders’30 (Campbell 2002: 27). The PRS Sourcebook further un-
derlines the need to examine the main obstacles to reform and how they 
can be overcome, which are: ‘the distributional characteristics of reform 
(the likely winners and losers), the political strength of key groups (par-
ticularly those that will lose out), and the design of existing state institu-
tions’ (Girishankar et al. n.d.: 144). Key to the NIE framework, these 
obstacles emphasise the need for a ‘strong state’ – i.e. ‘to be insulated 
from societal forces’ (Doner 1994: 400). Indeed Doner argues that: ‘insu-
lation permits officials to formulate policy and to mediate the influence 
of foreign capital independently of powerful distributional coalitions’ 
(1994: 400). 
What is crucial to emphasise at this stage is that there exist two formal 
mechanisms of restraint promoted by the IDM which seek to impede the 
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reversal of reform and also to limit democratic influence in the political 
economy. These mechanisms are a strong independent judiciary and the 
separation of state powers (World Bank 1997). These mechanisms repre-
sent an attempt to transform the architecture of the state, which defines: 
‘the relationships among the executive, legislature, and judiciary, and the 
extent to which they are able to scrutinize each other’s behavior’ (Giris-
hankar et al. n.d.: 271). 
Although the pressure exercised by donors for recipient governments 
to change their laws was present throughout the 1990s, the IDM is strik-
ing for the depth and systematic changes it advocated in terms of re-
forms in the legal sector. As argued by The Economist, the sector has be-
come the ‘motherhood and apple pie of development economics’ (2008). 
In fact, it is estimated that almost half of the Bank's total lending of $24 
billion in 2006 would have had some rule-of-law component (Economist 
2008). 
The overwhelming importance assigned to a strong legal framework 
within the IDM is clearly rooted in NIE. The emphasis on the rule of 
law translates the entrenched belief within NIE that the protection of 
propriety rights, national or international, is key to minimising transac-
tion costs – i.e. the cost of arranging, monitoring and enforcing contracts 
(North 1995). This is to say that the rule of law is essential in fostering 
private investment and encompasses everything from writing or revising 
commercial codes, bankruptcy status and company laws through over-
hauling regulatory agencies and teaching justice ministry officials how to 
draft legislation that fosters private investments (Messik 1999: 218). Ac-
cording to the Bank the rule of law is: ‘a key element of predictability and 
stability where business risks may be rationally assessed, transaction costs 
lowered, and governmental arbitrariness reduced’ (World Bank 1991: iii). 
The Bank’s expertise in legal and judiciary reform is overwhelming, its 
recommendation ranging from the selection and promotion of judges, 
developing procedures for litigation resolution and teaching justice min-
istry officials how to draft legislation. As further argued in the PRS 
Sourcebook:  
Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened pol-
icy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive 
arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law 
(Girishankar et al. n.d.: 271). 
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Such emphasis on building a legal framework specifically aimed at 
protecting property rights, is a hallmark of the self-restraining state. The 
idea is to clarify and simplify laws while simultaneously increasing the 
risk and the weight of possible sanctions in case of government miscon-
duct. In this respect, the CPIA mechanisms are quite straightforward, 
judging states on ‘the extent to which private economic activity is facili-
tated by an effective legal system and rule-based governance structure in 
which property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced’ 
(World Bank 2006a: 32). 
This rests on the premise that investors would constitute ‘a privileged 
stratum in capitalist societies – since the process of economic growth 
depends on the need to maintain investor confidence and thus govern-
ments are driven to sustain their credibility in the eyes of investors by 
attempting to provide an appropriate business climate’ (Gill 2000). Pub-
lic institutions indeed have to exercise discipline in order to prevent any 
interference with property rights and capital mobility (Gill 1995: 8).  
In its multi-country analysis of the mining sector in Africa, the con-
clusions of the Groupe de Recherche sur les activités minières en Afrique31 are 
illustrative of the key role the World Bank has been playing in redefining 
the legal settings in countries under reform. In fact, the research con-
cludes that the reform measure entailed a process of redefining the role 
of the state ‘that is so profound that it has no historical precedent’ 
(Campbell 2004: 7). This is to say that legal reforms advocated by the 
Bank have been key in shaping the role of local states, the nature and 
objectives of state interventions, and the determination of to what end, 
under whose control, and for whose benefit extractive industries operate. 
While the study clearly demonstrates that the regulatory and legal re-
forms promoted by the Bank in the mining sector have undoubtedly 
contributed to a more favourable environment for foreign investment, 
the study also concludes that the measures have fallen short of bringing 
forth sustainable development strategies and the introduction of norms 
and standards with regard to the protection of the environment, social 
impacts, or labour (Campbell 2004: 81). As Campbell concludes: 
In this regard, the extractive sector provides a particularly striking illustra-
tion of the way in which multilateral financial institutions, notably the 
World Bank, are, in view of their overall mission to reduce poverty and 
promote sustainable development, at times caught between contradictory 
and sometimes incompatible logics – promoting foreign private invest-
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ment as opposed to promoting the social and economic development of 
countries and their populations. This appears particularly true in the post-
adjustment African context, which has been characterised by a radical re-
definition of the role of the state (Campbell 2004: 81). 
Despite the IDM’s a-political narrative, it appears that legal and judi-
ciary reforms are locking-in policies which are striving to foster private 
investment, often to the detriment of interests that might arise from rep-
resentative politics. The rise of governance hides highly contentious is-
sues behind technical responses (UNRISD 2000: 7). As observed by Rit-
tich: ‘It is important to see legal reform as a part of a broader set of 
policy, legislative and institutional reforms which are designed to create 
not simply rule – and norm – based societies but particular types of mar-
ket economies’ (Rittich 1999: 17). 
The IDM’s new aid allocation mechanisms indeed isolate key political 
choices from the democratic realm, such as specific choices pertaining to 
the welfare state. These represent clear constrains on democratic choices 
which confer privileged rights of citizenship and representation to cor-
porate capital (Gill 1995: 8). This tendency to depoliticize the state con-
tributes to the institutions’ isolation from social demands which seek to 
influence the redistribution of resources. 
Conclusion 
Building on the idea that the Bank’s conditionality framework is intrinsi-
cally political, it has been argued here that the IDM represents a new 
corner stone in the attempt by neo-liberals to institutionalise the market 
ideology within reforming states. As such, with the new aid allocation 
mechanisms, the Bank is attempting to circumscribe the ability of bor-
rowing governments to challenge orthodox policies as prescribed by the 
greater donor community. 
Building on the gains of the structural adjustment period, the Bank 
has been a key element in promoting mechanisms of restraint deep 
within the state architecture in a way that any effective challenge to the 
neo-institutional reforms might prove to be quite difficult. It indeed be-
comes clear that in effectively transforming the state architecture, the 
Bank is shifting the political spaces between state and markets in a man-
ner that benefits one over the others. 
It is not the retreat of the state that the Bank is reaching for, but 
rather to transform the state’s functions in a way that undercuts its ability 
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to mediate, regulate or mobilise in favour of its citizens32. What indeed 
becomes striking is the democratic variable which appears to be conven-
iently avoided in the IDM’s narrative. Clearly, there is an urgent need to 
address the democratic deficit in the neo-liberal endeavour. 
The political consequences of the growing contradictions entrenched 
in the role of the self-restraining state – between the pressures for greater 
local ownership of the reform and a stricter governance framework – 
need to be studied. As studied in the following chapter, this is timely as 
such neo-liberal strategies, which are increasingly focused on institutions 
and governance, are clearly being carried out through PRS. 
 
Notes 
 
1 It is interesting to note that the Bank doesn’t have formal definition of 
‘conditionality’ in its legal framework or operational policies. Paragraph 13 of 
OP 8.60 policy identifies three essential requirements for the Bank to make dis-
bursements in a policy-based loan: (a) maintenance of an adequate macroeco-
nomic policy framework; (b) implementation of an overall program in a manner 
satisfactory to the Bank; and (c) compliance with critical policy and institutional 
actions (cited in Cisse and Raghavan 2005). 
2 In Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies, key authors from the 
World Bank – notably David Dollar, clearly demonstrate how the Bank con-
ceives technocrats. See Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren (2001). For a critical 
analsis of the Nigerian case, see Ibhawoh (1999). 
3 It is during the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development (March 2002) 
that all those stakeholders committed the concept of partnership between de-
veloping and developed countries, with to increasing both the volume of aid 
and the effectiveness of aid with a view to achieving the MDGs (United Na-
tions 2002). 
4 Of course, one needs to acknowledge that the ‘selectivity’ argument is not 
new to the Wolfensohn era. Easterly (2002) makes this point in his historical re-
view of the idea in the aid industry. He recalls that as early as 1963, the primordial 
objective was:  
To apply stricter standards of selectivity … in aiding developing countries” 
(President John F. Kennedy 1963) “Above all, it is realized that … that no 
foreign help will suffice where there is no national will to make the fundamen-
tal changes which are needed. It has become very clear that the impact made 
by contribution of resources from outside depends on … his overall eco-
nomic and social policy” (Pearson Commission 1969) “This report stresses 
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that the relief of poverty depends both on aid and on the policies of the re-
cipient countries” (Cassen Development Committee Task Force on Foreign 
Aid, 1985) “Donors…agreed to place greater emphasis on economic per-
formance.” (Fleming and Smith 1987, IDA-8) “The Deputies underlined the 
importance of sound macroeconomic and sectoral policies as a basis for effec-
tive use of IDA funds in all recipient countries.” (Stern 1990, IDA-9) “"Even 
very well designed projects cannot succeed in a poor policy…environment." 
(Wapenhans Report 1992, cited in Meltzer Commission Report) (Easterly 
2002: 36). 
5 The International Development Association (IDA) is the Bank’s concessional 
lending arm. In addition to the PRSP and a CAS, countries still need a Letter of 
Intent. 
6 Concretely, PRS replaced the Policy Framework Papers of the structural ad-
justment period as preconditions for concessional and grant financing from the 
Bank and the IMF. 
7 Launched in 1996 the Initiative’s stated objective is to reduce the external 
debt of the poorest countries. To be eligible for the HIPC Initiative a country 
must: face unsustainable debt situation; be only eligible for highly concessional 
assistance from the IDA and the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) and; establish a track record of reform. The Initiative was modified in 
1999 and was linked to the PRS process. 
8 Three criteria are used to determine which countries are eligible to borrow 
IDA resources (World Bank 2008f): 
1. Relative poverty defined as gross national income per capita below an es-
tablished threshold and updated annually (in fiscal year 2008: $1,065). 
Most of the 80 countries eligible for IDA funds have average annual in-
comes of less than $500 per capita and in many, substantially less. 
2. Lack of creditworthiness to borrow on market terms and therefore a 
need for concessional resources to finance the country's development 
program.  
3. Good policy performance, defined as the implementation of economic 
and social policies that promote growth and poverty reduction. 
9 In 1998, the Country Performance Rating system was revised and replaced 
by the CPIA system. The criteria were substantially revised: coverage was ex-
panded to include governance and social policies, the number of criteria was set 
at 20 (where it remained until 2004), and the ratings scale was changed from a 5 
to a 6 point scale (World Bank 2006a: 1). Following some of the recommenda-
tions of the External Panel Review on the CPIA (World Bank 2004a), the Bank 
rationalized the CPIA content to 16 criteria and the extended the rating scale. 
See Hout (2007: 24-49) for an historical analysis of the Bank’s approach to per-
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formance-based allocation. 
10 To ensure that ratings are consistent with performance within and across 
regions: (i) detailed questions and definitions are provided to country teams for 
each of the six rating levels for the 16 criteria; and (ii) an institution-wide proc-
ess of rating and vetting a dozen ‘benchmark’ countries is carried out to anchor 
the ratings in all IDA regions. This is followed by a process of institutional re-
view of all country ratings before they are finalized (World Bank 2008f). 
11 For a thorough analysis of the CPIA, see Hout (2007: 24-50). 
12 According to the World Bank, 80% of the IDA Country Performance Rat-
ing is based on CPIA, while the remaining 20% is based on a country’s per-
formance in relation to the portfolio of outstanding loans. The lather - which is 
the Annual Report on Portfolio Performance - measures the quality of devel-
opment project and program management, the Bank’s is used to determine a 
score for each country’s implementation performance. In the second step, this 
composite rating is multiplied by the ‘governance factor’ to produce the coun-
try’s IDA CPR. 
13 The cluster ‘Public Sector Management and Institutions’ has the following 
criterion: Property Rights and Rule-based Governance; Quality of Budgetary 
and Financial Management; Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization; Quality of 
Public Administration; Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the 
Public Sector. IDA’s resource is also allocated on the basis of population and 
GNI per capita. 
14 See Carroll (2007) who provides an interesting analysis of Country Assistance 
Strategies. 
15 The Citizens Network on Essential Services aims to democratize national and 
global governance by supporting citizens groups that are engaged in influencing 
policy decisions about basic services: water, power, education, and health care. 
16 To be define as having a: ‘[...] “relatively good” policies for productive use 
of development assistance for poverty reduction, the World Bank states that as 
an overall score of at least 3.0 on the Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) index. Of 136 countries rated in 2003, 112 had CPIAs of 
3.0 or greater. “3.0” rating on the CPIA rating scale in a policy area indicates 
that there are deficiencies in one or more of the criteria being rated in that area, 
while a rating of “4.0” indicates that a country is dealing quite effectively with 
most issues in the policy area’ (OED 2004a: 14). 
17 On the overall debate over the Bank’s failure to implement enforce the ‘se-
lectivity’ argument, see Kanbur (2000) and Van de Walle (2001). 
18 My translation.  
19 Although originally developed as part of a theory of schizophrenia within 
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families, Gore suggests that a double-bind structure can be found in a variety of 
institutions. The authors defines the double bind as the occurring within fami-
lies: ‘when a child faces two powerful injunctions from his or her parents to 
behave in certain ways, each of which is enforced through punishments that 
threaten survival, but both injunctions cannot be achieved because they are mu-
tually incompatible. The final ingredient of the double-bind situation is a fur-
ther injunction that prohibits the person from escaping the field of social inter-
action within which the contradictory injunctions occur’ (2004: 277). 
20 My emphasis. 
21 Hout gives a thorough review of the literature on the subject. He divides the 
critics of the selectivity argument as follows: the methodological and empirical 
problems related to the use of cross-country regressions and the construction 
of the policy index, issues of model specification and the distorting impact of 
influential observations and outliers, the inclusion of additional data, the impact 
of external shocks on the aid-growth relationship, and the impact of factors 
such as political stability, democracy and post-conflict reconstruction (Hout 
2008: 20). 
22 On the subject, also see Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2003). 
23 For a thorough historical analysis of the concept of governance, see Campbell 
(2000a, 2000b). For a critical analysis of the concept’s operational use within the 
Bank’s policies, see Hout (2007). 
24 My emphasis. Shihata further cautions: ‘With regard to legal framework for 
development, the Bank’s concern is with its procedural and institutional as-
pects. The substantive elements of such framework have political connotations 
that may sometimes lie outside the Bank’s mandate’ (1991: 16). 
25 My emphasis. 
26 Other multilateral players, such as the UNDP, have rather embraced the de-
mocratic, human right and participatory angle of the concept, using the notion as 
a point of entry in the struggle against poverty and inequalities (Campbell 2000a: 
4). 
27 Campbell further argues: ‘not only does the notion refer to a multitude of 
definitions which vary according to the strategies of the different actors – 
whether bi- or multilateral financial institutions, aid agencies or NGOs, but it 
may be shown, notably with regard to the World Bank, that the definition of 
the same notion is in constant evolution within the same institutions (2000a: 3). 
28 On the subject see Campbell 2005; Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2001; Harri-
son 2004, 2006; Hout and Robison 2008. 
29 The three key dimensions of governance are: (a) the process by which gov-
ernments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; (b) the ca-
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pacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and to formulate, im-
plement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; and (c) respect for institu-
tions that govern economic and social interactions (Girishankar et al. n.d.: 271). 
30 Campbell is referring to the paper World Bank, ‘Tool Kit: Commitment to 
Reform Diagnostic’, Institutional Analysis and Assessment. Available at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/toolkitscommitment.htm?OpenDocu
ment (accessed March 16, 2005) 
31 GRAMA’s research focus on the economic and social issues linked to the 
growing presence of mining activities in Africa. GRAMA works within an inter-
national political economy perspective and constitutes a forum for reflection and 
a meeting place for multidisciplinary researchers interested in issues related to 
economic, social, and environmental development in Africa and corporate social 
responsibility. See http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/grama
32 See Biersteker (1990). 
  
5 
The World Bank’s Participatory 
Agenda: An Analysis of the PRS Experi-
ences 
 
 
Those who are absent are always wrong 
(Congolese proverb) 
 
Introduction 
Increasing pressure from critics both within the Bank itself and exter-
nally has forced the World Bank to embrace a wider social development 
agenda. As a result, the Bank has been keen in arguing that its past zeal-
ous emphasis on economic growth – which marked the structural ad-
justment model – has been tamed with a more friendly over-arching ob-
jective: poverty reduction. Officially endorsed by James D. Wolfensohn, 
the new agenda was said to differ from the former Washington Consen-
sus by acknowledging that poverty includes a range of economic and so-
cial deprivations and that institutions were key to the development proc-
ess. The new ‘social development agenda’, which is core the Integrated 
Development Model, entrenched participation processes deep within the 
aid structure, and in so doing gave centre stage to ‘civil society’. It is a 
central feature of the new PRS that they would be written by govern-
ments with the participation of civil society. Such a process is expected 
to foster local ownership and overall, increase the reforms’ efficiency. 
While participation has become the central instrument to carry out 
the social development agenda on the ground, the debate over the politi-
cal significance of such agenda remains wide open. Some authors have 
argued that the Bank’s participatory model indicates that the institution is 
finally democratising its aid structures and is thus genuinely seeking em-
powerment of local entities1. By contrast, others have suggested that the 
new agenda represents a mere discursive shift and is nothing more than a 
public relation stunt2. 
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In this chapter3, the participatory agenda is analysed in light of the 
PRS experience. It is suggested that the question related to the participa-
tion process should not be limited to whether or not participation meth-
ods took place but rather what political objectives the participation proc-
ess itself accomplish in the larger technocratic setting of the IDM. The 
central argument guiding this chapter is that the participatory mecha-
nisms within the PRS processes – in direct contradiction to the owner-
ship narrative – should by no means be defined as part of an opening of 
political spaces in countries under reform. In relocating the PRS partici-
patory experiences within larger questions about political power it is ar-
gued that co-option is the intended objective of the participatory mecha-
nisms. This is a co-option of certain segments of civil society, which 
serves as a powerful tool for managing indifference or resistance within 
countries under reform. 
The argument is presented in four sections. The first part addresses 
the rise of the participatory agenda at the Bank and how powerful groups 
within the Bank itself have hijacked such an agenda. The second part 
investigates the mechanism of implementing such agenda on the ground 
is investigated. PRS experiences are analysed in the third section. It is 
observed that certain segments of civil society – commonly reduced to 
NGOs – have become pivotal ponds in the framework by providing le-
gitimacy to the process and assuming greater apolitical functions. Such 
functions, serve to ground disciplinary neo-liberalism at the local level. 
The last part of the chapter analyses the apolitical functions of CSOs 
within the IDM. 
The overall analysis will demonstrate that this instrumentalisation of 
certain segments of civil society in order to tackle the resistance against 
the neo-liberal policies might prove to be highly problematic for the de-
mocratic regime in countries under reform. This subject will be ad-
dressed in the subsequent chapter. 
5.1 The Changing Participatory Agenda at the Bank  
Although often credited to the Wolfensohn presidency, the participatory 
agenda was actively discussed throughout the 1980s in light of the Bank’s 
difficulties to implement its projects. Traditionally, projects had been 
implemented without any local stakeholder consultation, let alone any 
participation. This was seen as problematic by the social scientists who 
had been introduced within the Bank’s staff. The space the Social Devel-
 Chapter 5 122 
opment Network created for itself within the Bank forced an internal de-
bate on the issue of participation. Edited by Michael Cernea and pub-
lished by the World Bank in 1985, the book Putting People First pioneered 
the idea that: ‘people are—and should be—the starting point, the center, 
and the end goal of each development effort’ (Davis 2004: 2). This book 
was followed by Lawrence Salmen’s Listen to the People (1987) which sug-
gested: ‘[…] ways in which participant observation can strengthen 
evaluation, assist project managers in solving implementation problems, 
and help adapt projects to the values and needs of the poor’ (cited by 
Davis 2004: 2). 
At first the argument for a pro-participatory agenda rested solely on 
the possibility for stakeholder consultations to boost the success rate of 
specific projects. However, the global campaigns of a loud and highly 
critical international civil society movement in the 1990s forced the Bank 
to open up to the idea of participation of project stakeholders, at least 
within the Bank’s narrative. 
The acknowledgement of the relevance of participation emerged in 
the 1994 Bank publication, which provided lessons learned from twenty 
participatory projects. World Bank and Participation suggested that: ‘[…] 
participation was not only a means (a tool), but also an end (empowering 
people)’ (Davis 2004: 6). This was followed by the publication of the Par-
ticipation Sourcebook in 1994, which according to Gloria Davis4 had a ma-
jor role in mainstreaming participation in the Bank (2004: 9). Driven by 
these internal debates the Bank already had guidelines on Social Assess-
ment as early as 1994 which were designed to reduce poverty and pro-
mote sustainable development. However, the Bank, never formally 
adopted these guidelines issued by the Social Policy Division in the Environ-
ment Department. For Davis, this is mainly because: 
Bank practitioners were deeply divided on whether or not a policy on 
social assessment should be mandatory or advisory, and how rigorously 
it should be applied. Some of those who supported a mandatory policy 
felt that by waiting, a body of successful examples could be developed to 
make the case for a strong policy more compelling. By the time this body 
of work was available, however, antipathy was growing within the Bank 
toward additional mandatory processing requirements, and efforts to 
formalize the policy and make it mandatory lost momentum. Whether 
this was a missed opportunity or a blessing in disguise, remains a matter 
of dispute within the family […] (Davis 2004: 9). 
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As argued in chapter two, there is a lot to say on the internal divisions 
within the Bank itself and on the importance of the social development 
agenda. Hence the power struggles within the institution have always 
been an important part in explaining some of the contradictions between 
the Bank’s social narrative and the actual experiences on the ground. 
Nevertheless, as Robert Chase, Senior Social Development Economist in 
the World Bank’s Social Development Department, concludes, it is a fact 
that the influence of non-economists within the Bank often remains 
marginal (Interview September 18, 2006). Chase further concedes that 
the Social Development Department remains a ‘second class citizen’ 
within the Bank structure. Such observation is here quite revealing con-
sidering that the Department’s task – as described by Chase – is to moni-
tor the role of the PRS process to make sure that: ‘while the Bank was 
talking the talk [it was also] walking the walk’ (Interview September 18, 
2006).  
Yet the Wolfensohn presidency took important steps in order to 
make the Bank more transparent to its critics and to propose a more 
open agenda. Wolfensohn himself was described as an outspoken pro-
ponent of participation and outreach to civil society. He had agreed to 
involve himself and his staff with the Structural Adjustment Participatory 
Review International Network (SAPRIN), comprised of a number of NGOs 
engaged in the ‘50 Years Is Enough’ campaign. The initiative that fol-
lowed (the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative – 
SAPRI) was a joint five-year, multi-country participatory investigation 
into the effects of specific structural adjustment policies on a broad 
range of economic and social sectors and population groups (SAPRIN 
2004). 
James D. Wolfensohn’s official commitment to entrench civil soci-
ety’s participation within the Bank’s projects was further underlined by 
the introduction of the Comprehensive Development Framework 
(CDF), in which he stated that: ‘In all its forms, civil society is probably 
the largest single factor in development’, declared Wolfensohn (1999a: 
25). He identified a list of ‘players in the development business’ in the 
CDF matrix: governments; multilateral and bilateral agencies; civil soci-
ety in all its forms and the private sector, domestic and foreign (Wolfen-
sohn 1999a: 21-22).  
A key point of contention here is the evasiveness nature of the Bank’s 
approach to the concepts of civil society5. As such, instead of a clear 
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definition, the CDF matrix provides a list of the possible actors which 
compose ‘civil society’. These are: elected parliamentary assemblies; relig-
ions and religious organisations; foundations; trade unions and employee 
organisations; employer organisations; NGOs with international reach; 
local NGOs; local groups organised for consultation and for implemen-
tation of projects; and organisations of indigenous peoples (Wolfensohn 
1999a: 26). A more substantial definition – yet overwhelmingly inclusive 
– may be found on a page of the World Bank Website dedicated to civil 
society. It defines the group as a: 
[…] wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations 
that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of 
their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, 
religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: community 
groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indige-
nous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, profes-
sional associations, and foundations (World Bank 2008b). 
As argued in the in the following section, there exists an historical 
malaise within the Bank in clearly defining the concept of civil society. 
The problem stems from the fact that the concept brings forth eminently 
political discussions on the role and nature of this so-called ‘civil society’. 
As such, the idea of civil society at the Bank precludes the reality that 
there are deep and ongoing fractures and conflicts within civil society 
itself. 
It is interesting to note that while the Bank, in the 1980s and early 
1990s6, emphasised the term ‘NGOs’, the Wolfensohn presidency shifted 
towards the concept of ‘CSOs’. Alan Fowler – who at that time was an 
adviser to the Bank on issues of enabling civil society participation – ex-
plains that ‘Wolfensohn wanted greater inclusion’ and as such, he wanted 
to include faith organisations. As a result, attention turned to ‘civil soci-
ety’7 (Interview May 16, 2009). However, Fowler further observes that: 
‘the political difficulties of dealing with CSOs that wanted the bank to 
close – 50 Years is Enough – added to voices and backlash […] against the 
expansion from NGO-ism to CSO-ism […]’ (Interview May 16, 2009). 
Such political realities come a long way to explain how, in practice, the 
Bank has tended to use the concepts of civil society, CSOs and ‘NGOs’ 
interchangeably8 in its literature on PRS participation. As thoroughly ar-
gued in the remaining of this contribution, such practice hides the politi-
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cal intricacies inherent to ‘civil society’. In other words, it will be argued 
that in equating terms such as ‘civil society participation’ to the depoliti-
cised practice of having certain segments of this so-called civil society 
participate on limited issues, as reflected by the PRS experience, the 
Bank is attempting to limit participation to a technocratic and functional-
ist exercise. 
5.2 Participation and the PRS: from Narrative to 
Implementation 
The participatory agenda of the IDM has been primarily carried out by 
its main aid allocation mechanisms: the Poverty Reduction Strategies. 
The Bank’s PRS Sourcebook identifies several guiding principles for par-
ticipation in order to instigate a ‘more inclusive and equitable processes 
for formulating, implementing, and monitoring’ PRS. According to the 
Sourcebook, an ‘effective participation’ should focus on country owner-
ship, here characterised by government commitment and broad owner-
ship of the PRS process. The second given criteria is an outcome-based 
approach to participation, where the participatory processes are designed 
and conducted with specific outcomes in mind (Tikare et al. n.d.: 238). 
In addition to the necessity of being an inclusive process, the Sourcebook 
states that the process will foster ownership if the participation and its 
outcome are transparent (Tikare et al. n.d.: 239). 
However, the PRS participatory experiences appear to embody seri-
ous flaws, raising doubts over the Bank’s intention to foster genuine 
ownership at the local level9. An overwhelming issue that repeatedly 
emerged out of the PRS participatory agenda is linked to the pressured 
time frame of the process. Governments were rushing the participation 
requirement in order to rapidly reach the completion point for debt re-
lief10. As this was a major problem across the board for the first genera-
tion of PRSPs, the Bank and the Fund addressed this issue by instating 
the Interim PRSP (I-PRSP). The I-PRSP allows governments to access 
debt relief without compromising the participatory process of a full 
PRSP. I-PRSPs are meant to provide a roadmap for formulating the full 
PRSP (Tikare et al. n.d.: 240). 
While the I-PRSP addressed part of the time frame issue, experiences 
have shown that allowing a genuine participatory process to take place 
would require much more time than expected by the PRS process. On 
this issue, EURODAD – an important network of European develop-
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ment NGOs11 – stated that: ‘The principal problem is that producing a 
PRSP through a comprehensive participation will take significantly 
longer than expected – up to five years or more […]’ (EURODAD 
2001a). The Bank does not clearly establish a time frame for the partici-
patory process. However, it does acknowledge that consultations require 
time for adequate preparation – i.e. two to three months lead time for 
planning and preparation (World Bank 2002a: 28). Nonetheless, certain 
countries rushed the transition from an I-PRSP to a PRSP. This was for 
example the case in Malawi, where the government presented a full 
PRSP only four months after its I-DSRP. The Operation Evaluation 
Department (OED), the Bank’s own evaluation branch, states that 
rushed preparation of documents to meet the Bank and the Fund’s dead-
lines was cited as a problem, notably in Cambodia, Mozambique, Nicara-
gua and Tanzania (OED 2004b). 
Other technical issues have been linked to the lack of quality informa-
tion made available for the groups expected to participate to the consul-
tations. The IMF and World Bank 2004 evaluation of PRSPs progress in 
implementation observes that: ‘A more diverse set of stakeholders is en-
gaging in the PRS process, […]. They seek deeper engagement in PRS 
implementation and monitoring phases, but frequently express frustra-
tion that the flow of information and its quality continues to fall short of 
their expectations’ (2004: 18). In a synthesis study focussing on the Bo-
livian and the Tanzania PRSPs, Curran observes that the consultations 
for the first Bolivian PRSP were held in Spanish, which is not the first 
language of indigenous groups (Curran 2005). In a review of the quality 
and results of PRSPs in 19 countries CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis – a 
network of Catholic donors representing NGOs from eight European 
countries as well as Canada and the US12 – collected evidences of the lack 
of information sharing from government to civil society organisations in 
the case of Mozambique, Rwanda, Niger and Honduras, as well as Bo-
livia (2004: 4). 
Such difficulties faced by CSOs highlight the fundamental question 
about the quality of the participatory process within the PRS. The Bank 
has been keen in absorbing critiques of the technical aspects of participa-
tion and has adjusted its recommendations over time. This outlines the 
underlying argument of the Bank that issues set forth by the participation 
agenda are technical in nature. For Jean-Christophe Bas, the Manager of 
the Development Policy Dialogue at the World Bank, while ‘engaging 
 Chapter 5 127 
with all the communities is the wish of the institution [the World Bank] 
[it] sometimes may generate frustrations because of the long time that it 
takes’ (interview September 18, 2006). Bas further observes that ‘a big 
mistake is the acronym of the PRSP’, suggesting that part of the problem 
with the process is that the ‘acronym does not resonate in peoples mind’. 
Such strict focus on the technical aspects of participation is wide spread 
within the Bank’s evaluation of participatory process. For example, in the 
document Consultation with Civil Society: A Sourcebook the Bank suggests 
that CSO frustrations with the PRS process would be resolved by invit-
ing participants well in advance of a consultation and with background 
information disseminated to them at least two to three weeks prior to it 
(2002a: 28). The Sourcebook further observes that: ‘Inviting CSOs to a 
consultation at short notice creates ill-will and promotes the impression 
of not taking them seriously’ (2002a: 28). 
If over the last years the quality of the participatory process has fluc-
tuated from one country to another, an important factor has undoubt-
edly been the willingness of governments to engage with CSOs. While in 
many countries the processes were rushed because governments were in 
need of the debt relief funds linked to the PRSP, in other instances, it 
appears that governments were simply not interested in including civil 
society. In those cases, observed the Southern African Regional Poverty Net-
work: ‘[governments] did the minimal amount of consultations required’ 
(Curran 2005: 2). EURODAD further observes that CSOs in Kenya re-
ported that the government wasn’t keen on providing documentation 
prior to the consultation process of the first PRS of the country. In this 
case, it is the Bank and the Fund who stepped forward and made the 
draft I-PRSP available (EURODAD 2001b). CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis 
lists cases of non-cooperative governments towards the participation of 
CSOs in PRS notably in Uganda, Rwanda and other Francophone West 
and Central African countries (2004: 4).  
These obstacles linked to government-CSOs dynamics have often 
been the subjects of complaints to the Bank. The fact that the Bank and 
the Fund do not evaluate the participatory process has indeed been the 
subject of great controversy. While there are ‘recommendations’ pro-
vided by the IFI, there are no mechanisms in place to reject a PRSP 
which would have been the subject of a superficial participation process. 
Obviously, political, strategic and economic interests of the greater de-
velopment community have gone a long way to explain the efforts of the 
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IFI in exercising pressure on specific governments to foster a participa-
tory process. As observed by EURODAD, CSOs have noted that the 
IFI have sometimes been quite evasive when they did not want to upset 
the local government, relegating the participatory issue to a minor crite-
rion in the PRS process (2001b). 
In fact, and this is undeniably the heart of the problem on participa-
tion, there exist an obvious ambiguity between the concept as defined in 
the IDM and the fact that the IFI chose not to enforce the principle by 
linking it to the acceptance of the final papers. As summarised by Tim 
Kessler of Citizens Network on Essential Services during the EURODAD 
annual conference: ‘It is simply dishonest for the multilateral lenders to 
declare that participation is a key to poverty reduction, and then tell civil 
society to go complain to their own government if it doesn’t happen’ 
(Kessler 2000). 
Well beyond the issue of local government unwillingness to encour-
age CSOs participation, remains the crucial issue of the content available 
for the participation process. It indeed appears that in promoting partici-
pation in the reform process, the Bank is undeniably trying to give a new 
aura of legitimacy to its operations and thus provide what Jean-
Christophe Bas, the Manager of the Development Policy Dialogue at the 
World Bank, admittedly characterised as a ‘cosmetic exercise’ of consul-
tation with CSOs (Interview October 10, 2006). 
While the PRS Sourcebook defines participation as: ‘[…] the process by 
which stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, 
policymaking, resource allocations, and/or program implementation’ 
(Tikare et al. n.d.: 237), the PRS experiences show that this might be 
quite over-enthusiastic for what is actually happening on the ground. In 
their analysis of the participatory process, McGee and Norton (2000) 
proposed a ‘ladder of participation’, differentiating between i) Informa-
tion sharing; ii) Consultation; iii) Joint decision-making and; iv) Initiation 
and control by stakeholders. Contrary to the Sourcebook’s definition of 
participation – by which one could easily conclude that the participatory 
process is expected to reach the highest step of the ladder proposed by 
McGee and Norton – experiences so far have rather shown that partici-
pation has taken the form of ‘information sharing’ or at best, it has been 
‘consultation’. 
In fact, it appears that even in the best scenarios, the PRSP content on 
which CSOs were allowed to debate was overwhelmingly limited to tech-
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nical sectors. In her analysis of the institutionalisation of participation in 
the 2003 Ugandan PRSP13 revision, Namara (2009) highlights the con-
straints faced by CSOs during a consultation process which was organised 
into sector working groups. In her interviews with NGO representatives, 
she notes that there seams to be a consensus on the fact that their efforts 
were fragmented, limiting the possibility of thinking holistically about 
principles that guide the PRSP (Namara 2009).  
The Bank appears to have tackled this issue by suggesting that the lack 
of contribution to policymaking by civil society organisations is ex-
plained by their lack of capacity. While almost everyone is fully dedicated 
to the process, the jargon of PRSPs is very complex, argues Jean-
Christophe Bas (Interview September 18, 2006). As such, the Manager of 
the Development Policy Dialogue at the Bank concludes that the prob-
lem with participation in HIPC countries is one of capacity (Interview 
September 18, 2006). This take on the participation difficulties in PRS is 
generalised within the Bank’s official documents. For example, in the 
evaluation of PRSP progress in implementation, the World Bank ob-
serves that the: ‘capacity to contribute to policymaking and to engage in 
a constructive debate on policy is limited, particularly among civil society 
organisations. This is an area where coordinated assistance from other 
multilateral and bilateral donors can play an important role’ (IMF and 
World Bank 2004: 19). 
Capacity deficit is a genuine concern for CSOs’ participation in PRS, 
whether CSOs’ ability to address macro-economic issues or their capac-
ity to propose alternative policies14. While CSOs would undeniably bene-
fit from capacity building, there appears to be an important lack of struc-
tural analysis of the political underpinning of CSO participation. 
Downgrading the problematic surrounding participation to an issue of 
mere capacity is highly debatable. Well beyond the technicalities linked to 
the participatory process itself, the divergence in the power dimensions 
between the actors in the PRS playing field, do remain to be addressed. 
5.3 The Morning After: Have the Consultations Influenced 
the Papers? 
The participatory experiences, notably due to the wide range of countries 
involved, have obviously led to mixed experiences and evaluations. 
There are many examples where the PRS participation process was posi-
tive15. Sierra Leone’s first full PRSP, for example, is cited as having been 
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produced in a relatively participative manner (EURODAD 2005). The 
civil society in Zambia mobilised itself and taped into the policy dialogue 
during early formulation as well as final evaluation of the policy and in 
Uganda, there was a set up for participation and monitoring the policy 
implementation (Braathen 2006: 6). Other cases have been reported 
where the participatory process was a blatant failure. For example, East-
erly reports that in Bolivia, the first draft of the PRSP: ‘was written in 
part by an American consultant in Paris’, while the Cambodian first 
PRSP was prepared: ‘by 10 foreign consultants with guidance from the 
World Bank’ with little government involvement (Easterly 2002: 44). 
In this section, it is argued that there is a need to transcend the strict 
focus on the technical aspects of the participatory process in PRS, a 
trend which is hiding the overarching political roots of the current em-
phasis on participation. Two issues are at play here: one linked to the 
PRS content opened to CSO consultations and one linked to the actual 
possibilities for these consultations to influence the content of a final 
PRSP. 
The analysis of the participatory endeavour in PRS countries points to 
the fact that macro-economic issues appear to have been kept well out of 
reach of the participatory process. In the evaluation of PRSPs progress in 
implementation, the World Bank concludes that: ‘There is as yet relatively 
little evidence of a broad-based and open discussion of macroeconomic 
policy alternatives in PRSPs’ (IMF and World Bank 2004: 19). The under-
lying problem is linked to the existence of parallel processes where on the 
one hand soft issues such as education and health are open to participa-
tion, while macro-economic issues are not on the table. In the case of the 
first PRSP in Bolivia16 for example, Curran’s study showed that most of 
the discussions were kept to how the HIPC funds would be spent in se-
lected sectors:  
CSOs were informed that they were not able to discuss the role of the 
state in stabilising the economy in Bolivia or the IFI conditionalities to 
which the Government had agreed. The result was that the PRSP docu-
ment focused on policies narrowly related to the productive sectors, some 
of which had been recommended by CSOs at the consultations, but CSOs 
remained critical that broader issues on macro-economic policies and trade 
were omitted from the final draft (Curran 2005: 8). 
Undoubtedly in direct response to the score of criticism following the 
experiences of the first generation of PRS, the Bank now acknowledges 
 Chapter 5 131 
the importance of opening the macro-economic framework to the par-
ticipatory process. In the PRS Sourcebook, it is observed that:  
Macroeconomic policies are generally viewed by governments, donors, 
and even some civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs as being too 
technical for them to contribute. However, recent experience shows that 
participation in macroeconomic policy is possible, and that it helps to off-
set some of the harsher side effects of these policies, which can include 
cutting subsidies or imposing value added taxes, for example. There are 
typically some representative groups in society who can actively engage in 
substantive dialogue with donors and government on policy alternatives, 
and there are other groups that can speak to issues such as sequencing of 
policy reforms and adopting measures to increase accountability and 
transparency (Tikare et al. n.d.: 247). 
While this is a shift to be celebrated by CSOs, there are serious 
doubts that the participatory process would actually influence PRSPs, 
especially at the macro-economic level. The foundations of the IDM re-
main solidly anchored within the objective of consolidating the regula-
tory state. In the previous chapter, it was argued that the IDM’s govern-
ance framework is about controlling the gateways of reforming 
countries’ economy in a way that weeds-out unwarranted political influ-
ence. The analysis of the PRS experience in light of the governance 
agenda is quite revealing as it explains the contradictions between the 
content of the final PRSPs and the participatory process. Such discrep-
ancy between the participation and the Papers are rooted in the con-
straints imposed by the new conditionality framework which prioritises 
market-enabling policies. The striking similarities from one final PRSP to 
the next does suggest that the participatory process which is argued to be 
core to the PRS framework is tromped by the neo-liberal prerequisites. 
As observed by Robert Chase of the World Bank, PRSPs are not run by 
the Social Development Department but by the same group of macro-
economists who used to manage the Structural adjustment programs. 
Chase bluntly adds that: ‘These people are absolutely not interested in 
discussing some of these participatory process’ (Interview September 18, 
2006). 
In their analysis of the overall PRS framework, Bretton Woods Project – 
an advocacy NGO which analyses and seeks to influence the IFIs – con-
cludes that: 
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While there have been examples of innovation in some areas, the macro-
economic framework has remained largely unchanged. Many NGOs are 
concerned that this contradiction means that governments opt for pro-
grammes that they know will be accepted even if this conflicts with priori-
ties identified through consultative processes (Bretton Woods Project 
2003). 
An analysis of the chapter on macroeconomic issues of the PRS 
Sourcebook is quite revealing. The Sourcebook clearly states that a PRSP 
must espouse what the Bank defines as ‘sound macroeconomic policies’. 
Furthermore, while the Bank is now more inclined to open the participa-
tion process to macroeconomic issues, the strict conditionality package 
attached to the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility remains. 
This leaves no doubt that the little space remaining for negotiations lies 
between the executive branch and the World Bank. In other words, con-
sidering the importance of international aid allocation for the HIPC, it is 
highly unlikely that indebted governments would actually risk writing a 
paper that defied the orthodoxy, an argument which resonates in an 
overwhelming case of PRS experiences. While such facts led the World 
Development Movement to conclude that: ‘PRSP[s] have become a rub-
ber-stamping exercise for conventional Bank and Fund policies’ (Jones 
and Hardstaff 2005: 7), Oxfam International concludes that ‘it seems to be 
“business as usual” with regards to policy design’ (2001: 5). Dembele, 
from the Forum for African Alternatives and 50 Years Is Enough Network 
South Council, further observes that there is a lot of frustration in the CSO 
community:  
They have been frustrated by the PRSP process: They found out that they 
were used more as alibi than considered as true partners whose opinions 
are valued and taken seriously. In several countries, including Uganda, 
Mauritania, Senegal, Tanzania and Mali, CSOs have found themselves as 
the ‘guinea pigs’ of the PRSP process (Dembele 2004). 
It is further illustrative that the Bank’s language used to refer to the 
participating organisations has alternated between two different mean-
ings. On the one hand, the organisations are ‘stakeholders’ but on the 
other hand, they are sometimes rather perceived as vested interests. The 
difference being whether they agree or not with the neo-liberal frame-
work. 
This further highlights the risk of ‘participation fatigue’ of CSOs 
which have been reorienting time, moneys and staff towards the PRS 
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process. Molenaers and Renard, who have analysed the participatory 
process in PRS warn that these empty participation exercises may lead to 
participation fatigue and heighten the already high levels of distrust exist-
ing between the state and wider society (2006). And the frustration ap-
pears to be warranted. In a study of 42 PRSPs, the World Development 
Movement observes that the policies contained within PRSPs: ‘[...] bear 
striking similarity both to each other and to the standard prescriptions of 
the supposedly defunct Washington Consensus’ (Jones and Hardstaff 
2005: 10). The report finds that on average, a PRSP contains six out of 
nine standard IMF and World Bank policies17. The main findings are 
summarised in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 
Standard IMF and World Bank Policies in 42 PRSPs 
Policies Main findings 
Trade liberalisation: There are further trade liberalisation measures in 30 of 
the 42 PRSPs on top of the significant trade liberalisation 
that has already happened in many of these countries; 
Privatisation: 38 of the 42 PRSPs include privatisation, and 27 of these 
specifically include water privatisation or greater private 
sector involvement in water supply services; 
Deregulation: 26 PRSPs include investment deregulation;  
Fiscal stringency: 40 out of 42 PRSPs include fiscal stringency. 
Source: Adapted from Jones and Hardstaff 2005: 10-11. 
 
The study of all the PRSPs and I-PRSPs18 in the Sub-Saharan African 
countries involved in the process19 reveals compelling similarities with 
World Development Movement’s findings. On the subject of privatisa-
tion for example, 30 poverty reduction strategy documents out of the 34 
documents submitted by Sub-Saharan countries clearly state or re-iterate 
their commitment to privatisation. While Burkina Faso plans to ‘step up’ 
the privatisation process (2004: 66), Senegal to ‘deepen’ it’ (2006: 71) and 
Benin to ‘expedite’ it (2007: 37), Rwanda announces the completion of 
the privatisation of 70 enterprises (2007: 24). Cameroon vows to privat-
ize its state-owned agro-business and commercial enterprises (2003: xiii), 
Burkina Faso to establish a program for privatisation in telecommunica-
tions, information technology, energy, and water sectors (2004: 77), 
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Gambia to privatise the groundnut trade (2006: 16) and Kenya to include 
several modalities for private sector participation in water, energy, roads, 
transport, and communications (2004: 39). 
Beyond the participatory narrative, final PRSPs appear to reveal ex-
tensive privatisation of essential services. To imply that the privatisation 
of water supply would be advocated by CSOs, for example, is highly 
questionable. Out of 42 PRSPs analysed by World Development Report, 
27 specifically included water privatisation or greater private sector in-
volvement in water supply services (Jones and Hardstaff 2005: 10-11). In 
his study of the case of Sierra Leone, Kovach (2005) observes that CSOs 
were strongly against privatisation of essential services, especially the pri-
vatisation of the Guma Valley Water Supply. In Bolivia, CSOs and aca-
demics analysing the process leading to the first PRSP concluded that the 
impact recommendations made by CSOs had on policies was negligible 
and issues that had been agreed in the consultations were changed in the 
final document without general consensus (Curran 2005: 6). 
Despite the participatory imperative at the heart of the IDM and 
promoted via the PRS process, the fact remains that the model is solidly 
grounded in the traditions of the Washington Consensus. As argued in 
the previous chapters, the Bank remains adamant that achieving sustain-
able growth and poverty reduction have good economic policies prereq-
uisite (including the promotion of macroeconomic stability), well-
developed human capital, and openness to the world economy (World 
Bank 1997: 18). As explained in the PRS Sourcebook: 
The fact that solutions to poverty therefore cannot be based exclusively on 
economic policies, but require a comprehensive set of coordinated meas-
ures lies at the heart of the rationale underlying comprehensive poverty 
reduction strategies. Economic growth, however, remains the single most 
important factor influencing poverty, and macroeconomic stability is es-
sential for high and sustainable rates of growth. Macroeconomic stability 
must therefore be a key component of any poverty reduction strategy 
(Ames et al. n.d.: 4). 
It is thus with out surprise that in her extensive study of the condition-
ality framework and the PRS, Wood (2004) observes that civil society has 
voiced disillusionment on the participatory process: ‘The general view is 
that the PRS process to date has been little more than a public relations 
exercise’ (2004: 39). 
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The obvious contradictions between the IDM’s narrative and the 
constraints of producing a neo-liberal oriented framework has led count-
less critics to argue that PRS are thus structural adjustments in disguise20. 
The mechanics of melding a ‘top down’ agenda with a ‘grass root par-
ticipation process’ are bound to raise concerns. As acknowledged by the 
Bank, there is a ‘need to lessen the tension between the PRSP role as a 
process for building domestic consensus and ownership and the roles 
that it plays with regard to debt relief and access to aid resources’ (OED 
2004a: 22). However, the implementation of measures truly linked to 
poverty reduction – not to mention the very eradication of poverty – 
would require an analysis of the true causes of poverty. As such, many 
CSOs who participated to the PRS process felt that more abstract ques-
tions on ‘why is there poverty in our country’, ‘how did we get to where 
we are now’ and ‘what sustains this poverty’ – were not open to discus-
sions (Curran 2005: 16). Marshall, Woodroffe and Skell further observe 
that: ‘The poverty diagnosis at the start of the PRSPs and I-PRSPs fre-
quently state that poverty exists because the country did not follow, or 
followed inadequately, the neo-liberal economic model promoted 
through SAPs, by the IFIs’ (2001: 15). 
This is the very paradox of the social narrative at the Bank: the quest 
for a technical framework which is said to tackle poverty while refusing 
to address the very contradictions within the model. The neo-liberal 
model does not admit that the problems of poverty require a reorganisa-
tion of power, a reorganisation which is in fact, often to the disadvantage 
of the Bank’s allies. The economic conditionality that remains at the 
heart of the IDM continues to promote the same economic austerity that 
characterised the structural adjustment period. As such, there exists a 
considerable gap between policies that are seen by CSOs to be in the in-
terests of the poor and most of the recommendations contained in the 
PRSP. For instance, the Mozambican PRSP indicates that the pursuit of 
rapid economic liberalisation is a government priority, while those in 
Mauritania and Uganda vow to increase the role of the private sector in 
public services, thus threatening the existing public subvention to the 
poor communities (Mutume 2003). As argued by Dembele in a study for 
Forum for African Alternatives and 50 Years Is Enough Network South Council, 
poor people call for cheaper and more affordable prices for staple goods 
and for free access to basic services, a demand which is in direct contra-
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diction with the delivery of such services by the market, as prescribed by 
the IFIs (2004): 
The privatization of essential services, like water and electricity and the de-
terioration or privatization of public services, such as health and education, 
have never been in the interests of the poor. For instance, the imposition 
of user fees on health care or education has led to a sharp drop of hospital 
attendance and school enrolment from poor or low-income families and 
increased the gender gap, since girls and women are the main victims of 
those policies (Dembele 2004). 
It is revealing to note that in 1999, the Bank itself provided evidence 
for this in some of its own studies. For example, it interviewed 20,000 
poor people in 24 countries in order to better understand poverty. The 
resulting study – Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change – was analysed by 
UNCTAD who asked what the poor in Africa expected from policy-
makers in order to alleviate their situation and then proceeded to see if 
their aspirations were truly reflected in the PRSP. UNCTAD (2002) 
found serious inconsistencies between the demands of the poor and pol-
icy components of PRSPs: 
In some instances their demands go far beyond what is proposed in 
PRSPs. For instance, while the poor welcome the elimination of fees at 
primary schools or the introduction of free inoculations for their children, 
they would like to see free provision of health services and education at all 
levels. Again, while they support the emphasis on the elimination of cor-
ruption, they are concerned much more with petty corruption involving 
police, doctors or teachers than with other forms of corruption, such as 
may occur on a particularly large scale among domestic and foreign busi-
nessmen and politicians in respect of government procurement. But there 
is also a large area where the aspirations of the African poor directly con-
flict with the policy approach incorporated in the PRSPs. Positions on ag-
riculture, labour markets, macro-policies, income distribution and the pri-
vate sector, […] are to a large degree incompatible. In these areas, policy 
preferences of IFIs and/or national governments rather than expectations 
and aspirations of the poor appear to have prevailed (UNCTAD 2002: 15). 
In demonstrating that the possibilities of a participatory process to in-
fluence the content of PRSPs remain extremely constrained by neo-
liberal pre-requisites, one has to transcend the IDM’s narrative and ana-
lyse the real political motivations feeding the participation agenda.  
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5.4 On Fragile Ground: the Politics of Participation 
In this final section, it is argued that the focus on civil society’s partici-
pation within the IDM is geared towards the technical skills that CSOs – 
or in this case NGOs – may offer in the reform process. In direct con-
tradiction to the IDM’s official narrative, it is argued that the immediate 
concern for civil society is not intended to foster participation but rather 
to ensure policy implementation at the local level.  
Under the new aid framework, it can be said that CSOs have been as-
signed three apolitical roles: 1) to provide accountability; 2) to co-opt 
and neutralise the voice of contestation to the reform process; 3) to 
provide services to the poor as sub-contractors of the state. While these 
tasks are dislocated from the possible political functions of civil society 
– such as political advocacy – they represent nonetheless a key instru-
ment to implement regulatory neo-liberalism at the local level in the fol-
lowing ways. 
5.4.1 To provide a Techno-Managerial Form of Accountability 
Beyond the urgency to rebuff international criticism and to feed some 
well-needed legitimacy to the reform process, the PRS participation 
model has become a pivotal tool in the fight against corruption. 
As Wolfensohn declared war on corruption in the mid-1990s, ‘cor-
ruption’ became quite the buzzword throughout the aid community. 
Amongst the Bank’s battle plans, civil society was assigned a ‘vital role’ 
(World Bank 2007a). The idea stemmed from the experience of the 
Structural Adjustment period where the state’s predatory behaviour was 
hampering the reform process. If the costs of fighting corruption remain 
too high for politicians, the Bank’s new strategy – which is solidly an-
chored in New Institutional Economics – suggests that civil society may 
be used to pressurise governments into reforming its behaviour. The 
World Bank argues: 
But rule-based government is not enough. […] Partnerships within the 
state can build commitment and loyalty on the part of government work-
ers and reduce the costs of achieving shared goals. The flip side of part-
nership is competitive pressure-from markets and civil society and within 
the state itself. Such pressure can improve incentives for performance and 
check the abuse of the state’s monopoly in policymaking and service deliv-
ery (World Bank 1997: 78). 
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Under the IDM, civil society is assigned a role as an ‘accountability’ 
provider, but in a depoliticised fashion. Their comparative advantages 
over the state make CSOs representative of the plural interests of the 
poor and are consequently seen as more accountable to the poor than 
the state. While this is further discussed in the following chapter, it is 
relevant to observe that the state, under the neo-liberal definition, is per-
ceived as a grouping of rent-seeking individuals. As a result, donors are 
turning to CSOs – local and international – to counter the governance 
predicament. As such, international donors contract CSOs as external 
monitors to stimulate demand among poor people for effective service. 
The roles assigned to CSOs, as accountability providers, take different 
forms such as creating public awareness about corruption, formulating 
and promoting action plans to fight it and, as it is frequently the case in 
PRS, to monitor governments’ actions and decisions in relation to cor-
ruption. This ‘watchdog’ function (World Bank 2007a) is illustrated by 
the rise of the idea of ‘Social Accountability’ at the Bank. It is an ap-
proach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, 
i.e. in which it is ordinary citizens and/or CSO participate in exacting 
accountability (World Bank 2007b). However, a closer look at the con-
cept might reveal that it has been completely deprived of its traditional 
link to social change. Social accountability, according to the Bank, is 
about holding government officials and bureaucrats accountable: 
Across the world, we find citizens are mobilizing, often locally, to demand 
better services. Not by shouting, but by counting. Making sure their govern-
ments spend effectively, and keep their promises. It’s not just about peo-
ple protesting and making noise. This new approach to citizen action actu-
ally involves systematic analysis and intelligent use of data […]. Citizens 
are demanding accountability from their public institutions. At the heart of 
this is getting and using critical information about budgets, expenditures, 
corruption, performance, etc. (Our emphasis. World Bank 2004c). 
Here CSOs’ role as accountability provider is a device knitted within 
a technocratic agenda where technocrats mobilise certain segments of 
civil society on behalf of specific apolitical objectives – such as the fight 
against corruption. Such a take on the role of CSOs is quite revealing of 
the Bank’s intent to tackle the political realm – i.e. to manage the preda-
tory behaviour of government – while simultaneously trying to avoid 
enticing political activism that may arise from a mobilised civil society. 
Here the quote ‘Not by shouting, but by counting’ mentioned above is 
 Chapter 5 139 
illustrative of NIE’s take on social institutions, as argued in chapter 
three. As such, participation mechanisms core to the PRS process are 
geared towards an apolitical process that has little to do with allowing 
CSOs to influence policy but rather as useful actors in insuring reform 
sustainability, an element which is considered vital to foster foreign in-
vestments. The PRS Sourcebook states that participation is essential for 
the sustainability of the reform process given that if participatory proc-
esses are built on existing mechanisms, they are more likely to be institu-
tionalised and sustained over time (Tikare et al. n.d.: 239). 
5.4.2 Managing Dissent 
This introduces another vital role assigned to CSOs in the IDM. While 
serving as technical accountability providers, CSOs also have a vital role 
to play in terms of managing dissent. Two factors are at play here: one 
related to the social impact of the reform and the other pertaining to the 
contestation and the civil unrest that might arise from an unmanaged 
civil society. As stated by the Bank in its 1997 World Development Re-
port: 
There is also a danger that dissatisfaction with the state-whether expressed 
through social protest, capital flight, or the ballot box-will undermine eco-
nomic prospects even further (World Bank 1997: 38). 
Participation may thus be defined as a vehicle for creating the appear-
ance of consensus in favour of the reform process. As such, the Bank 
further states that the benefit CSOs can bring to the development efforts 
is the promotion of public consensus, notably ‘by building common 
ground for understanding and encouraging public-private cooperation’ 
(World Bank 2008a). The idea that stems from the PRS participatory ex-
perience indeed reflects that governments had to foster a coalition in fa-
vour of the reform in order to secure the process in the long-term. In 
light of the hectic record of the 1990s, managing opposition was indeed 
pivotal. It is no coincidence that the Bank embraced CSOs at the same 
time as the structural adjustment model was crumbling under criticism, 
not only from the vocal international civil society but also from within.  
Participation of civil society in the PRS process can thus be viewed as 
a relief valve for venting opposition in a controlled environment. Car-
roll’s analysis of the participation in the Filipino CAS is revealing:  
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The meetings were described by the Bank as lively. From the point of view 
of one Bank staffer they also helped to dispel issues with and criticisms of 
the Bank and erase the perception of the Bank as ‘shrouded in mystery’. 
This hints at why, as communication and constituency building exercises, 
consultative and participatory processes are perceived as value-adding for 
the Bank. Getting people ‘on-board’, giving people a sense that they are 
inputting into the process dissolves the perception that the Bank is a 
monolith, unresponsive to domestic concerns and meddling in domestic 
politics (Carroll 2007: 169). 
5.4.3 Providing Services to the Poor as Sub-Contractors of the 
State 
The other side of the coin of the IDM’s quest for legitimacy for the re-
form process has been to address the social impacts of the structural ad-
justment reforms. As such, a central role of the IDM has been to ac-
knowledge that poverty includes a range of economic and social 
deprivations and that there is a need to facilitate social service access for 
the poor. 
While service delivery such has health care and education has been an 
important function of CSOs throughout the 1990s – it represents a 1.1 
trillion dollar industry (Salomon, cited in Edwards 2004: 14) – the recent 
years have brought forth an important increase in their role as social ser-
vice providers, especially for development NGOs. 
The collapse of the Keynesian model and twenty years of structural 
adjustment programs have indeed been characterised by an important 
transfer of the states’ traditional functions to CSOs. The organisations 
gradually became sub-contractors to deliver social programs that were 
formerly under the state’s jurisdiction. Such renewed faith in the capacity 
of CSOs derives from the neo-liberal perception of the breakdown of 
the states’ own capacity, as illustrated by Stiglitz during his testimony on 
the World Bank for the House Financial Services Committee: 
Moreover, the challenge to the World Bank and other aid agencies, when 
confronting a country with poor governance, is to find alternative delivery 
mechanisms for aid. It is bad enough that the people in these countries are 
suffering from poor governance; to be doubly punished by denying aid 
would seem unfair—especially if there exists alternative ways by which as-
sistance can be provided (especially in health and education, investments 
in the youth in these countries). Bangladesh is a country whose govern-
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ance is widely criticized; yet it has some very effective NGOs which have 
been successful in reducing poverty, increasing literacy, and advancing 
gender rights. It would be wrong to cut off Bangladesh from assistance 
simply because of poor governance. Aid can be delivered effectively 
through these NGO’s. In other countries, we should work to create and 
strengthen alternative delivery mechanisms (Stiglitz 2007: 9). 
Such a statement brings forth the issue of the changing role of the 
state after more than two decades of liberalisation, privatisation and de-
regulation. As argued in the previous section, the content of PRSPs and 
the greater IDM framework appear to be riddled with contradictions. 
The merger of the quest for strict neo-liberal economic reforms and a 
narrative focused on poverty reduction remains difficult to make opera-
tional. Interestingly, and as studied in chapter three, the social narrative 
of the IDM has been greatly influenced by NIE ideas. As such, this 
should be viewed as a framework which attempts to address social prob-
lems in technocratic ways that seemingly avoid political interventions. 
The emphasis on strengthening the voice of the poor as well as the re-
cent interest in maximising self-help initiatives in local communities is 
here quite revealing. As argued by the Bank: ‘Evidence is mounting that 
government programs work better when they seek the participation of 
potential users, and when they tap the community’s reservoir of social 
capital rather than against it (World Bank 1997: 10). 
The overwhelming emphasis on social capital in the new framework is 
further revealing. For the Bank, social capital refers to the institutions, 
relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's 
social interactions (World Bank 2008i). The institution states: 
Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to 
prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital 
is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the 
glue that holds them together (World Bank 2008i). 
This concept has alternatively been associated with all types of bene-
fits: in growth, competition, well-being and economic development, but 
also in health, security and political participation, institutional efficiency 
and even, happiness (Ponthieux 2003: 8). However, the concept be-
comes extremely contentious when presented as the possible ‘missing 
link’ in development. The Bank’s recent enthusiasm for social capital is 
problematic as far as it may be disconnected from its political dimen-
sions. It is indeed not Pierre Bourdieu’s definition that has been adopted 
 Chapter 5 142 
by the World Bank but rather Robert Putnam’s vision that has generated 
the most echoes in the institution. Where Bourdieu saw an issue of class 
reproduction in social capital and understood it as an instrument of 
power, Putnam saw a less political concept. 
Inspired by James Coleman’s rational choice approach, Putnam’s 
study of Italy and America brought him to the conclusion that perform-
ance and the level of socio economic development are most strongly ex-
plained by a factor that he labels ‘civic engagement’ (Putnam 1995). This 
suggests that social capital, defined in terms of norms that value collec-
tive goods and density of networks, is a critical condition for ‘good gov-
ernment’ and probably for economic development as well (Harriss 2002: 
7). While not against state interventionism entirely, Putnam’s take on the 
concept prescribes caution, as public policies should not damage a soci-
ety’s social capital21.  
There undoubtedly is a great appeal for neoclassical economists to 
foster a ‘bottom-up’ approach or in other words, to focus on community 
development, training, capacity building, and the inculcation of values 
and norms, rather than investing in policies that are designed to enhance 
opportunities for individuals. When combined with the World Bank’s 
need to answer the wave of criticism it was facing throughout the 1990s, 
one can easily understand the appeal for such a take on the concept 
within the Bank. While it does warn against the downside of social capi-
tal22, the emphasis the institution gives on the concept is overwhelming 
within the IDM23. As argued by Hammer and Pritchett, the contradic-
tions are linked to the temptation to expand a successful innovation far 
beyond its original successes (in Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olson and 
Woolcock 2004: 71). Ben Fine argues that while the non-economists at 
the Bank embraced the concept of social capital in the institution, thus 
answering their own need to appear less anti-state and more social, the 
social capital agenda was hijacked by the economists within the Bank 
(cited in Ponthieux 2003: 56). 
Harriss’ (2002) extensive investigation of the World Bank’s enthusi-
asm for the concept of social capital however, clearly demonstrates that 
the Bank’s analysis is deprived of its political dimensions. As such, social 
capital serves as a technical response to social issues that are highly po-
litical by bypassing questions that are linked to notions of rights and so-
cial justice. Harriss states that the Bank’s take on social capital:  
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[...] systematically evades issues of context and power. […] this mystifica-
tion serves the political purpose of depoliticizing the problems of poverty 
and social justice and, in elevating the importance of ‘voluntary associa-
tion’ in civic engagement, of painting out the need for political action 
(Harriss 2002: 12). 
In fact the appeal of the concept is potent for all disciplines as it gives 
an important role to non-market elements, while also providing for an 
affordable solution to social problems that do not involve a challenge to 
the existing power structures (Ponthieux 2003: 10). Mayoux’s (2001) 
findings on social capital and micro-finance in Cameroon are quite illus-
trative. She warns that if the complexities of power relations and inequal-
ity are ignored, ‘reliance on social capital as a mechanism for reducing 
programme costs may undermine programme aims not only of empow-
erment but also of financial sustainability and poverty targeting’ (2001: 
435). A fundamental issue linked to the increasing credential given to 
social capital is that poor people could be made responsible for the 
weight of their own poverty. One may argue that while investing in social 
capital rather than universal welfare programs, the burden of the poor 
rests on the existence of a vague network which, if maximized, could 
become a ladder to get out of poverty. Jayasuriya illustrates this in the 
context of the necessity to manage the rise of unemployment following 
the Asian economic crisis: 
Political management of unemployment was as much an ideological ex-
perience as a policy venture mainly because the intent of many of these 
social programs was to shift the burden of unemployment on to commu-
nities or individuals. [...] Therefore, building on notions such as social capi-
tal or community empowerment, social programs have had the effect of 
turning unemployment from a social issue or a social problem to one of 
social conduct (Jayasuriya 2003: 2). 
The intrinsic underlying argument is that poverty can be understood 
in terms of dysfunction rather than power relations. With this angle in 
mind, attacking poverty would therefore be a technical endeavour which 
could indeed be strengthened by technical participation from civil soci-
ety and governments alike. Weber’s (2005) extensive study of micro-
credit schemes within the new aid architecture is a compelling example 
of the new technocratic rationality in addressing poverty. Contrary to 
other poverty reduction approaches microcredit – which is the provision 
of small loans to individuals usually within groups as capital investment 
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to enable income-generation through self-employment (Weber 2005: 14) 
– is embedded in a commercial framework. Weber concludes that in 
such light: ‘poverty and social experiences of inequality are not concep-
tualised in social and relational terms, but rather, as the consequence of 
unfulfilled market potentials’ (2005: 22). The technical turn towards em-
phasising the role played by local organisation and ‘self help’ is thus re-
markably convenient, as further argued by Harriss, as it may justify im-
plementing large-scale public expenditure cuts (2002: 7). 
Conclusion 
Nestled in the stronghold of New Institutional Economics, the new aid 
architecture’s overarching influence on aid allocation and debt relief sug-
gests that the neo-liberals have indeed found a way to institutionalise the 
market ideology within the developing state. Building on the gains of the 
structural adjustment period, the Bank has promoted mechanisms deep 
within the state architecture in a way that any effective challenge to the 
neo-institutional reforms might prove difficult. As such, it is not the re-
treat of the state that the Bank is reaching for, but rather the transforma-
tion of state functions in a way that undercuts its ability to mediate, regu-
late or mobilise in favour of its citizens. 
As illustrated by the analysis of the PRS experience, the Bank’s recent 
interest with civil society has to be seen as a complimentary process to 
implementing regulatory neo-liberalism. The PRS participatory experi-
ences indeed revealed multiple flaws, raising serious doubts over the 
Bank’s intention to foster genuine ownership at the local level. It was 
argued that the strict focus on the technical aspects of the participatory 
process in PRS is hiding the overarching political roots of the current 
emphasis on participation. Two issues have been key to the argument, 
one linked to the limited PRS content opened to CSO consultations and 
one linked to the limited possibilities for these consultations to influence 
the content of a final PRSP. 
While the participatory agenda is undeniably a direct answer to the 
Bank’s legitimacy crisis, the IDM’s social narrative serves as a powerful 
tool for managing civil unrest within countries under reform, something 
the Washington Consensus had failed to address. As such, the Bank’s 
embrace of specific segments of society opens the door to a particular 
approach based on public choice political economy. Its main concern is 
more about reshaping the behavior of individuals within institutional and 
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governance mechanisms rather than restructuring power or distribution 
of wealth. In direct contradiction to the ownership narrative, this move 
to participation is therefore not an invitation to popular rule but rather 
embodies a highly functional role for civil society within the terms of 
free market agendas. In fact, it represents a contraction of political 
spaces in PRS countries in order to embed neo-institutional liberalism at 
the local level. 
Beyond the technical intricacies of the transformation of the interna-
tional aid architecture, the consequences of the implementation of the 
participatory agenda, combined with the consolidation of the techno-
cratic state, raises serious concerns linked to democracy and rights. This 
is addressed in the following chapter. 
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6 The Politics of Entrapment: The IDM’s Neo-populist Agenda 
 
 
Neo-liberals, radical democracy supporters and even conservatives 
find themselves using the same political vocabulary, in which civic 
and correlated concepts such as civil society, citizenship and par-
ticipation are central. Far from expressing a genuinely consensual 
view, this apparent homogeneity stems from the fact that this 
pseudo-unanimity conceals conflicts and dilutes disputes between 
different political projects, creating confusion, distortion and mis-
perceptions. 
(Dagnino 2008: 27) 
 
Introduction 
As the IDM represents a clear attempt to put certain segments of civil 
society at work to tackle the resistance against neo-liberal policies, this 
chapter addresses the impact of such objectives on the democratic re-
gime of countries under reform. In short, this final chapter1 seeks to 
provide an overall understanding of the possible meaning of the IDM in 
terms of political representation. 
If the participatory agenda has offered new opportunities for different 
actors to participate in their country’s PRS, not all members of society 
have been granted a seat at the table. Participation therefore, is effec-
tively an instrument by which some groups are given access and others 
are being marginalised. In this chapter, a special attention is given to the 
striking absentees of the participatory process: Members of Parliament 
(MPs). More specifically, it provides an analysis of why parliaments have 
overwhelmingly been bypassed in the PRS process and interestingly, how 
they have come to be replaced de facto by certain segments of civil society. 
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The main argument guiding this chapter is that the Bank’s endeavour 
to directly involve specific segments of civil society through direct par-
ticipatory mechanisms is an attempt to bypass representative politics and 
parliaments. The correlation of the IDM’s narrative and practices in 
promoting what will here be argued to be neo-populism, demonstrates that 
the IDM seeks to curtail the realm of political society. The IDM’s neo-
populist underpinning will be shown to be an essential element of the 
neo-liberal agenda and tactics. In turn, such attempt to embed new 
modes of authority and sources of legitimacy in countries under reform 
brings forth key issues linked to the very idea of citizenship and political 
rights. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first part provides an 
analysis of the different definitions of the concept of civil society and 
how defining such notion is directly influenced by how the state is de-
fined as well. Following this, the problematic of replacing existing repre-
sentation structures such as the institution of parliament with a participa-
tory process based on the illusive civil society is analysed. In the third 
part of the chapter, it is argued hat the anti-democratic sentiments evi-
dent within the IDM has resulted in ambivalent attitudes towards the 
representative process within second and third generations of PRS. It 
will become apparent, in the second generation of PRS, that there has 
been a gradual shift in the Bank’s take on the involvement of parliamen-
tarians. While MPs were once defined as problematic and unmanageable, 
more recent World Bank documents now define them as new allies 
against corruption and a source of legitimacy for the reforms. In address-
ing such recent shifts in the Bank’s perception of parliaments, the last 
section of this chapter offers a discussion on the issue of political repre-
sentation in the IDM. 
6.1 The Politics of Entrapment: Civil Society vis-à-vis the 
State 
If the IDM does introduce important roles for civil society that tran-
scend a mere cosmetic attempt to provide legitimacy, these changes nev-
ertheless have political ramifications for the exercise of state authority. In 
this section, it is argued that civil society’s new roles, as analysed in the 
previous chapter, imply a new view of civil society which is closely linked 
to neo-populism – here defined as a form of rule that seeks to bypass 
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existing political arrangements and to introduce new forms of social con-
tract to stakeholders. 
It is well established that civil society is a very elusive concept2. It has 
many definitions and serves the purpose of various political interests. 
Everyone across the political spectrum – from the far right to the far left 
– has been embracing it. As observed by Edwards: 
Conservatives see associations as vehicles for rebuilding traditional moral 
values while progressives see them as vehicles for rebuilding whole socie-
ties, and the world. […] Increasingly, it seems, voluntary associations are 
expected to organize social services, govern local communities, solve the 
unemployment problem, save the environment, and still have time left 
over for rebuilding the moral life of nations (Edwards 2004: 19). 
Defining the concept of civil society is therefore rarely a politically 
neutral exercise. While the Left traditionally used civil society as a collec-
tive noun to represent the poor and oppressed, neo-liberals have frown 
on the concept all together, preferring to deal with individuals operating 
within a series of voluntary transactions. On the one hand, such indi-
viduals may constitute a progressive and self-reliant force that flourishes 
without the state while on the other hand, they may form predatory coa-
litions in search of rents. Such dual analysis of civil society by the neo-
liberals3 remains the key to understanding the ongoing contradictions 
emerging from the PRS experiences. The Bank’s choice to make civil 
society’s participation one of the main pillars of the IDM reflects the 
newly pragmatic approach adopted by the institution. It reflects the diffi-
culties faced by the Bank in imposing markets and ‘good governance’ 
throughout the 1990s and the need to implement a strategy to capture, 
co-opt and mobilise civil society behind the market agenda.  
As underlined by Biekart, there are two main questions that one 
should ask in order to unpack the concept of civil society: who belongs 
to it and what are its properties (1999: 32)? While the emphasis is most 
often given to the positive functions of civil society, such as their abilities 
to better reach the poorest and to represent them, these organisations 
also have important downsides. As it became clear in the study of the 
participatory process of civil society – commonly reduced to ‘NGO’ par-
ticipation in the PRS – the fragmentation of CSO membership sheds 
doubt on their representative nature: What voices do they represent? 
What accountability structures do they really have? In reality, CSOs are 
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extremely diversified and they also face accountability problems and le-
gitimacy crisis.  
While granting legitimacy to the reform process, donors have also 
come to depend on CSOs technical functions in the development indus-
try, as argued in the previous chapter. However, in such a context, the 
‘representative’ nature of CSOs has to be questioned. As Paul (1996) – 
the Executive Director of Global Policy Forum – observes in his discus-
sion of the World Bank ‘partnerships’ with CSOs, there are important 
concerns that, with its enormous wealth, the Bank is able: ‘to “buy” 
small grassroots organisations in the South, to gain legitimacy for its pro-
jects’ (Paul 1996). One might recall that donors’ interest in civil society 
emerged out of the troubled waters of the early 1990s, when they finally 
addressed the governance predicament of the states under reform. 
NGOs then became a way to channel donors’ moneys away from cor-
rupt bureaucrats and failed institutions.  
Not withstanding bilateral aid and international NGO support, Bank-
funded projects involving NGOs rose steadily over the past decade, 
from 21 per cent of the total number of projects in fiscal year 1990 to an 
estimated 72 per cent in fiscal year 2003 (World Bank 2008a). Further-
more, the Bank developed a number of programs to promote Bank-
NGO collaboration – such as social funds, NGO contracting, grants, 
etc. 
Beyond their obvious financial dependence on foreign donor agents, 
CSOs – including of course NGOs – do not necessarily have account-
able structures and their membership often remains difficult to assess4. 
Furthermore, CSO employees may sometimes adopt a certain position 
simply to seek more funding or maintaining it. As observed by Carroll 
during the participatory process in a Country Assistance Strategy: 
‘NGOs were vocal at the CAS meeting and they present a position that 
they know what’s going on. But they have an interest. NGOs don’t want 
to break down the problem’ (Carroll 2007: 620). Not only do NGOs of-
ten choose to act in a way which they know will please their funding 
partners but they also have an unspoken interest in a specific problem to 
continue in order for their source of funding to be maintained. In their 
study of the PRS process, Molenaers and Renard observe: 
And not to forget, creating wide debate within civil society, with the pros-
pect of becoming an interlocutor for the donor community and the gov-
ernment, can wet the appetite of ambitious civil society entrepreneurs, re-
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sulting in clashes of interest, both ideological and material, among poorly 
organized and often autocratically managed pressure groups, NGOs, trade 
unions, human rights groups, and the like. (Molenaers and Renard 2006: 
16) 
This point further relates to the greater debate on the ‘NGOisation’ 
of development5 which refers to the politics of development NGO pro-
liferation in the last decades6. In her extensive study of civil society build-
ing in Africa, Hearn observes that bilateral and multilateral donors have 
contributed, throughout the 1990s, to build a very specific kind of ‘civil 
society’: 
[...] foreign support to civil society in all three countries [Ghana, South 
Africa and Uganda], is not about the breadth and depth of actually exist-
ing, largely rural based civil society. Donors are not funding the popular 
sector of society, but are strengthening a new African elite committed to 
the promotion of a limited form of procedural democracy and structural-
adjustment-type economic policies in partnership with the West. The 
sixty or so organizations that I identified as donor-funded form the core 
of the kind of liberal civil society that is being ‘socially engineered’ in Af-
rica (Hearn 1999: 4). 
While the new development model is presented under the umbrella of 
inclusiveness, it seems that, in practice, it might actually do the exact op-
posite. As argued by Harriss, there is a ‘dark side’ here as CSOs can also 
be rent seeking: ‘A moment’s reflection shows that ‘social capital’ for one 
group of people may constitute ‘social exclusion’ for others […]’ (Harriss 
2002: 8).  
The World Bank’s approach to civil society is highly depoliticised 
both in terms of its composition and its political function. On the one 
hand, the Bank reduces civil society’s legitimate composition – only the 
poor are legitimate interlocutors, non-poor voices are disregarded – and 
on the other hand it confines civil society’s participation to a very spe-
cific areas of debate (Lafortune 2003). Hickey and Mohan suggest that 
there are many problems associated with the current involvement of 
CSOs, the first being their ‘confused status between civic, public and 
private institutional spheres’ (Hickey and Mohan 2005: 241). In redirect-
ing the state’s traditional function as provider of rights (civil, political 
and socio-economic), it is now civil society that is increasingly entrusted 
with the responsibility for promoting the common good. As Kamat un-
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derlines, there has been a curious shift in who bears the legitimacy of 
such responsibility:  
In a curious flip-flop of what served as a universal conceptual frame for 
development planning, the state, today, is represented as fragmented by 
private interests (otherwise referred to as corruption), and hence inept at 
representing the will of the people, whereas civil society is seen as the 
honest broker of ‘the people’s interests’ (Kamat 2004: 160). 
This all derives from the neo-liberal view of the state (with its roots in 
modernisation theory of the 1960s) as ideally a neutral adjudicator of 
competing demands, implementer of policies that provide the common 
good – a highly abstracted and technocratic interpretation of its role and 
power. The entry of CSOs into the equation can thus be seen as a reac-
tion to a breakdown of state capacity after more than two decades of 
neo-liberal policy reform. While the attention now paid to CSOs is in-
tended to address the effects of drastic economic medicine prescribed by 
the IFI in the last decades7, it also potentially undermines CSO functions 
in the very framework within which they are integrated. Furthermore, 
the idea of CSOs as an alternative to the existing state opens to door to 
chaos and uncertainty. The idea that CSOs can be more efficient and 
cheaper in providing services than the state remains questionable how-
ever. As argued by Van Rooy: ‘Policies that promote civil society organi-
zations to the detriment of functioning state services may do no one any 
favours’ (Van Rooy 1997: 17).  
It is revealing that organisations with a strong political mandate – 
such as trade unions and members of parliament – are often noticeably 
absentees from the PRS process. In fact, civil society – or rather ele-
ments of it – is given a voice in what are essentially technical matters of 
implementation. On this point, Easterly (2002) observes that the partici-
pation chapter of the PRSP Sourcebook fails to mention: ‘the possibility 
that the poor might have different interests than the political elite, nor 
that different groups among the poor might have conflicting interests’ 
(Easterly 2002: 46). While a small proportion of society is given a voice 
on matters that do not influence the organisation of power, concepts of 
rights and democracy are subsumed, together with the representative role 
of parliaments and political parties. This is the subject of the remaining 
sections of this chapter. 
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6.2 The Ambiguity of Ownership: Parliaments and the PRS 
Process  
The growing trend towards the co-option of CSOs within the new aid 
architecture brings forth the question of democratic representation 
within countries under reform. There is indeed a greater agenda which 
appears to be intrinsically rooted at the very core of the IDM’s philoso-
phy which is linked to neo-populism. It is here argued that the Bank has 
chosen the path of technocratic populism rather than helping to build 
effective democracies in countries under reform. Such thesis is argued in 
the following sections, first by addressing the role assigned to the institu-
tion of parliament in the PRS process and then by tackling the implica-
tions of such roles on the very idea of democracy and citizenship. 
Shifting toward IDM in the late 1990s, the Bank’s narrative became 
highly focused on ‘country ownership’ and ‘participation’ and national 
parliaments gradually received more attention. In fact, while the World 
Bank has done some capacity building work related to parliaments since 
1995, it is the Comprehensive Development Framework and the follow-
ing PRS that prompted the institution to give greater attention to parlia-
ments: 
Since the late eighties, a wave of democratization has swept the world. 
[...] With that dramatic rise [of elected democracies] comes a marked in-
crease in the number of elected officials [...]. It’s an impact that has not 
been overlooked by the World Bank. ‘Development clearly works best 
when the process is country-led and based on partnerships’, says World 
Bank president James D. Wolfensohn. The World Bank strongly encour-
ages parliamentary involvement in the development process. [...] In keep-
ing with this global expansion of parliamentarians, the World Bank has 
stepped up the ways in which the members of parliament and Bank staff 
can exchange information and gain greater understanding of the impact 
of development – both at a local and global level (World Bank 2006b). 
Today, the World Bank’s programs toward parliaments are initiated 
via three central sources: the Development Policy Dialogue Team, the 
World Bank Institute (WBI) and the capacity building programs, country 
offices and country teams. They are also reflected in the Bank’s support 
for partnerships and programs more generally8. These initiatives are de-
fined by the Bank as the institution’s official attempt to open up a debate 
with broader constituencies (Bas, Interview November 17, 2006). Ac-
cording to Jean-Christophe Bas, the Manager of the Development Policy 
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Dialogue at the World Bank, the Bank has become a ‘dialogue facilitator’ 
for a greater involvement of MPs in the development process (Interview 
November 17, 2006). 
However PRS experiences have so far shown little participation of 
parliamentarians in the process, a fact that Alan Gelb, Director of the 
Development Policy at the World Bank openly acknowledged9 (Inter-
view September 18, 2006). Eberlei and Henn’s analysis of the PRS ex-
perience in Sub-Saharan Africa concludes that: ‘[…] little attention was 
given – in either theory or practice – to the people’s representatives, the 
parliaments’ (2003: 27). World Development Movement concludes that 
the participation of MPs has been limited in more than 26 countries 
(Jones and Hardstaff 2005: 18). 
In the majority of the PRS cases where parliaments were indeed in-
volved, the participation was limited to a few MPs participating in work-
shops, without a link to the institution of parliament itself10. Other or-
ganisations such as the Overseas Development Institute and the 
European Commission have also expressed concern regarding the rela-
tive failure to involve parliaments in the PRS process (Leautier 2002: 
180). Gould and Ojanen’s findings on Tanzania are more than revealing 
of such trend as they observe: ‘In fact, most parliamentarians interviewed 
for this study had never heard of the PRSP’ (Gould and Ojanen 2003: 
94). 
This lack of attention to the legislative branch in the PRS process is 
customarily explained by the fact that parliaments often face fundamen-
tal constrains of all sorts that hamper their representative, legislative and 
oversight functions. As summarised by the Swedish International Devel-
opment Cooperation Agency, these failures are often linked to the: ‘[…] 
lack of technical expertise, the lack of funds, and the lack of access to 
information’ and ‘last, but hardly least, whether parliamentarians have 
the political will to use their oversight functions’ (SIDA 2002: 24). It is 
indeed undeniable that parliaments’ institutional weaknesses are often 
linked to the scarcity of resources and lack of institutional infrastructures 
such as electoral commissions, ombudsmen, parliamentary oversight 
committees, highly-trained civil servants in both central and local gov-
ernment, police forces, schools, and accessible, impartial judicial systems 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 2003: 12). One might observe however that 
some of these deficiencies have paradoxically been directly weakened by 
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more than twenty years of structural adjustment programs in many Afri-
can countries. 
Crucially, donors disinterest in parliaments in the last decade is unde-
niably linked to neo-patrimonial tendencies of many parliamentarians11. 
Politics is often linked to patronage by which well-connected individual 
voters expect a direct form of assistance from their MP, which translates 
into a patron-client form of politics (UNDP n.d.), or as Bayart (1992) 
coined it ‘la politique du ventre’. Eberlei and Henn argue that Africa is 
plagued by neopatrimonialism, which symptoms are: ‘[...] presidentialism, 
clientism and the use of state resources for the purposes of political le-
gitimation. In many African countries, members of parliament in particu-
lar are still tainted as being part of the system of organised political pa-
tronage’ (Eberlei and Henn 2003: 21-14).  
There is no doubt that MPs long lasting record of predatory behav-
iour has been endemic in many countries under reform, not withstanding 
parliamentarians’ chronic lack of capacity. However, in opting to bypass 
parliaments altogether, the PRS model has been facing a crisis in legiti-
macy, as analysed in the following section. 
6.3 Acknowledging Parliaments 
In this section, the Bank’s recent initiatives to mainstream parliamentary 
involvement in the PRS process are analysed. After an assessment of the 
new IDM’s narrative on parliamentarians, an analysis of the specific role 
it now envisions for the formerly marginalised actor is provided. 
The World Bank has increasingly acknowledged its failure to empha-
sise the important role parliaments could play in the PRS process. At the 
heart of the problem was the fact that PRS were facing an immediate 
legitimacy crisis linked to the obvious failure to involve the representa-
tive of the people within the so-called participatory process. For Leau-
tier, the Vice President of the World Bank Institute, the ownership im-
perative does serve to: ‘[...] avoid potential criticisms that policies and 
priorities are being imposed by the Washington-based institutions’ 
(Leautier 2002:179). Furthermore, as NGOs and international advocacy 
groups are closely monitoring the PRSPs progresses, parliaments in all 
logic, must be included in the participation process if the initiatives are to 
be promoted as being ‘owned’ by the country. This has been reflected in 
a report for parliamentarians as well: 
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Overall, though, the role of Parliaments in the PRS process has been lim-
ited. This has proved to be a cause for concern for many development 
partners. Several World Bank reports have raised the issue along with a 
number of development partners such as the Utstein Group of bilateral 
donors (the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, and Norway) and 
the European Union. Individual parliamentarians also have raised this is-
sue (Chevalier, Kingham and Trapp 2005: 43). 
In reminiscing on the first experiences of the Parliamentary Network on 
the World Bank12, which was created in 2000, Jean-Christophe Bas recalls 
that there were ‘strong issues’ right from the start. Citing the Kenyan 
experience as an example, he evokes the tensions created by involving 
opposition MPs in the Network’s platform and how the Kenyan execu-
tive strongly reacted (Interview November 17, 2006). It is true that the 
World Bank has traditionally shied away from direct engagement in de-
mocracy promotion and legislative attention. The obvious reason for 
such choice is rooted in Article IV of the IBRD Articles of Agreement, 
which clearly emphasises the apolitical nature of the institution13. As 
such, channels between Bank staff and reforming countries government 
have traditionally followed the executive branch. And as argued in the 
previous section, CSOs in a way had become a means of addressing the 
democratic deficit of bypassing parliaments. 
However, there is now a clear shift in the Bank’s perception of par-
liamentarians, at least discursively. Bas’ statements are quite revealing of 
such fact. The Development Policy Dialogue manager indeed observes 
that the change on how the Bank’s staff perceived parliamentarians was 
‘day and night’ (Interview November 17, 2006). This change in percep-
tion of MPs is further argued by Jean-Francois Rischard, the World Bank 
vice-president for Europe, who claimed that there had been a ‘revolu-
tion’ in the Bank in the last few years (reported by Bretton Woods Pro-
ject 2005). 
While there is a crucial change brought forth by the IDM’s focus on 
ownership and participation which has undoubtedly favoured a narrative 
focused towards parliament inclusion, the key question however remains 
to assess how exactly MP’s are now to be involved in the PRS process. In 
turn, such analysis sets the scene for a deeper understanding of why the 
Bank has actually now chosen to embrace parliaments in its reform 
process. While the Bank’s thirst for legitimacy for its backed policy re-
forms undoubtedly counts for an important part of its sudden interest in 
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MPs, an analysis of the new functions assigned to MPs in the PRS proc-
ess reveals an agenda that has sticking similarities with the depoliticised 
role assigned to civil society. It is here proposed to first look at the new 
roles assigned to the institution of parliament in the PRS process. An 
analysis of the consequences of such turn in the Bank’s policies is then 
provided. 
6.3.1 Integrating Parliaments Into the PRS Narrative 
It is clear in the Bank’s literature that there has been a shift in favour of 
engaging with MPs in the PRS process. However, in light of the IDM’s 
instrumentalisation of the concepts of ownership and participation, it is 
necessary to unpack the Bank’s take on parliamentarians’ ‘participation’. 
And this was precisely the point of Khalifa Ababacar Sall, a Senegalese 
MP and member of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank who 
argued that the ‘real question’ about the PRS is ‘why is this important to 
us to participate?’ (Interview September 19, 2006) Sall further observes 
that while he agrees that the PRS proposal for MPs participation is ‘an 
evolution’ of the World Bank, he wonders if the results won’t be the 
same as the last 25 years of failed economic policies imposed by the mul-
tilateral institution: ‘we are still poor’ concludes Sall (Interview Septem-
ber 19, 2006). While the MP does think that: ‘it is time to integrate the 
parliamentarians in the process if you want to succeed’, he emphasises 
the need to know what role parliamentarian are to play in the process of 
policy formulation (September 19, 2006). 
A key element of the Bank’s take on parliamentarians’ involvement 
can be found in the Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies to which the 
Bank has recently added an annex (Hubli and Mandaville 2004) specifi-
cally dedicated to parliaments. Let us recall that the Sourcebook is a compi-
lation of chapters that details the views of the Bank and the IMF on the 
PRS and intended as a guide for countries in strengthening their devel-
opment strategies. Although the Bank asserts that the Sourcebook is in-
tended to be only suggestive, it also states that it reflects the ‘thinking 
and practices associated with the Comprehensive Development Frame-
work, the World Development Report 2000/2001, good international prac-
tices related to poverty reduction, and emerging experience about the 
effective design and implementation of PRSPs (World Bank n.d.: vii). In 
this respect, the addition of an annex in the Sourcebook specifically dedi-
cated to parliaments should leave no doubt about the Bank’s attempts to 
 Chapter 6 159 
amend its former minimalist view of legislatures in the PRS process. The 
annex indeed recognises the pivotal role they should play: 
Under most constitutions, legislatures are the most representative ele-
ment of a country’s national government. Although in some cases this 
representative potential has been latent or underutilized due to political 
conditions or lack of resources, parliaments remain an obvious mecha-
nism for encouraging poor people’s input into national poverty reduc-
tion policies and ensuring cooperation from a variety of political actors. 
The representative responsibilities of parliament, as assigned by each 
country’s constitution, provide a greater level of ownership and legiti-
macy than other participatory methods, such as stakeholder workshops 
(Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 13). 
As shown in Figure 6.1, the annex strives for greater involvement of 
parliaments in all four components of the PRSP cycle – i.e. poverty diag-
nosis, development, implementation process and finally, monitoring and 
evaluation of the PRSP. 
Figure 6.1
Possible Mechanisms for Parliamentary Engagement in the PRSP Cycle 
 
 
Source: Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 5. 
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In terms of poverty diagnosis, the Sourcebook focuses on parliamen-
tarians’ capacity to ‘provide the only political representation for large 
numbers of citizens from specific geographic or demographic constitu-
encies’ (Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 7). Under the rubric of contribution 
to development of the PRSP, the Sourcebook states that a greater in-
volvement of MPs could build consensus on PRSPs and thus ‘pave the 
way for smoother implementation over time’. According to the Source-
book, such involvement would not only result in a greater national own-
ership of the PRS process but would also provide the PRSP with an ex-
isting body of politically active national leaders and staff of varying skill 
levels and interests (Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 8). As for the PRSP im-
plementation level, the Sourcebook calls for parliamentarian involvement 
at three levels: budget allocations, legislation and educating the public 
about PRS processes, programs, and impact. It is stated that parliamen-
tarians’ main task should be to align national legislation with PRSP pri-
orities, approve PRSP-compatible budgets and pass PRSP-relevant legis-
lation (Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 12). The fourth and final component 
of the PRSP cycle – monitoring and evaluation – emphasises the role of 
Committee hearings on the impact of PRSP, an annual review of the 
PRSP Progress Reports. 
The World Bank’s renewed attention to parliaments warrants some 
caution. In his thorough analysis of the Sourcebook’s annex, Youash ob-
serves that the suggested take on legislature has thrown the Bank’s posi-
tion from one extreme to the other, from a ‘Rubber stamp legislature’ to 
a ‘Transformative legislature’ (2003: 13). The key point to note is that if 
the Bank’s previous framework gave few possibilities for legislatures to 
influence or debate the issues at hand, the annex propels legislatures – at 
least theoretically – towards its rarest type; one where bodies are capable 
of both representing and shaping societal demands (Youash 2003: 13). 
However, as stated by Johnson and Nakamura (1999), this type of legis-
lature is rather uncommon as it aims not only to represent but also to 
lead. This requires a specific structure not only capable of dealing with 
differences, but that is equipped with information capacities permitting 
the initialisation of policies as well. Youash observes: ‘Not surprisingly, 
there are not many examples of such legislatures, and those that do exist 
do not always live up to the requirements’ (2003). While the PRS Source-
book’s annex on parliaments does contradict such an interpretation, 
Youash further observes that the document mentions no implementa-
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tion processes, an omission that clashes with the surgical attention the 
executive branch receives in the area of public expenditure in the PRS 
Sourcebook: 
The difficulty with this leap [of the World Bank] is that no detailed road 
map is provided for such a transition and more importantly, no guiding 
logic is provided for making such a shift. [...] What is generated by such 
an approach is a rather hobbled together set of prescriptions with little 
substantive reasoning behind them and a seemingly naïve hope that de-
manding such a role of parliament will immediately necessitate its capaci-
tation for fulfilling the proposed functions (2003: 14). 
A clear conclusion here is that the Bank’s outreach to MPs is moti-
vated by a need for bringing some legitimacy to the PRS process. Manish 
Bapna – Executive Director of the Bank Information Center – observes 
that the Bank had to recognise that its failure to reach out to parliamen-
tarians was ‘a real and honest threat’ (Interviewed October 15, 2006). 
Bapna further argues that in the midst of a ‘strong interest to reclaim the 
national policy space’, the Bank’s attempt to enter the national stage 
without the authority of doing so is the institution ‘Hercules heel’ (Inter-
viewed October 15, 2006).  
The key question however remains to ask how exactly the Bank is 
bringing parliamentarians on board. Here the PRS Sourcebook suggests 
that MPs participation could be better understood via the narrow win-
dow of governance oversight in which parliamentarians are indeed in-
vited to play a greater role. Beyond the Bank’s enthusiastic narrative, this 
is a technical and depoliticised role that narrowly fits governance and 
anti-corruption objectives. Such analysis of the Sourcebook sets grounds 
for further questioning on the apparent apolitical nature of the IDM’s 
interest in the institution of parliament. 
6.3.2 Co-opting Parliaments 
This depoliticised integration of MPs in the second and third generations 
of PRS may be further understood as a means to manage the veto gates 
that they represent within the PRS process, as argued in this section. As 
such, this new enthusiasm towards MPs represents an attempt to co-opt 
the institution of parliament in favour of the reform process. 
During an interview with Jean-Christophe Bas (Interview November 
17, 2006), who actively contributed to the creation and the design of the 
Parliamentary Network on the World Bank, it became clear that the Bank had 
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realised that bypassing MP’s was becoming a greater problem than not 
involving them. Beyond the legitimacy predicament caused by having 
failed to involve the institution of parliament in the PRS process, the 
Bank came to realise that MPs represented a significant veto gate to the 
reform and that as such, they needed to be managed. Bas observes that 
MPs in the past would only be in contact with the World Bank in case of 
crisis, a fact ‘which is not very conductive’ (Interview November 17, 
2006). Furthermore, the Bank’s recent interest in parliaments is over-
whelmingly linked to the very concrete fact that MPs in many countries 
have to vote on PRSPs. On the subject, Bas underlines that:  
MP’s are decision makers. They represent a growing force in many coun-
tries. […] some parliamentarians have to approve the Bank’s loans which 
means that if a country director is confronted by a parliament that is re-
luctant to the reform, he is in a bad shape’ (Interview November 17, 
2006). 
 An obvious example of the problematic linked to the failure to in-
volve MPs in the PRS process is the fact that in some countries, PRSPs 
have bluntly been anti-constitutional (Jones and Hardstaff 2005; Action 
Aid and coll. 2005). This is because PRS indeed often require secondary 
legislation to be passed. Let us recall that PRSPs are meant to direct a 
reforming country’s policies for three years. Following an analysis inves-
tigating the role played by parliaments during the implementation of PRS 
in 28 African states, Eberlei and Henn state that the marginal role played 
by parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa in PRS had indeed in some cases, 
breached explicit constitutional rights (2003: 9). 
A greater involvement of parliamentarians throughout the PRS proc-
ess would thus increases the chances for parliamentarians’ endorsement 
if and when PRSPs are submitted to legislatures. As observed in the PRS 
Sourcebook: ‘A parliament that has already played an active role in the di-
agnosis and development of its PRSP will be better able to coordinate 
such legislation’ (Hubli and Mandaville 2004: 14). 
With this in mind, an analysis of the PRS Sourcebook is quite revealing. 
It is indeed evident that that the Sourcebook’s proposals for MPs involve-
ment in the budget cycle is tailored precisely to manage the actors’ tasks 
in the PRS process. The Sourcebook’s chapter on ‘Public Spending’ out-
lines the Bank’s given ‘good practices in budgeting and public financial 
management in the context of implementing affordable pro-poor poli-
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cies’ (Fozzard et al. n.d.: 189). It identifies eleven steps in an ‘idealised’ 
budget cycle, as shown in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2 
The Budget Cycle 
 
Source: Fozzard et al. n.d.: 192. 
 
Out of these eleven steps, eight require solely the executive to act in 
policy formulation, one allows for the Auditor-General to review the 
government’s accounts, while the parliament’s role in the budget cycle is 
relegated to the two remaining stages – i.e. steps seven and eleven 
(Youash 2003: 4). While these given functions are indeed important, they 
are however quite reductive as parliament’s role remains marginal and 
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deprived of any meaningful political contribution. In their study of the 
Tanzanian PRS process, Gould and Ojanen’s do observe that the budget 
process is: ‘an aid-conditioned exercise where the structures of power 
created by the iron triangle between donors, government and non-state 
actors leave the parliament without a proactive role’ (2003). 
The obvious similarities amongst the content of PRSPs in reforming 
countries suggest that the influence of stakeholders – both civil society 
and MPs – has been quite limited, a trend that might not change with an 
increased parliamentarian involvement in the process, especially not a 
technical involvement as experienced in the last PRS. Hickey and 
Mohan’s article on politics and participation is here important to men-
tion (2005). The authors argue that: 
[…] participatory approaches are most likely to succeed: (i) where they 
are pursued as part of a wider radical political project; (ii) where they are 
aimed specifically at securing citizenship rights and participation for 
marginal and subordinate groups; and (iii) when they seek to engage with 
development as an underlying process of social change rather than in the 
form of discrete technocratic interventions […] (Hickey and Mohan 
2005: 237). 
A clear conclusion is that while the PRS endeavour warrants a greater 
MP involvement, it is not on the basis of their political input as represen-
tatives of the people. When apposed to Hickey and Mohan’s given success 
criteria for participation, one can conclude that MPs role in the PRS is in 
fact better understood as technical facilitators for the reform process. 
This brings forth the question of the legitimacy of a participatory process 
that neglects the democratic channels already in place. In a brief au-
thored by a coalition of NGOs and parliamentarians, it is observed that: 
Governments are supposed to lead the PRSP process, with the active 
participation of parliament and civil society. However, parliaments are 
regularly sidelined and key decisions regarding economic policies are of-
ten deliberately excluded from this process. Frequently, parliaments and 
the public are not even aware of conditions that will have massive impli-
cations for their society. Worse still, the World Bank and IMF continue 
to over ride the express wishes of sovereign parliaments, undermining al-
ready fragile democratic processes and public faith in them (All Party 
Group on Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 2004: 1). 
Experiences have revealed that even when MPs had indeed voiced 
their concerns regarding certain policy reform backed by the executive 
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and the IFI, such concerns had rarely been taken into account. World 
Development Movement documented several examples of parliamentary 
opposition to IFI policies in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Georgia, Ghana, 
Honduras, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Moldova, Mozambique, Tanza-
nia, Uganda and Zambia14 (Jones and Hardstaff 2005: 28). 
As such, Jean-Francois Rischard’s – the World Bank vice-president 
for Europe – claims that there has been a ‘revolution’ in the Bank in the 
last few years in regards to MPs perception, take another meaning (re-
ported by Bretton Woods Project 2005). Rischard argued that 85 per 
cent of country staff reported meeting with parliamentarians on a regular 
basis (cited by Bretton Woods Project 2005). However, such ‘meetings’, 
argues Bretton Woods Project, were actually World Bank Institute’s efforts 
to ‘train parliamentarians about how to improve their oversight role’ 
(cited by Bretton Woods Project 2005). We are here far from a process 
where the representatives of the people are politically engaging in formu-
lating their countries policies. It is therefore not without surprise to note 
the existence of an international petition signed by 1100 MPs. It is calling 
for donors to acknowledge the importance of parliamentarians’ involve-
ment in the economic policies of their respective countries15: 
We therefore call on the BWIs [Bretton Woods Institutions] and their 
principal shareholders to ensure that the democratically elected represen-
tatives of recipient nations are the final arbiters of all economic policies 
in their countries. It is vital that national parliaments in recipient nations 
have the right and obligation to be fully involved in the development and 
scrutiny of all measures associated with BWI activities within their bor-
ders, and hold the final power of ratification. Ensuring the primacy of 
sovereign national parliaments in this way will improve implementation 
of measures to reduce poverty, enhance good governance, and foster 
democracy (All Party Group on Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 2004). 
Beyond the issue of the erosion of the legitimacy of the already fragile 
legislature in countries under reform, the Bank’s new outreach to parlia-
ments is better defined as an attempt to co-opt MPs in playing a depo-
liticised role in the PRS process. As argued in the following section, this 
is an attempt which is embedded in the IDM’s neo-populist agenda and 
such attempt brings forth questions linked to the very concept of citizen-
ship. 
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6.4 Market Citizenship 
In this final section, the IDM is assessed in terms of its impact on repre-
sentative politics. It is argued that the technocratic principles embedded 
in the IDM’s governance imperative, combined with a neo-populist take 
on civil society must be viewed as an attempt to transform traditional 
notions of citizenship. 
While the IDM is being promoted in terms of ownership and partici-
patory principles, the analysis of the mechanisms rooted in the IDM 
clearly demonstrate neo-populist underpinnings. Neo-populism is here 
defined as a form of rule that seeks to bypass existing political arrange-
ments and to introduce new forms of social contract to stakeholders de-
prived of any political role. Accordingly, it is a form of civil society con-
sultation that has become the privileged source of policy legitimacy 
(Gould and Ojanen 2003: 93). It is a form of rule where individuals pur-
portedly deal directly with policy-makers rather than operate through 
representative structures. The quest for decentralisation and local CSO 
participation is a clear instrument of such form of rule. After all, the 
IDM’s list of suggested stakeholders for participation in the PRS reveals 
that the Bank views MPs as just another actor within an undifferentiated 
pool of stakeholders – i.e. the general public, the poor and vulnerable 
groups, an organised civil society, the private sector, the government and 
the donor community. In practice, the involvement of parliamentarians 
in the PRS process has been limited to being part of a checklist with 
other government stakeholders that are consulted along with line agency 
departments (e.g. health, education, social welfare, roads and works), the 
necessary local governments, and state/provincial governments (Youash 
2003: 6). The result is that an official democratic institution is levelled to 
other stakeholders such as CSOs. 
It is interesting that the Sourcebook does acknowledge that MPs have a 
distinct ability to ‘bring the input of local constituencies to the national 
level’ (Tikare et al. n.d.: 244). Such acknowledgment combined to the 
analysis of the depoliticised role assigned to the MPs at the national level 
suggests a form of neo-populist tendencies much similar to the IDM’s 
approach to civil society. Hence traditional arenas of political representa-
tion – such as the institution of parliament – remain marginal in terms of 
policy influence despite the framework’s rhetoric. 
The neo-populist agenda brings forth serious implications for the 
conceptual absentee of the new aid agenda: citizenship. Under the neo-
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liberal model, the notion of citizenship is reduced to the technicalities of 
participating in the electoral process and in the market economy; a mar-
ket-citizenship. Stripped from its political structure, participation is 
geared towards the market and, through an identity now downsized to 
that of producer/consumer, citizens are expected to maximize their indi-
vidual interests. In such light, the ultimate right of the citizen is that of 
individual freedom – i.e. the state’s jurisdiction should be ‘restricted to a 
bare minimum as any positive role impinges on the rights of the individ-
ual’ (Taylor 1998: 24). As it was argued by Gill, the Bank’s enthusiasm 
for civil society participation represents an attempt to ‘legitimate a hier-
archical and unequal system of representation in the making of state pol-
icy’ (Gill 2000). 
The IDM here introduces a new type of ‘market citizenship’, one that 
does clash with the former post war social democracy model. What is 
key here to emphasise is thus the double transforming effect of the IDM 
on classical notions of rights and citizenship. The first one is linked to 
the neutralisation of the possible veto gates to the reform process. This 
is where for example we see attempts to involve MPs in the reform 
process but in a depoliticised way. This is also where key mechanisms of 
restraints are promoted deep within the state architecture, as studied in 
chapter four of this contribution. Gill here observes that in such a proc-
ess: ‘the key areas of policy – relative to the “commanding heights” of 
the economy and strategy are separated from real democratic participa-
tion and accountability’. This introduces the second transforming effect 
the IDM has on redefining citizenship which is the idea of channelling 
participation away from the realm of political society. This is where cer-
tain segments of civil society become key players, as well as new social 
welfare instruments such as microcredit16 and the overall emphasis on 
building social capital. However, notions of equity and social justice are 
restrictively redefine in a complementary process. This is to say that the 
overwhelming emphasis on the privatisation and liberalisation of public 
services is altering what was previously accepted as social and economic 
rights (Campbell 2005: 20). 
As illustrated in Figure 6.3, political society is this intermediate realm 
where actors (political parties) and institutions (election, legislature), are 
mediating, articulating and institutionalizing the relations between the 
state and civil society (Biekart 1999: 58). However, it is argued that such 
realm is shrinking under the IDM, as political power is being redefined 
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both in the state apparatus and civil society. This is to say that in focus-
ing on civil society, rather than on citizenship, the IDM is capable to by-
pass the realm of political society. 
Figure 6.3 
The IDM and the Contraction of Political Society 
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Adapted from Biekart 1999: 34. 
 
In addition to this contraction of the realm of political society, it is 
here argued that the IDM can be viewed as a process which also dislo-
cates the realm of political of society from the state and civil society, as 
illustrated by Figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4 
The IDM and the Dislocation from the Realm of Political Society 
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The crux of this mutation from citizenship to civil society rooted in 
the IDM is the fact that the notion of rights – political, civil and socio-
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economic – is de facto evicted from the stage. Here the democratic 
rights of citizens to influence resource allocation are replaced by depo-
liticised local participation schemes which position certain segments of 
civil society where citizens use to be the main actors.  
As argued by Gill, the World Bank has developed its notion of ‘par-
ticipation’: ‘to offset the limitations imposed on mass democracy in the 
economic realm by increasing democratic participation in other safely 
channelled areas’ (Gill 2000). As observed by UNRISD (2000) in a study 
on technocratic policy making and democratisation, there is a need to 
tackle the serious challenges brought forth by an increasingly techno-
cratic governance model on democratic representation: 
Pressure to standardize macroeconomic objectives encourages govern-
ments to restrict policy making to experts and insulate key economic in-
stitutions from democratic scrutiny. This may affect democratization in 
two ways. First, it may distort the structure of accountability by encour-
aging national authorities to be more responsive to financial markets and 
multilateral institutions than to fledgling parliaments and citizens. Sec-
ond, social policies, which were crucial in consolidating Western democ-
racies, may be treated as residuals of macroeconomic policy, and democ-
ratization that does not conform to neo-liberal economic orthodoxy 
dismissed as populism (UNRISD 2000: 1). 
This current mutation from citizenship rights to targeting the poor 
depoliticizes issues closely related to power relations and resource alloca-
tion. As observed by Wood, the neo-liberal view of civil society serves 
the objective of sidelining the concept of class: ‘to dissolve it in all-
embracing category or even any political relevance at all’ (Wood 1990: 
79). At the heart of this transformation resides the highly political ques-
tion of who owns the legitimate right of making demands on the state. 
On a long-term basis, this type of social management will indeed be less 
expensive for governments who already have difficulties addressing their 
debt service. Luxury of another era or not, this tendency puts an end to 
the universal programs ideal and simultaneously narrows the popula-
tion’s legitimate spaces of political demands.  
Conclusion 
In this contribution, it was observed that while the participatory agenda 
has offered new opportunities for different actors to participate in their 
country’s PRS, not all members of society have been granted a seat at the 
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negotiation table. It has indeed been revealing that organisations with a 
strong political mandate – such as trade unions – have often been absent 
from the PRS process. As such, it was observed that only certain ele-
ments of civil society had been given a voice and only in what was de-
fined as essentially technical matters of implementation.  
Recent trends have demonstrated that this process has not spared 
MPs. While MPs were once defined as problematic and unmanageable, 
the institution of parliament has gradually become the object of much 
interest by the Bank. The Bank’s thirst for legitimacy for the policy re-
forms it promotes undoubtedly counts for an important part of its sud-
den interest in MPs. As such, PRS were indeed facing an immediate le-
gitimacy crisis linked to their obvious failure to involve the 
representatives of the people within the so-called participatory process.  
The analysis of the mechanisms proposed by the Bank to mainstream 
parliaments within the PRS process has suggested that their assigned role 
had been restricted to a narrow window of governance oversight, leaving 
little opportunity to influence the content of the strategies.  
In turn, such a process has revealed that the new functions assigned 
to MPs in the PRS process represents an agenda that has striking simi-
larities with the depoliticised role it assigned to civil society. When juxta-
posed to the Bank’s endeavour to directly involve specific segments of 
civil society through direct participatory mechanisms, the initiative to-
wards parliaments reveals itself to be quite problematic in terms of the 
possible impact of the IDM on political representation. Far beyond a 
mere public relation exercise, it was argued that this strategy is illustrative 
of the Bank’s decision that it may be more effective to co-opt parlia-
ments and certain segment of civil society within a functional, techno-
managerial system, than excluding them from the entire process and thus 
risking future interference with PRS. 
Crucially, it was argued that civil society and MPs are not seen as a 
political site where interests organise to capture and overthrow or reori-
ent the state, but rather as a useful watchdog deprived of political input. 
While a small proportion of society is given a voice on matters that do 
not influence the organisation of power, concepts of rights and democ-
racy are subsumed, together with the representative role of parliaments 
and political parties. 
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1 Part of this chapter was published in a different form in Hatcher, P. (2009) 
‘The Politics of Entrapment: Parliaments, Governance and Poverty Reduction 
Strategies’ in Hout, W. and R. Robison (eds) Governance and the Depoliticisation of 
Development, pp. 123-136. Routledge: New York. 
2 On the subject see for example Biekart 1999; Edwards 2004; Van Rooy 1997; 
Wood 1990. 
3 See the work of public choice economists such as Buchanan and Tul-
lock(1962). See also Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olson and Woolcock (2004). 
4 In fact, NGOs are often defined as having no membership. For a thorough 
review of the contending conceptual definitions of NGOs and civil society, see 
Edwards (2004) and Biekart (1999). 
5 On the subject see Edwards 2004; Hearn 2007; Van Rooy 1997. 
6 Hearn’s mapping of what she coins as ‘Africanization of the NGO-sector’ is 
interesting. She observes that by the end of the 1980s it became clear that the 
heavy white foreign presence was politically unsustainable and this led to the 
indigenization of the NGO-sector in Africa. She argues that since the private 
sector and the state were perceived as rent-seekers, the voluntary sector, with its 
significant inflows of external funding, had become the place to make money 
(2007: 1101). 
7 On the subject, see for example Fine 2004; Harriss 2002; Hearn 1999; 
Jayasuriya 2001; 2006; Van Rooy 1997. 
8 Development Pol cy Dialogue Team: The Vice Presidency for Europe 
runs the Bank’s Development Policy Dialogue Team, which is the principal 
point of contact for parliamentarians and parliamentary organisations at the 
Bank. Officially, ‘it facilitates policy dialogue with elected officials worldwide 
and connects parliamentarians with relevant Bank units and Bank country of-
fices and with other constituencies such as academics and youth’. Available at 
http://web.worldbank.org (accessed January 11, 2009) 
i
 
 World Bank Institute: The WBI is the capacity development arm of the 
Bank, which is presented as ‘the world's largest source of development assis-
tance’ (World Bank 2006a ‘About the World Bank Institute’, World Bank web-
site, accessed April 2006). While historically it focused on individual MPs it 
now focuses on ‘enhancing the capacity of parliament as an institution of gov-
ernance’ (World Bank Institute, Parliamentary Strengthening Program Bro-
chure). The WBI works with the Bank’s country teams to integrate capacity 
development activities into Country Assistance Strategies. Through its capacity 
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building courses, the WBI has trained over 4000 MPs. The Parliamentary 
Strengthening Program of the WBI aims to ‘assist parliaments in playing their 
constitutionally designated role in governance process’. 
 tParliamen ary Network on the World Bank: Created in 2000, the 
PNOWB is a network that aims to: ‘encourage policy dialogue between legisla-
tors and the World Bank and the IMF, and to mobilize parliamentarians in the 
fight against poverty’ (Parliamentary Network on the World Bank 2005). 
9 Gelb observed during an interview conducted during the Singapore Workshop 
on the World Bank that in fact: ‘the World Bank has not involved parliamentarian 
in the reform process’ (September 18, 2006). 
10 This was notably observed by Eberlei and Henn 2003; Gould and Ojanen 
2003; Jones and Hardstaff 2005; Youash 2003. 
11 For a thorough review of the debate on the subject see Bayart 1992; Harri-
son 2006; Walle 2001. 
12 Let us recall that the PNOWB’s objectives are to: ‘encourage policy dialogue 
between legislators and the World Bank and the IMF, and to mobilize parliamen-
tarians in the fight against poverty’ (Parliamentary Network on the World Bank 
2005). 
13 The article states that: ‘The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the 
political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions 
by the political character of the member or members concerned’. International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles of Agreement, Section 10, 
Article IV. 
14 Details on these cases are available online on World Development Move-
ment website at: http://www.wdm.org.uk/democracy/parliament (accessed 
December 17, 2007) 
15 According to the International Parliamentarians’ Petition 2005 Annual report, by 
the end of 2005, the petition had been signed by over 1100 MPs in 55 coun-
tries. World Development Movement states that it has been endorsed by the 
Parliamentary Network on the World Bank; UK All-Party Parliamentary 
Groups on Debt, Aid and Trade, World Government and Overseas Develop-
ment; the Committee for a Democratic UN; the Committee of the Parliaments 
of the Americas; European Parliamentarians for Africa; and numerous civil so-
ciety organisations and networks. Online. Available at 
http://www.wdm.org.uk/resources/reports/debt/IPPannualreport01022006.p
df (accessed January 10, 2009) 
16 On the subject see Weber (2005). 
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The shift towards an international aid reform at the turn of the century 
was the product of numerous debates and great confusion, notably on 
the novelties that it actually brought forth. While the poverty reduction 
and participatory narrative linked to the latest model appeared to be sig-
nalling a shift towards a more social policy agenda, there was a contradic-
tory move towards a stricter governance model that seemed to be spe-
cifically designed to insulate policy-makers from vested interests. The 
overarching objective of this thesis has been to shed new a light on this 
apparent paradox inherent to the international aid reform.  
The thesis has focussed both on the theoretical sources that inspired 
the World Bank to adopt a new model and on the political objectives of 
this agenda. Such a research focus has led to the combination of the 
Bank’s narrative and its new aid allocation mechanisms under the label 
‘Integrated Development Model’. As such, this thesis’ contribution has 
further been located in its methodological choices. The IDM – as a main 
object of study – has allowed this research to transcend common coun-
try-based analyses of the PRS experience and to re-position the new aid 
allocation mechanisms within the larger reordering of power on behalf 
of market-oriented interests. The theoretical framework has brought to-
gether key authors from the field of International Political Economy and 
emphasised the usefulness of the social conflict theory, which focuses on the 
power dynamics at play.  
Such a framework has allowed for a new light to be shed on the ap-
parent contradictions within the Bank’s new aid agenda: the contrasts 
between the Bank’s social development narrative and the Bank’s govern-
ance agenda. The analytical framework’s given originality has thus been 
to specifically triangulate the two core concepts of the IDM: Governance 
and Civil society, with citizenship, the conceptual absentee of the Model.  
In light of this framework, it was argued that contrary to the main-
stream arguments, the reform is far more than a mere ‘structural adjust-
ment in disguise’. Building on an analysis of the theoretical foundations 
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of the IDM, the existing confusions between narrative, assumptions and 
methods entwined with the so-called PWC, were addressed.  
The central proposition defended in this thesis has been that the IDM 
is part of the contemporary neo-liberal project and serves to lock-in neo-
liberal policies. Three sub-propositions were further expressed. First, the 
aid reform was shown to be closely linked to the former consensus and 
as such – contrary to what the Bank has been arguing – the IDM cannot 
be defined as a new aid paradigm. It was further argued that the IDM 
should be viewed as a fundamental part of a greater socio-political pro-
ject linked to the political consolidation of the neo-liberal agenda at the 
global and local levels. Thirdly, and logically, this socio-political project 
has tangible political consequences closely linked to the idea of citizen-
ship. 
Such propositions have been supported by the analysis of two insulat-
ing mechanisms inherent to the IDM, clearly demonstrating that the 
Model represents the Bank’s attempt to isolate from political competi-
tion a highly political agenda – which had proven highly problematic in 
the past. The new conditionality model and the participatory agenda are 
indeed two insulating mechanisms which are effectively transforming the 
state architecture; shifting the political spaces between state, civil society 
and markets in a manner that benefits one over the others.  
The new conditionality model, which consolidates the governance 
agenda, explicitly serves to alter the state in favour of technocratic prin-
ciples. Building on a study of the mechanics of the new aid allocation 
mechanisms embedded in the IDM – primarily the PRS – it was argued 
that it represents an attempt to circumscribe borrowing governments in 
their possibilities to challenge orthodox policies.  
The IDM’s participatory and social agenda was identified as the sec-
ond key insulating mechanisms vital to the IDM’s strategy. It was argued 
that the model serves to capture, co-opt and mobilise civil society ele-
ments behind the market agenda, thus insulating the reform process 
from the realm of political society. The study of the PRS experience has 
indeed revealed that only certain segments of ‘civil society’ – the one de-
prived of political attributes – were invited to the participation table. 
Such a process represents a clear attempt to put certain segments of civil 
society at work in an effort to tackle the resistance against neo-liberal 
policies. 
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The correlation of the IDM’s insulating mechanisms has brought 
forth serious concerns relating to what was shown to be an attempt to 
embed new modes of authority in PRS countries. The central argument 
here has been to demonstrate that the IDM’s systematic attempts to cur-
tail the realm of political society in countries under reform may be char-
acterised as promoting neo-populism, thus raising serious concerns over 
issues linked to the very idea of citizenship.  
Overall, the question of the impact of the IDM on political represen-
tation is significantly relevant since the IDM hides highly contentious 
issues behind technical responses. The study of the PRS framework has 
clearly shown that its purpose is to isolate key political options from the 
democratic realm, such as specific choices linked to the welfare state. 
These represent clear constraints on democratic choices which, as argued 
by Gill, confer privileged rights of citizenship and representation to cor-
porate capital (1995: 8). As such, the IDM establishes technocratic 
precedents which are geared to free the state from what is perceived as 
the debilitating effects of political bargaining (Jayasuriya 2001: 1). While 
this is done under the cover of seemingly benign terms such as participa-
tion, ownership and empowerment, the IDM has undoubtedly set anti-
democratic precedents by substituting representative politics with a tech-
nocratic form of rule. One is forced to conclude that the IDM’s over-
whelming focus on civil society has carried out an understanding that the 
civil society option was preferred to the option of helping to build effec-
tive democracies.  
The New Battle Ground: Neo-Institutionalists, Neo-
Conservatives and the Future of the IDM 
In an interesting twist, the architect of the IDM – James D. Wolfensohn 
– was successively replaced by two prominent figures of the George W. 
Bush administration, a change that has proven to be quite challenging for 
the IDM. The question here of course, is whether the lessons that led to 
the creation of the IDM – which was developed to address the escalating 
setbacks of the Washington Consensus – have been lost on the neo-
conservative turn at the Bank. In this thesis, it was argued that the IDM’s 
central objective is to consolidate neo-liberalism by securing the eco-
nomic achievements of the last decade on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, by pursuing a greater expansion of markets via the colonisa-
tion of the realm of political society. In this light, the lessons of the SAP 
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era seem to have been lost on the Bush administration and, as many 
feared, on the Wolfowitz’ presidency.  
In March 2005, the Bush administration appointed Paul Wolfowitz as 
President of the World Bank, a decision described by the Financial Times 
as putting a ‘fox in charge of the chicken coop’ (Financial Times 2005). 
While the paper’s editorialist rejoiced that finally someone would be 
‘tough-minded and willing to set priorities’ (Financial Times 2005), the 
decision to appoint the architect of the Iraq war at the head of the multi-
lateral development organisation remained controversial. If the Wolfen-
sohn legacy was sometimes perceived as eclectic for its pursuit of miscel-
laneous development themes, the Wolfowitz nomination, as many 
feared, marked the US administrations’ will to openly use the multilateral 
organisation for its own specific security and strategic ends. It is reveal-
ing that within 48 hours of this nomination, 1300 civil society groups 
and individuals had already signed a petition1 voicing concerns that ‘un-
der Wolfowitz, World Bank aid flows could become more dependent on 
the priorities of the US administration (Wilks 2005).  
Two years after his controversial nomination, Wolfowitz resigned (in 
June 2007) amidst extensive media attention, ironically for showing his 
partner preferential treatment rather than for the difficulties pertaining to 
his specific approach to the nature and problems of development. Nev-
ertheless, and as observed by Wade (2007), these ethical issues became 
‘the lightning-rod for much broader anger over the way he was running 
the Bank’. During his short term, Wade argues, Wolfowitz had indeed 
managed to stir controversy, not only by alienating the staff of the or-
ganisation with his management style but by bringing the Bank towards a 
neo-conservative agenda that revolved around US security and strategic 
interests.  
In fact, the neo-conservatives vision of the global order and strategies 
for ensuring America’s place in the world might indeed undermine many 
of the principles of Wolfensohn’s IDM. Neo-conservatives, contrary to 
the institutionalism ideas inherent to the IDM, strongly believe in the 
doctrine of pre-emptive war and assault on the system of social and po-
litical powers that may be detrimental to US interests. Wolfowitz did 
suspend loans to countries he considered corrupt such as Chad, Kenya 
and Bangladesh while also expanding the Bank’s activities in places 
where the United States had intervened militarily such as Lebanon and 
Iraq (Cassidy 2007). 
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However, such a shift towards a neo-conservative agenda at the Bank 
might not necessarily prove to be the end of the IDM. While the jury is 
still out, the analysis of the impact of the neo-conservative agenda on the 
IDM principles suggests that the Model might be adaptive enough to 
meet some of the neo-conservative features for a short period of time. 
That is at least until such features are tamed by an important political 
backlash against the unilateralism of the Republican administration. Let 
us recall that the IDM has two main levels which need to be assessed in 
light of the neo-conservative turn: one linked to the consolidation of a 
technocratic governance imperative, and one linked to the co-option of 
certain segments of civil society.  
At the governance level, it appears that the Wolfowitz presidency 
consolidated the principles of strategic selectivity in term of aid alloca-
tion on the basis of ‘good governance’. This governance policy was es-
tablished in March 2007, when the Board of Directors unanimously en-
dorsed the proposal ‘Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on 
Governance and Anticorruption’. Such an agenda was described as a re-
vised and improved strategy for heightening the Bank’s focus ‘on gov-
ernance and anticorruption as an integral part of its work to reduce pov-
erty and promote growth’ (World Bank 2007c). The Economist (2007b) did 
note that: ‘He [Mr Wolfowitz] irked shareholders, borrowers and staff 
alike by interrupting the flow of money to self-dealing governments or 
tainted projects’ (Economist 2007b). Of course – and this is where the 
IDM principles have been ousted by the neo-conservative imprint – the 
governance agenda under Wolfowitz has clearly been carried out less on 
the basis of technocratic principles and more on the basis of defending 
American interests, or as argued by Wade: ‘as a cover for advancing 
United States-centric political objectives’ (2007). In particular, Wade cites 
as an example the Bank’s suspension of Uzbekistan’s new loan proposals 
only two weeks after the Uzbek government made the US withdraw its 
military forces from the country in March 2006 (Wade 2007).  
Neo-liberalism has historically been served by IFI conditionality. 
However, and as argued by Tabb: ‘Where local coalitions cannot be as-
sembled around neoliberal goals through the usual incentives and blan-
dishments it is tempting for the world’s hyper power to employ more 
direct threats and indeed use of violence’ (Tabb 2006: 174). While the 
means to consolidate neo-liberalism might have changed under a neo-
conservative agenda, the ultimate objective of paving the way for free 
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markets remains the same. Of course, the main issue at hand is when the 
fundamentalist religious right and the petro-military interests overpower 
the expansion of the neo-liberal objectives of producing freer and more 
efficient markets. In direct contradiction to the IDM principle acknowl-
edging the importance of co-opting elements of civil society to the neo-
liberal agenda, the Bush doctrine has managed to alienate local popula-
tions, notably in Iraq. As pointed out by Tabb: ‘Part of the explanation 
of the US failure in Iraq is the result of the neo-liberal model the Bush 
administration imposed on that country, which ignored provision of ba-
sic public services and, more generally, an almost wilful lack of planning 
beyond that undertaken to protect the oil’ (Tabb 2006: 176). 
The point here is that the IDM was the product of an adaptation of 
the Bank’s tactics to impose neo-liberalism in reforming countries. As 
such, the lessons of the SAP era seemed to be lost on the Wolfowitz 
presidency. The unilateralism of neo-conservatism has undoubtedly 
clashed with the neopopulist agenda, which is at the core of the IDM 
principle.  
But the verdict on the importance of the neo-conservative agenda at 
the Bank is still pending. Robert Zoellick, as a former American trade 
representative who was appointed in July 2007, is also perceived as 
someone who harmonises the Bank’s agenda in order to meet US neo-
conservative interests. In comparison to his predecessor however, he is 
seen as a tamed neo-conservative: ‘[Zoellick] is not viewed as represent-
ing as much of a hardliner as the neo-conservative Wolfowitz is re-
garded’ observes The Economist (2007a). On the subject, a senior Bank 
official declared to the Washington Post: ‘Zoellick may not enjoy a honey-
moon, but there will still be a sizable slice of the bank prepared to give 
him the benefit of the doubt’ (Goodman 2007: A01).  
In light of the global financial crisis however, it now appear that the 
Zoellick presidency may be judged less for its neo-conservative influ-
ences than on the Bank’s ability to efficiently address the current eco-
nomic turmoil. Interestingly however, the crisis has provoked an impor-
tant debate over the very future of the IFIs: ‘the world need[s] a new 
Bretton Woods agreement’ stated British Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
in January 2009, after calling on world leaders to reform the international 
financial institutions (CNN 2009). Shortly after, the Chinese government 
was declaring that ‘The critical part of any reform package should be 
greater representation and voting rights for emerging and developing 
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countries within the IMF and the World Bank’ (Reuters 2009). This was 
followed by the announcement of Brazil’s Finance Minister to the effect 
that his country, along with Russia, China and India, would no longer 
contribute to the IMF until their voting shares were increased (Reuters 
2009).  
The issue of representation within the IFIs is indeed being scrutinised 
both in terms of the legitimacy of having American and European ap-
pointments for the presidency of both institutions, and in terms of over-
all voting power within the organisations’ decisions. In February 2009, 
the Bank’s Governors took a first step towards giving reforming coun-
tries a greater voice inside the organisation by adding a seat for Sub-
Saharan Africa on the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. This opened 
the door for borrowing countries to increase their voting power to 44%. 
But does this really signal the beginning of a significant transforma-
tion within the Bank’s ideology? Scepticism is required. As Sengupta 
(2009) argues: ‘But even though the Bank’s cafeteria probably serves 
more curry and couscous than it’s done before, there’s been no percepti-
ble shift in the institution’s orientation’ (2009). In fact, there is little hope 
that such minor changes can challenge the neo-institutional strongholds 
at the Bank and as such, the core principles of the IDM. 
Beyond the modest concessions granted to borrowing nations, the 
immediate question is rather to see whether the Bank will need to make 
more fundamental changes as it adapts to the current global economic 
turmoil. Afterall, the crisis was fed by a financial sector which was gradu-
ally freed of state laws and regulations and had thus carried an unprece-
dented weight in the world economy.  
As the IMF is starting to provide emergency loans, the conditionality 
packages will be crucial in indicating any real change. If the conditionali-
ties attached to these loans are not as complex as those imposed during 
the Asian financial crisis, the antes nature of some of the conditions, 
which require prior actions from borrowing governments, remain for 
now well within the path of the selectivity agenda promoted in the IDM. 
For example, at a meeting2 between the International Trade Union Confedera-
tion (ITUC) attended by Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the IFM Managing 
Director, and the World Bank President Robert Zoellick, ITUC mem-
bers raised concern that the new loans were conditional to interest rate 
and utility price hikes, restrictions and even reductions in wages and re-
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ductions of pension payments other public spending cuts (Olayinka 
2009). One member of the ITUC, Guy Ryder, suggested that:  
It makes no sense for the World Bank to continue to heavily promote 
across-the-board deregulation as the answer to developing countries’ ills, 
when it [is] obvious that it is the lack of adequate regulation world-wide 
that has plunged the global economy into its worst straits since the 1930s 
(cited in Olayinka 2009). 
For Zoellick himself, the global financial crisis appears to represent 
‘an opportunity for revisiting the role and size of government and for 
taking measures to increase economic freedom’ (cited in Daboub 2009). 
Here it appears that the Bank’s strategy to address the current crisis is 
to tightly cling to its traditional policy package where targeted safety nets 
are promoted in conjunction with economic and institutional reforms. 
This obstinate will to drive the old neo-liberal prescriptions is revealing 
of the persistence the apolitical and technical institutional norms at the 
Bank, as discussed in chapter two of this contribution. Ironically, while 
aid packages appear to remain firmly in line with the economic model of 
the last decade, the same double policy standard is maintained. On the 
subject, Stiglitz himself observed that bailing out firms in rich countries 
could disadvantage their rivals in the emerging world: ‘Even the knowl-
edge that there may be a rescue if things go badly gives firms in ad-
vanced industrial countries a distinct advantage: they can undertake risks 
that those in poorer countries cannot’ (cited in Stewart 2009). 
What is crucial to underline here is how the crisis represents an un-
precedented opportunity for the Bank to reassert its own relevance 
amidst the challenges of a changing world. As observed by Manish 
Bapna: ‘IFIs have been desperately awaiting the new business this finan-
cial crisis will likely generate’ (cited in Jaruzel 2008). The Wolfensohn era 
was indeed followed by fundamental changes in the check board of in-
ternational aid, changes that were threatening the historical influence of 
the Bank. New players, such as China and Korea, growing private foun-
dations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, and multiplying 
Global vertical programmes3 have indeed become tremendously influen-
tial. Therefore, the Bank’s new commitments of up to $100 billion in aid 
over the next three years, will undeniably help secure the institution’s 
position for the years to come, making it less susceptible to pressure for 
change. 
As the economic downturn is securing the influence of the World 
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Bank within this changing world, one must wonder if the IDM will be 
reinforced or if other strategies will be carried out.  
The Obama administration has already started challenging the neo-
conservative principles of the Bush Presidency and as such, it is expected 
that the principles of the IDM will come back in force. Such changes 
echo Tabb’s conclusions that the ‘muscular adventurism of the Bush 
neo-conservatives’ would likely be replaced by greater caution and that 
the ‘desire for multilateral cover may lead the United States back to a 
greater commitment to global state governance regime building’ (Tabb 
2006: 193). As further argued by Hout and Robison, even the neo-
conservatives came to recognise that the elimination of specific regimes 
was not enough to guarantee the effective implementation and embed-
ding neo-liberal reforms, their point being that it was the creation of ef-
fective pro-market alliances that really mattered (2009: 197). 
On that note, there is no doubt that the social aftermath of the global 
financial crisis will require neo-liberals to reach out well beyond a strict 
economic orthodoxy in order to nurse those local coalitions vital to its 
very survival. As such, the IDM ideology will remain the most useful 
policy choice for the Bank. As argued throughout this contribution, the 
IDM was developed precisely to address the escalating setbacks of a spe-
cific crisis – the Washington Consensus – without actually challenging its 
fundamental assumptions and goals. What is key here is the fact that it is 
not the retreat of the state that the Bank is reaching. Instead, it is seeking 
to transform the functions of states in a way that undercuts their ability 
to mediate, regulate or mobilise in favour of the elite that dominates 
them or even, in rare occasions, in favour of their citizens. Zoellick 
clearly clings to the traditions of the IDM: 
 […] the effectiveness of governments and institutions will play a crucial 
role in weathering the storm. Governments can redouble efforts to re-
move obstacles to growth and create a better business environment by 
increasing transparency, respecting and strengthening property rights, 
putting in place a well functioning judiciary, and reducing crime and vio-
lence. This is crucial as the private sector is the engine of innovation and 
productivity – and best placed to create jobs. 
Many governments could also take advantage of the present crisis to 
review their policies on ‘universal subsidies,’ which are subsidies that are 
going not only to the poor, but to others that can do without. Why 
should the state subsidize water and sanitation, education services, gaso-
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line or electricity for those who can afford it? (Zoellick cited in Daboub 
2009) 
There is much to fear in terms of the social impacts and the tensions 
that the current economic meltdown will bring forth. Handling dramatic 
political changes is essential to the Bank’s agenda. The IDM has proven 
itself by providing various institutional and governance approaches that 
allow political opposition to be defused, at least temporarily. As such, the 
ideology of the IDM remains essential to the market agenda of the Bank. 
 
Notes 
 
1 The petition was initiated by the organisation European Network on Debt and 
Development. 
2 Held in Washington DC in January 2009. 
3 Global vertical programmes are also known as ‘vertical funds’, ‘global pro-
grams’ and ‘global initiatives’. The Accra High Level Forum, the OECD and the 
World Bank define vertical programmes as ‘international initiatives outside the 
UN system which deliver significant funding at the country level in support of 
focused thematic objectives’ (EURODAD 2008: 5). 
  
 References 
 
 
Abrahamson, R. (2004) ‘The Power of Partnerships in Global Govern-
ance’, Third World Quarterly 25(8): 1453-1467. 
Ahrens, J. (no date) ‘Toward a Post-Washington Consensus: the Impor-
tance of Governance Structures in Less Developed Countries and 
Economies in Transition’, University of Göttingen, Department of 
Economics. Available at http://www.sigov.si/zmar/apublic/jiidt/ 
iib0400/08-ahren.pdf (accessed July 10, 2004) 
Alexander, N. (2004) ‘Judge and Jury: the World Bank’s Scorecard for 
Borrowing Governments’, Citizens’ Network on Essential Service, 
in Social Watch: 17-23. 
All Party Group on Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (2004) ‘Parliamen-
tary Briefing: International Parliamentarians’ Petition for Democ-
ratic Oversight of IMF and World Bank Policies’, September. 
Available at http://www.pnowb.org/admindb/docs/IP% 
20petition.pdf (accessed November 11, 2008)  
All Party Group on Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (2009) ‘Interna-
tional Parliamentarians’ Petition for Democratic Oversight of IMF 
and World Bank Policies’. Available at 
http://www.pnowb.org/admindb/docs/IP%20petition.pdf (ac-
cessed January 11, 2009)  
Ames, B., W. Brown, S. Devarajan and A. Izquierdo (no date) ‘Macro-
economic Issues’, Chapter 12, in World Bank, A Sourcebook for Pov-
erty Reduction Strategies, Vol. 2. 
Arkadie, B. (1990) ‘The Role of Institutions in Development’, Proceedings 
of the 1989 World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 
World Bank: 153-175. 
Bayart, J. F. (1992) L'Etat en Afrique: La politique du ventre. Paris: Fayard.  
Beattie, A. (2000) ‘World Bank Broadens Approach to Ending Poverty’ 
Financial Times, September 21. Available http://specials.ft.com/ 
183 
 References 184 
worldconomy2000/FT3MXSSQEDC.html 
Bebbington, A., S. Guggenheim, E. Olson and M. Woolcock (2004) ‘Ex-
ploring the Social Capital Debates at the World Bank’, Journal of 
Development Studies 40(5): 33-64.  
Benin, Republic of (2007) Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction (April). 
Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/ Re-
sources/Benin-PRSP (April2008).pdf (accessed November 8, 
2008) 
Biekart, K. (1999) The Politics of Civil Society Building: European Private Aid 
Agencies and Democratic Transition in Central America. Amsterdam: In-
ternational Books and the Transnational Institute. 
Biersteker, T. J. (1990) ‘Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: 
A Conceptual Exploration of IMF and World Bank Prescriptions’, 
International Studies Quartely, No. 34: 477-492. 
Boas, M. and D. McNeill (2003) Multilateral Institutions: A Critical Introduc-
tion. London: Pluto Press. 
Braathen, E. (2006) ‘A Participatory Pathbreaker? Experience with PRSP 
from Four South African Countries’, Norwegian Institute for Ur-
ban and Regional Research, Working Paper 122, Oslo (October).  
Bretton Woods Project (2003) ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs): A Rough Guide’, April. Available at 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/ 
prsp_roughguide/prsp_roughguide.pdf (accessed November 8, 
2008) 
Bretton Woods Project (2005) ‘Parliamentarians Go To Washington to 
Demand Greater Oversight’, News, 13 June. Available at 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd[126]=x-
126-235793 (accessed September 17, 2005)  
Bretton Woods Project (2006) ‘Analysis Casts Doubt on Bank Scorecard: 
CPIA Numbers Made Public for First Time’, November. Available 
at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-542375 (accessed 
November 8, 2008) 
Bryld, B. (2000) ‘The Technocratic Discourse: Technical Means to Po-
litical Problems’ Development in Practice 10(5): 700-705. 
Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock(1962) The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: Michigan Press. 
Burkina Faso (2004) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (July). Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Burkin
 References 185 
aFaso_PRSP_July2004.pdf (accessed November 15, 2008) 
Burnside, C and D. Dollar (1997) ‘Aid, Policies and Growth’, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3251, Washington DC: 
World Bank 
Burnside, C and D. Dollar (2000) ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’, American 
Economic Review 90(4): 847-868. 
Cameroon, Republic of (2003) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (April). 
Available at http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/Cameroon_-
_PRSP1.pdf (accessed November 10, 2008) 
Cammack, P. (2003) ‘The Governance of Global Capitalism: A New Ma-
terialist Perspective’, Historical Materialism 11(2): 37-59.  
Cammack, P. (2004) ‘What the World Bank Means by Poverty Reduc-
tion, and Why it Matters’, New Political Economy 9(2): 189-211. 
Campbell, B. (1996) ‘Débats actuels sur la reconceptualisation de l’État 
par les organismes de financement multilatéraux et l’USAID’, 
Politique Africaine, No. 61: 18-28. 
Campbell, B. (1997) ‘La Banque mondiale prône un État efficace: pour 
faire quoi?’, Revue québécoise de droit international, Vol. 10: 189-199. 
Campbell, B. (2000a) ‘An Overview of Governance’, Commissioned Pa-
per Prepared for the International Development Research Centre, 
Université du Québec à Montréal (October). 
Campbell, B. (2000b) ‘Gouvernance: un concept apolitique?’, 
communication pour la table ronde ‘Quel modèle politique est 
sous-jacent au concept apolitique de Gouvernance?’, Séminaire 
d’été du Haut Conseil de la Coopération Internationale, ‘Le 
développement : pour un débat politique’, Dourdan (29 août). 
Campbell, B. (2002) ‘Stratégies de lutte contre la pauvreté en Afrique: 
Enjeux de développement et de sécurité’, document présenté au 
Forum sur l'Afrique Centre canadien pour le développement de la 
politique étrangère, Département de Science Politique, Faculté de 
Science Politique et de Droit, Université du Québec à Montréal (8 
février).  
Campbell, B. (ed.) (2004) ‘Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose 
Benefit?’, Discussion paper 26, Groupe de recherche sur les 
activités minières en Afrique (GRAMA). Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet. 
 References 186 
Campbell, B. (ed.) (2005) Qu’allons-nous faire des pauvres? Réformes 
institutionnelles et espaces politiques ou les pièges de la gouvernance pour les 
pauvres. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
Campbell, B. and P. Hatcher (2004) ‘Existe-t-il encore une place pour la 
coopération bilatérale? Réflexions à partir de l'expérience 
canadienne’, Revue Tiers Monde XLV(179): 666-687. 
Canadian International Development Agency (2002) Policy Statement on 
Strengthening Aid Effectiveness. Hull: CIDA.  
Carroll, T. (2007) The Politics of the World Bank’s Socio-Institutional Neoliberal-
ism, PhD dissertation, Murdoch University. 
Cartier-Bresson, J. (no date) ‘La banque mondiale, la corruption et la 
gouvernance’, Université de Reims, EDJ et Membre associé 
CEDI-GREITD, Paris XIII.  
Cassen, R. (1985) Does Aid Work? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cassidy, J. (2007) ‘The Next Crusade: Paul Wolfowitz at the World 
Bank’, The New Yorker, April 9.  
Caufield, C. (1997) Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Na-
tions. London: Pan Books. 
Chaudhry, K. A. (1994) ‘Economic Liberalization and Lineages of the 
Rentier State’, Comparative Politics 27(1). 
Chevalier, V., T. Kingham and L. von Trapp (eds) (2005) A Parliamentar-
ian’s Guide to the World Bank, Revised version (April). Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPARLIAMENTARIAN
S/Resources/Parliamentarians_Book_Revised.pdf (accessed 
March 9, 2008) 
CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis (2004) ‘PRSP: Are the World Bank and 
IMF Delivering on Promises?’, Background Paper (April). 
Cisse, H. and V. Raghavan (2005) ‘Review of World Bank Conditionality: 
Legal Aspects of Conditionality in Policy-Based Lending’, World 
Bank Legal Vice Presidency (June 29). 
CNN (2009) ‘Call For Reform of the IFI’, Simon Hooper, January 31. 
Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/01/31/ 
davos.wef.brown (accessed February 6, 2009) 
Coase, R. (1937) ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica: New Series 4(16): 
386-405. 
Commonwealth Secretariat (2003) ‘Making Democracy Work for Pro-
Poor Development’, report based on the meetings of the Com-
monwealth Expert Group on Development and Democracy held 
 References 187 
11-12 November 2002, 1-2 May 2003 and 24-25 July 2003, Lon-
don, October. 
Cornia, G., R, Jolly, and F. Stewart (1987) Adjustment with a Human Face. 
UNICEF, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Culpeper, R. (1997) The Multilateral Development Banks: Titans or Behemoths? 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Curran, Z. (2005) ‘Civil Society Participation in the PRSP: The Role of 
Evidence and the Impact on Policy Choices?’, PPA Synthesis 
Study, Southern African Regional Poverty Network. Available at 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002121/PRSP_Civil-
society_Curran.pdf (accessed September 18, 2008) 
Daboub, J. J. (2009) ‘The Crisis: Opportunity for Reform’, Latin Business 
Chronicle, January 15. Available at http://www.latinbusiness 
chronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=3056 (accessed March 12, 
2009) 
Dagnino, E. (2008) ‘Civic Driven Change and Political Projects’, K. 
Biekart and A. Fowler (eds) Civic Driven Change: Citizen’s Imagination 
in Action, pp. 27-49. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.  
Dalgaard, C-J., H. Hansen and F. Tarp (2003) ‘On the Empirics of For-
eign Aid and Growth’, University of Copenhagen and the Eco-
nomic Policy Research Unit. Available at 
http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/files/wp/wp-03-13.pdf (accessed 
November 14, 2008) 
Davis, G. (2004) ‘A History of the Social Development Network in the 
World Bank, 1973-2002’, Social Development Paper, No. 56, World 
Bank (March). 
Dembele, D. M. (2004) ‘PRSPs: Poverty Reduction or Poverty Rein-
forcement?’, Forum for African Alternatives and 50 Years Is Enough 
Network South Council 7(1), January. Available at 
http://www.50years.org/cms/ejn/story/40 (accessed November 
8, 2008) 
Denny, C. (2000) ‘Don’t Bank On It: Factions at the World Bank Argue’, 
Guardian (July 4). 
Devarajan, S., D. Dollar and T. Holmgren (2001) Aid and Reform in Af-
rica: Lessons from Ten Case Studies. Washington DC: World Bank, 
second edition. 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (DAC-OECD) (1996) Shaping the 
 References 188 
21st Century: the Contribution of Development Co-operation. Paris: 
OECD. 
Dollar, D. and V. Levin (2004) ‘The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid 
1984-2002’, World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3299, 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
Doner, R. (1992) ‘Limits of State Strength: Toward an Institutionalist 
View of Economic Development’, World Politics 44(3): 398-431. 
Easterly, W. (2002) ‘The Cartel of Good Intentions: Bureaucracy Versus 
Markets in Foreign Aid’, Working Paper No. 4, Washington D.C.: 
Center for Global Development (Revised version, May 2002). 
Eberlei, W. and H. Henn (2003) ‘Parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa: Ac-
tors in Poverty Reduction?’, Division 42, State and Democracy, 
Planning and Development Department, study commissioned by 
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (December). 
Economist (The) (2007a) ‘The World Bank: A stitch in time’ The Econo-
mist (October 18). Available at http://www.economist.com 
/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_JJJPQPD 
Economist (The) (2007b) The World Bank: Right, Second time’, The 
Economist, May 31. Available at http://www.economist.com 
/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_JNVSGNS (accessed 
May 9, 2009) 
Economist (The) (2008) ‘Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the 
Jungle’, The Economist (March 13). 
Edwards, M. (2004) Civil Society. Cambridge: Polity.  
European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD) (2001a) 
‘EURODAD Poverty and Structural Adjustment Update’, Brussels 
(Spring meeting). Available at http://www.eurodad.org (accessed 
September 29, 2008) 
EURODAD (2001b) Many Dollars, Any Change? Part I: The Changing Na-
ture of Development Co-operation: Building Ownership, Brussels (Octo-
ber). Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1 
/Re sources/Comprehensive-Review/eurodad1a.pdf (accessed 
September 29, 2008) 
EURODAD (2002) Moving Beyond Good and Bad Performance, Brussels 
(June). Available at http://www.eurodad.org (accessed September 
29, 2008) 
EURODAD (2005) ‘A New Development Agenda? Sierra Leone's First 
 References 189 
PRSP’, H. Kovach (July). Available at http://www.eurodad.org 
/articles/ default.aspx?id=642 (accessed September 18, 2008) 
EURODAD (2008) ‘Global Vertical Programmes: the Future of Aid or a 
Quick Fix?’, RealityCheck, E. Delph (July). Available 
athttp://realityofaid.org/downloads/realitycheck_jul2008.pdf (ac-
cessed March 4, 2009) 
Financial Times (The) (2005) ‘A poor choice for the World Bank’, Finan-
cial Times, Editorial page, March 18. Available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/da59203e-9755-11d9-9f01-
00000e2511c8.html?nclick_check=1 (accessed February 10, 2009) 
Fine, B. (1997) ‘The New Revolution in Economics’, Capital and Class, 
Polemic, 61: 143-148. 
Fine, B. (1999) ‘The Developmental State Is Dead-Long Live Social 
Capital?’, Development and Change 30(1): 1-19. 
Fine, B., C. Lapavitsas and J. Pincus (eds) (2001) Development Policy in the 
Twenty-First Century: Beyond the Post-Washington Consensus. London: 
Routledge. 
Fleming, A. and M. O. Smith (1987) ‘Raising Resources for IDA: the 
Eighth Replenishment’, Finance and Development, September: 23-16. 
Fozzard, A., M. Holmes, J. Klugman, and K. Withers (no date) ‘Public 
Spending’, Chapter 6, in World Bank, A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategies, Vol. 1: 189-522. 
Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press. 
Gambia, Republic of (2006) Poverty Reduction Strategy (November). Avail-
able at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources 
/Gambia_PRSP(Sept-2007).pdf (accessed October 26, 2008) 
Gamble, A. (2006) ‘Two Faces of Neo-liberalism’, in R. Robison (ed.) 
The Neoliberal Revolution: Forging the Market State, pp. 20-35. Hamp-
shire: Palgrave. 
Gilbert, L. and D. Vines (eds) (2000) The World Bank: Structure and Policies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gill, S. (1995) ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neo-
liberalism’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24(3): 399-423.  
Gill, S. (2000) ‘The Constitution of Global Capitalism’, paper presented 
to the Panel: The Capitalist World, Past and Present at the Interna-
tional Studies Association Annual Convention, Los Angeles. 
 References 190 
Girishankar, N., L. Hammergren, M. Holmes, S. Knack, B. Levy, J. Lit-
vack, N. Manning, R. Messick, J. Rinne, and H. Sutch (no date) 
‘Governance’, Chapter 8, in World Bank, A Sourcebook for Poverty 
Reduction Strategies, Vol.1: 3271-556. 
Global Policy Forum (2000) ‘Statement on Ravi Kanbur's Resignation as 
World Development Report Lead Author: A Serious Blow for the 
World Bank and for Sensible Discussion of Globalisation’, 
APIC, June 14. Available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-
wto/critics/2000/kanbur2.htm (accessed November 13, 2008) 
Goldman, M. (2005) Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social 
Justice in the Age of Globalization. New Haven, CT and London: Yale 
University Press. 
Goodman, P. S. (2007) ‘Bush to Pick Zoellick for World Bank: Former 
Trade Negotiator Tapped to Replace Wolfowitz’, Washington Post, 
Wednesday, May 30: A01. 
Gore, C. (2004) ‘MDGs and PRSPs: Are Poor Countries Enmeshed in a 
Global-Local Double Bind?’, Global Social Policy 4(3): 277-283. 
Gould, J. and J. Ojanen (2003) ‘Merging the Circle: The Politics of Tan-
zania’s Poverty Reduction Strategy’, Policy Paper, no. 2, Institute 
of Development Studies, University of Helsinki. 
Grindle, M. (1991) ‘The New Political Economy: Positive Economics 
and Negative Politics’, in Meier, G.M. (ed.) Politics and Policy Making 
in Developing Countries: Perspectives on the New Political Economy, pp. 41-
67. San Francisco: ICS Press. 
Hadiz R. V. (2004) ‘Decentralisation and Democracy in Indonesia: A 
Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives’ Development and 
Change 35(4): 697-718 
Harmes, A. (no date) ‘New Constitutionalism and Multilevel Governance 
in Developing Countries’, Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Western Ontario. Available at 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citatio
n/0/9/8/4/9/pages98499/p98499-1.php (accessed November 20, 
2008) 
Harrigan, J., P. Mosley and J. Toye (1995) Aid and Power, Vol. 1. New 
York: Routledge. 
Harrison, G. (2004) The World Bank and Africa: the Construction of Govern-
ance States. London: Routledge. 
 References 191 
Harrison, G. (2006) ‘Neo-liberalism and the Persistence of Clientelism in 
Africa’, in R. Robison (ed.) The Neoliberal Revolution: Forging the Mar-
ket State, pp. 98-114. Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Harriss, J. (2002) Depoliticizing Development: The World Bank and Social Capi-
tal. London: Anthem Press. 
Hatcher, P. (2006) ‘Partnership and the International Aid Reform: Chal-
lenging Citizenship and Political Representation’, in D. Stone and C. 
Wright (eds) The World Bank and Governance: A Decade of Reform and 
Reaction, pp. 189-206. Routledge: New York. 
Hatcher, P. (2009) ‘The Politics of Entrapment: Parliaments, Govern-
ance and Poverty Reduction Strategies’ in Hout, W. and R. Robi-
son (eds) Governance and the Depoliticisation of Development, pp. 123-
136. Routledge: New York. 
Hearn, J. (1999) ‘Foreign Aid, Democratisation and Civil Society in Af-
rica’, Discussion Paper, No. 368. Sussex: Institute of Development 
Studies.  
Hearn, J. (2007) ‘African NGOs: the New Compradors?’, Development and 
Change 38(6): 1095-1110. 
Henwood D. (2000) ‘Stiglitz and the Limits of “Reform”’, The Nation, 
September 27. Available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/ 
20001002/henwood (May 20, 2009). 
Hickey, S. and G. Mohan (2005) ‘Relocating Participation within a Radi-
cal Politics of Development’, Development and Change 36(2): 237-262  
Higgott, R. and R. Robison (ed.) (1985) Southeast Asia: Essays in the Politi-
cal Economy of Structural Change. London: Routledge.  
High Level Forum (2005) ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Own-
ership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Account-
ability’, Paris, (February 28-March 2). 
Hout, W. (2007) The Politics of Aid Selectivity: Good Governance in World 
Bank, US and Dutch Development Assistance. London: Routledge.  
Hout, W. and R. Robison (eds) (2009) Governance and the Depoliticisation of 
Development. Routledge: New York.  
Hubli K. S. and A. P. Mandaville (2004) ‘Parliaments and the PRSP 
Process’, World Bank Institute, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Ibhawoh, B. (1999) ‘Structural Adjustment, Authoritarianism and Hu-
man Rights in Africa’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East XIX(1): 158-167. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008) ‘A Factsheet: Poverty Reduc-
 References 192 
tion Strategy Papers’. Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm (accessed 
November 8, 2008) 
IMF and World Bank (2004) ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Pro-
gress in Implementation’, Approved by Gobind Nankani and Mark 
Allen (September 20). Available at http://go.worldbank.org/ 
OP6APP4L40 (accessed November 16, 2008) 
Inter Pares (2001) ‘An Honorable Commitment: Policy Coherence in 
Canada’s Relations with the Global South’, February. Available at 
http://www.interpares.ca/en/publications/pdf/honorable_comm
itment.pdf (accessed November 30, 2008) 
Jaruzel, M. I. (2008) ‘Global Economic Woes, Climate Change Increase 
Importance of NGO Oversight’, Mott Mosaic, Fall/Winter 
2008/2009. Available at http://www.mott.org/publications/ 
Mott%20Mosaic/Winter%202009%20V7N2/env%20winter%202
009.aspx (accessed February 6, 2009) 
Jayasuriya, K. (2001) ‘Governance, Post-Washington Consensus and the 
New Anti Politics’, Working Paper Series, No. 2. Hong Kong: City 
University of Hong Kong. 
Jayasuriya, K. (2003) ‘Civil Society, Regulatory State and the New Anti 
Politics’, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University. 
Jayasuriya, K. (2006) ‘Economic Constitutionalism, Liberalism and the 
New Welfare Governance’, in R. Robison (ed.) The Neoliberal Revo-
lution: Forging the Market State, pp. 234-254. Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Jayasuriya, K. and A. Rosser (2001) ‘Economic Orthodoxy and the East 
Asian Crisis’, Third World Quarterly, 22(3): 381-396  
Johnson, J. K. and R. T. Nakamura (1999) ‘A Concept Paper on Legisla-
tures and Good Governance’, based on a paper prepared for 
UNDP, July. Available at http://www.undp.org/governance/ 
docs/Parl-Pub-ConceptPaper.htm (accessed July 6, 2008) 
Jones, T. and P. Hardstaff (2005) Denying Democracy: How the IMF and 
World Bank Take Power From People. London: World Development 
Movement. 
Jong, N. De, J. C. Aguilar, K. Komives (2008) ‘Effective External Aid 
for Poverty Reduction?’, Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategies in Latin America: Executive Summary of Country Re-
port – Bolivia, 2007, Project commissioned by the Swedish Inter-
national Development Agency (January). Available at 
 References 193 
http://www.iss.nl/prsp (accessed March 2008) 
Kagia, R. (ed.) (2005) Balancing the Development Agenda: the Transformation of 
the World Bank Under James D. Wolfensohn 1995-2005. Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
Kamat, S. (2004) ‘The Privatisation of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO 
Discourse in a Neoliberal Era’, Review of International Political Econ-
omy, 11(1): 155-176. 
Kanbur, R. (2000) ‘Aid, Conditionality and Debt in Africa’, in Finn Tarp 
(ed) Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the 
Future. Routledge. 
Kapur, D., J. Prior Lewis, R. C. Webb (1997) The World Bank: History. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Kenya, Republic of (2004) Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery 
Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007 (March). 
Available at http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/cr0511.pdf (ac-
cessed November 27, 2008) 
Kessler, T. (2000) ‘Business as Usual of Pro-poor Growth? Some 
Thoughts on How to Evaluate the PRSPs’, paper presented at the 
Annual Conference of EURODAD (December 16). 
Krueger, A. (1974) ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’, 
American Economic Review 64(3): 291-303. 
Lafortune, A. (2003) La résurgence du concept de société civile dans le discours 
politique contemporain, mémoire en science politique, Université du 
Québec à Montréal.  
Leautier, F. A. (2002) ‘Parliaments and Poverty: Building the Capacity to 
Tackle the Problems’, The Parliamentarian, issue Two: 179-182. 
Lister, S., and Nyamugasira, W. (2003) ‘Design Contradictions in the 
‘‘New Architecture of Aid’’? Reflections on Uganda and the Roles 
of Civil Society Organisations’, Development Policy Review 21(10): 93-
106.  
Lobe, J. (2000) ‘WDR Lead Author Resigns in Apparent Protest’, Third 
World Network, June 14. Available at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/wdr.htm (accessed May 10, 2009) 
Mallaby, S. (2004) The World’s Banker. New York: Penguin Books. 
Marshall, A., J. Woodroffe and P. Skell (2001) Policies to Roll-Back the State 
and Privatise? Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Investigated, World De-
velopment Movement. 
 References 194 
Mayoux, L. (2001) ‘Tackling the Down Side: Social Capital, Women’s 
Empowerment and MicroFinance in Cameroon’, Development and 
Change 32(3): 435-464. 
McGee, R. and Norton, A. (2000) ‘Participation in Poverty Reduction 
Strategies: a Synthesis of Experiences with Participatory Ap-
proaches to Policy Design, Implementation and Monitoring’, Insti-
tute of Development Studies, Working Paper 109.  
Mcleod, R.H. and R. Garnaut (ed.) (1998) East Asia in Crisis: From Being a 
Miracle to Needing One? London: Routledge. 
Meier, G.M. (1991) ‘Policy Lessons and Policy Formation’, in Gerald M. 
Meier (ed.) Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries: Perspectives 
on the New Political Economy, pp. 3-12. San Francisco: ICS Press. 
Meltzer Commission (Allan H. Melzer, chairman) (2000) Report of the In-
ternational Financial Institution Advisory Commission. Washington DC: 
U.S. Treasury (March). 
Messik, R. E. (1999) ‘Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A 
Survey of the Issues’, The World Bank Research Observer, Washington, 
February 14(1): 117-136. 
Miller-Adams, M. (1999) The World Bank: New Agendas in a Changing 
World. London: Routledge. 
Molenaers, N. and R. Renard (2006) ‘Participation in PRSP processes: 
Conditions for Pro Poor Effectiveness’, Discussion Paper, Insti-
tute of Development Policy and Management, Antwerpen, Janu-
ary. 
Mosley, P. (2001) ‘Attacking Poverty and the “Post-Washington Consen-
sus”’, Journal of International Development 13: 307-313. 
Mutume, G. (2003) ‘Un nouveau remède contre la pauvreté en Afrique?’, 
Afrique Relance 16(4): 12.  
Namara, R. B. (2009) ‘NGOs, PRSPs and Social Exclusion in Uganda’, 
PhD dissertation, Institute of Social Studies. 
Nelson, P. (2006) ‘The Varied and Conditional Integration of NGOs in 
the Aid System: NGOs and the World Bank’ Journal of International 
Development, 18: 701-13. 
North, D. C. (1994) ‘Economic Performance Through Time’, The Ameri-
can Economic Review 84(3): 359-368. 
North, D. C. (1995) ‘The New Institutional Economics and Third World 
Development’, in J. Harriss, J. Hunter and C.M. Lewis, The New In-
 References 195 
stitutional Economics and Third World Development, pp. 17-26. London: 
Routledge. 
North, D. C. (1997) ‘Understanding Economic Change’, in J.M. Nelson, 
C. Tilly and L. Walker (eds) Transforming Post-Communist Political 
Economies, pp. 13-18. Washington DC: National Academy Press. 
Olayinka, C. (2009) ‘Union Tasks IMF, World Bank on Growing Global 
Unemployment’, The Guardian, Abuja, January 22. Available at 
http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/appointment/article01/indexn
2_html?pdate=220109&ptitle=Union%20tasks%20IMF,%20Worl
d%20Bank%20on%20growing%20global%20unemployment (ac-
cessed March 6, 2009) 
Operation Evaluation Department (OED) (1999) Annual Review of Devel-
opment Effectiveness. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Operation Evaluation Department (OED) (2004a) 2003 Annual Review of 
Development Effectiveness: The Effectiveness of Bank Support for Policy Re-
form. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Operation Evaluation Department (OED) (2004b) An evaluation of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process. Washington DC: 
World Bank (July). 
Oxfam International (2001) Making PRSPs Work: The Role of Poverty As-
sessments. Washington DC: Oxfam International. 
Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (2005) ‘Progress Report: 
From Paris to Helsinki (February 2004-October 2005)’. Available 
at www.pnowb.org/admindb/docs/PNoWBProgressreport2004-
2005.doc (accessed January 11, 2009) 
Paul, James A. (1996) ‘The World Bank & NGOs, Global Policy Forum’, 
Global Policy Forum. Available at http://www.globalpolicy. 
org/ngos/int/bwi/1996/wrldbank.htm (accessed November 13, 
2008) 
Peet, R. (2003) Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO. London: 
Zed Books. 
Ponthieux, S. (2003) ‘Que faire du ‘‘social capital’’?’, Institut National de 
la Statistique et des Études Économiques, No. F0306, Paris (Sep-
tembre).  
Powell, J. (2004) ‘The World Bank Policy Scorecard: the New Condi-
tionality?’, At Issue, Bretton Woods Project, November. 
Preston, P. W. (1996) Development Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 References 196 
Putnam, R. D. (1995) ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capi-
tal’, The Journal of Democracy (6)1: 65-78. 
Reuters (2009) ‘IMF, World Bank need reform’, Nanyang news agency, 
March 15. Available at http://www.nanyang100.com/ 
world/4790.html (accessed March 20, 2009) 
Rittich, K. (1999) ‘Law and Social Justice’, Unesco Courier 52(11), Novem-
ber. 
Robison, R. (2006a) ‘Introduction’, in R. Robison (ed.) The Neoliberal 
Revolution: Forging the Market State, pp. xii-xv Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Robison, R. (2006b) ‘Neo-liberalism and the Market State: What is the 
Ideal Shell?’ in R. Robison (ed.) The Neoliberal Revolution: Forging the 
Market State, pp. 3-19. Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Robison, R., Rodan, G. and K. Hewison (2002) ‘Transplanting the Regu-
latory State in Southeast Asia: A Pathology Of Rejection’, Working 
Papers Series, No. 33, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City Uni-
versity of Hong Kong (September). 
Rodan, G. (2006) ‘Neo-Liberalism and Transparency: Political Versus 
Economic Liberalism’ in R. Robison (ed.) The Neoliberal Revolution: 
Forging the Market State, pp. 197-215. Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Rodan, G., K. Hewison and R. Robison (eds) (2001) The Political Economy 
of South-East Asia: Conflict, Crisis and Change. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rooy, A. van (1997) ‘The Civil Society Agenda: Switching Gears in the 
Post Cold War World’, paper presented to the International Stud-
ies Association Panel on Foreign Aid in the Post Cold War Era, 
Toronto (March). 
Rostow, W. W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rwanda, Republic of (2007) Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (September). Available at http://siteresources.worldbank. 
org/INTPRS1/Resources/Rawanda_PRSP(March-2008).pdf (ac-
cessed November 14, 2008) 
Sarrasin, B. (1999) Ajustement Structurel et lutte contre la pauvreté: la Banque 
mondiale face à la critique. Montreal: L’Harmattan. 
Save the Children UK (2001) Submission to the IMF/WB Review of PRSPs, 
December. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org 
/INTPRS1/Resources/Comprehensive-Review/scuk1.pdf (ac-
cessed September 29, 2008) 
 References 197 
Senegal, Republic of (2006) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II (September). 
Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/ Re-
sources/Senegal-PRSP(Sept2007).pdf (accessed November 10, 
2008) 
Sengupta, M. (2009) ‘Different Image, Same Tune? Reforming the World 
Bank’, Couter Punch, March 11. Available at 
http://www.counterpunch.org/sengupta03112009.html (accessed 
March 20, 2009) 
Shihata, I. (1991) The World Bank in a Changing World, World Bank, Vol. 1. 
Soederberg, S. (2004a) ‘American Empire and “Excluded States”: the 
Millennium Challenge Account and the Shift to Pre-emptive De-
velopment’, Third World Quarterly 25(2): 279-302. 
Soederberg, S. (2004b) The Politics of the New Financial Architecture. London 
and New York: Zed Books. 
Stern, E. (1990) ‘Mobilizing Resources for IDA: the Ninth Replenish-
ment’, Finance and Development, June: 20-23. 
Stewart, H. (2009) ‘West Urged to Increase Aid to Poor Nations’, The 
Observer, 11 January. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
business/2009/jan/11/aid-spending-credit-crunch-recession/print 
(accessed February 6, 2009) 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1994) ‘Some Lessons From the East Asian Miracle’, World 
Bank Research Observer 11(2): 151-77 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1998a) ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving 
Toward the Post Washington Consensus’, paper presented at the 
WIDER Annual Lecture, Helsinki (January 7).  
Stiglitz, J. E. (1998b) ‘Redefining the Role of the State: What Should It 
Do? How Should It Do It? And How Should These Decisions Be 
Made?’, paper presented on the Tenth Anniversary of MITI Re-
search (March 17). 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1998c) ‘Towards a New Paradigm for Development: 
Strategies, Policies, and Processes’, paper presented as the Prebisch 
Lecture, UNCTAD, Geneva (October 19). 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2001) ‘Information and the Change in the Paradigm in 
Economics’, Prize Lecture, Nobel Prize in Economics (December 
8). 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) ‘Introduction’ in Gilbert, L. and D. Vines (eds) The 
World Bank: Structure and Policies, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 1-9. 
 References 198 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2004) ‘Post Washington Consensus’, Task force on Gov-
ernance of Globalization, Working Paper series, Initiative for Pol-
icy Dialogue, Colombia University (November). 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2007) ‘The World Bank and Development Assistance’, tes-
timony for presentation before the House Financial Services 
Committee (May 22). 
Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network 
(SAPRIN) (2004) Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report the Policy 
Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and Inequality. London: Zed Books. 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) (2002) 
The Political Institutions: Parties, Elections and Parliaments, Department 
for Democracy and Social Development, Division for Democratic 
Governance, July. 
Tabb W. K. (2006) ‘Mr. Bush and Neo-Liberalism’ in R. Robison (ed.) 
The Neoliberal Revolution: Forging the Market State, pp. 173-194. 
Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Taylor, L. (1998) Citizenship, Participation and Democracy: Changing Dynamics 
in Chile and Argentina. London: MacMillan Press. 
Taylor, M. (2004) ‘Responding to Neoliberalism in Crisis: Discipline and 
Empowerment in the World Bank’s New Development Agenda’, 
Research in Political Economy, Vol. 21: 3-30. 
Teunissen, J. J. and A. Akkerman (eds) (2004) Diversity in Development: Re-
considering the Washington Consensus. The Hague: FONDAD.  
Thomas, M. (2004) ‘Can the World Bank Enforce its own Conditions?’, 
Development and Change 35(3): 485-97.  
Tikare, S., D. Youssef, P. Donnelly-Roark and P. Shah (no date) ‘Partici-
pation’, Chapter 7, revised version, in World Bank, A Sourcebook for 
Poverty Reduction Strategies, Vol. 1: 237-551. Available at 
http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/13839_chap7.pdf (accessed 
November 10, 2008) 
Toye, J. (1987) Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution 
in Development Theory and Policy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
United Nations (2002) ‘Outcome of the International Conference on 
Financing for Development’, Fifty-seventh session, Item 95 of the 
provisional agenda, Report of the Secretary-General, General As-
sembly (23 August). Available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/535/43/PD
F/N0253543.pdf?OpenElement (accessed July 19, 2007) 
 References 199 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
(2002) ‘Economic Development in Africa: From Adjustment to 
Poverty Reduction, What is New?’, Geneva: United Nations. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (no date) The Legisla-
ture and Constituency Relations. Available at http://www.undp.org/ 
governance/parldev/docs/constrelat.htm (accessed March 9, 
2008) 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) 
(2000) ‘What choices Do Democracies Have in Globalizing 
Economies: Technocratic Policy Making and Democratization’, 
Report of the UNRISD International Conference, Geneva (April). 
Vetterlein, A. (2007) ‘Change in International Organizations: Innovation 
or Adaptation? The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund - A Comparison of Organizational Cultures’, paper pre-
sented at the PhD Workshop on the World Bank, Bled, Slovenia 
(May 16). 
Wade, R. (1996) 'Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Main-
tenance: the East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective', New Left 
Review 217: 3-36. 
Wade, R. (2001a) ‘Making the World Development Report 2000: Attack-
ing Poverty’, World Development 29(8): 1435-1441. 
Wade, R. (2001b) ‘Showdown at the World Bank’, New Left Review, No. 7, 
January-February: 124-137. 
Wade, R. (2007) ‘The World’s World Bank Problem’, OpenDemocracy, July 
10. Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalisation/ 
institutions_government/world_bank_problem (accessed July 11, 
2008) 
Walle, N. Van de (2001) African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Cri-
sis, 1979-99. Cambridge: University Press. 
Wapenhans Report (1992) Effective Implementation: Key to Development Im-
pact. Washington DC: World Bank.  
Weber, H. (2005) ‘The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Initiative and 
the Organisation of World Politics: “Embedded Liberalism” or 
“New Constitutionalism”?’, Paper presented at the Workshop for 
Researchers on the World Bank, Budapest (April 1-2).  
Weyland, K. (1996) ‘Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: 
Unexpected Affinities’ Studies in Comparative International Development 
31(3): 3-31. 
 References 200 
Whaites, A. (2000) ‘PRSP’s: Good News for the Poor? Social Condition-
ality Participation and Poverty Reduction’, Policy and Advocacy 
Department, World Vision UK Partnership Offices, Milton 
Keynes.  
Wilks, A. (2005) ‘US Bank or World Bank?’, Open Democracy, March 24. 
Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-
institutions_government/article_2391.jsp (accessed February 4, 
2009) 
Wilks, A. and F. Lefrançois (2002) ‘Blinding with Science or Encourag-
ing Debate? How World Bank Analysis Determines PRSP Poli-
cies’, World Vision International and Bretton Woods Project. 
Available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-16047 (ac-
cessed July 11, 2008) 
Williams, D. (2008) The World Bank and Social Transformation in International 
Politics: Liberalism, Governance and Sovereignty. Routledge and Warwick 
Studies in Globalisation, No. 17, London: Routledge. 
Williamson, J. (1989) ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, in 
Williamson, J. (ed.) Latin American Readjustment: How Much has Hap-
pened, Washington: Institute for International Economics. 
Williamson, J. (2000) ‘What Should the World Bank Think About the 
Washington Consensus?’, The World Bank Research Observer 15(2), 
August. 
Wolfensohn, J. D. (1997) ‘The Challenge of Inclusion’, Annual World 
Bank Meetings Address, Hong Kong (September 23). 
Wolfensohn, J. D. (1998) ‘The Other Crisis’, address to the Board of 
Governors, Washington DC (October 6). 
Wolfensohn, J. D. (1999a) ‘A proposal for a Comprehensive Develop-
ment Framework: a Discussion Draft’, World Bank (January 21). 
Wolfensohn, J. D. (1999b) ‘Coalition for Change’, Address to the Board 
of Governors of the World Bank Group, Washington DC (Sep-
tember 28). 
Wood, A. (2004) ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back Ownership, 
PRSPs and IFI Conditionality’, Department of International Policy 
and Advocacy, World Vision International, Milton Keynes.
Wood, E. M. (1990) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Civil Society’, The Socialist 
Register: 60-84. 
World Bank (1981) National and International Development, World Devel-
opment Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 References 201 
World Bank (1985) Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Devel-
opment. M. Cernea (ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
World Bank (1987) Listen to the People: Participant Observation Evaluation of 
Development Projects. L.F. Salmen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
World Bank (1989) Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 
World Development Report. Washington DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (1991) Managing Development: the Governance Dimension, Discus-
sion Paper, Washington DC (August 29). 
World Bank (1992) Governance and Development. Washington DC: Oxford 
University Press. 
World Bank (1996) The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, Environmen-
tally Sustainable Development, Gloria Davis (director), Washing-
ton DC. 
World Bank (1997) The State in a Changing World, World Development 
Report. Washington DC: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (1998a) Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (1998b) ‘Partnership for Development: Proposed Actions 
for the World Bank – A Discussion Paper’, Partnerships Group 
Strategy and Resource Management, Washington DC: World Bank 
(May 20). 
World Bank (2000a) ‘Comprehensive Development Framework: Country 
Experience Report’ (March 1999-July 2000), September. 
World Bank (2000b) ‘Learning to Partner: Engaging Civil Society’, NGO 
and Civil Society Unit, Washington DC: World Bank.  
World Bank (2000c) ‘Working Together: The World Bank’s Partnership 
with Civil society’, NGO and Civil Society Unit, Washington DC: 
World Bank.  
World Bank (2001a) World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Pov-
erty. Washington DC: Oxford. 
World Bank (2001b) World Development Report: Building Institutions for Mar-
kets. Washington DC: Oxford. 
 World Bank (2002a) ‘Consultations with Civil Society: A Sourcebook’, 
Working Document by Paula Lytle, W. Reuben and N. Siddiqi. 
Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANET 
SOCIALDEVELOPMENT/873204-1111663470099/20489462/ 
ConsultationsSourcebook.pdf (accessed December 18, 2007) 
 References 202 
World Bank (2002b) Low-Income Countries Under Stress. Washington DC: 
World Bank. 
World Bank (2004a) Country Policy and Institutional Assessment: an 
External Panel Review, June 10. Available at 
http://siteresources.worlbank.org/IDA/Resources/CPIAExpPan
RepSecM2004-0304.pdf (accessed March 18, 2007) 
World Bank (2004b) ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Progress in 
Implementation’, approved by G. Nankani and M. Allen (Septem-
ber 20). Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTPRS1/Resources/prsp_progress_2004.pdf (accessed July 7, 
2007) 
World Bank (2004c) ‘From Shouting to Counting: A New Frontier in 
Social Development’, Participation & Civic Engagement Group, 
Social Development Department, Washington DC, February 26. 
Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPCENG/ 
214574-1116506074750/20511078/Social+Accountability+Boo 
klet+Feb+26+04.pdf (accessed November 14, 2008) 
World Bank (2005) ‘World Bank Group Historical Chronology’, World 
Bank Group Archives. Available at http://siteresources. world-
bank.org/EXTARCHIVES/Resources/World_Bank_Group_Hist
orical_Chronology_19944_2005_.pdf (accessed November 10, 
2008) 
World Bank (2006a) ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessments: 2006 
Assessment Questionnaire’, Operations Policy and Country ser-
vices (December 11). Available at http://siteresources.worldbank. 
org/IDA/Resources/73153-1181752621336/CPIA06Criteria 
A2.pdf (accessed May 16, 2008) 
World Bank (2006b) ‘Electing to Work Together: Parliamentarians and 
The World Bank’. Available at http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/PARTNERS/EXTPA
RLIAMENTARIANS/0,,menuPK:64165869~pagePK:64165874~
piPK:64165885~theSitePK:464534,00.html (accessed April 4, 
2007) 
World Bank (2006c) ‘Poverty Reduction Strategies 2005 Review: Lessons 
and Resources’, PREM Poverty Reduction Group (February). 
Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTPRS1/Resources/PRSP-Review/PRS_Review_brochure.pdf 
(accessed November 8, 2008) 
 References 203 
World Bank (2007a) ‘Anticorruption: Civil Society Participation’. Avail-
able at http://go.worldbank.org/NULF579BT0 (accessed July 11, 
2008) 
World Bank (2007b) ‘Social Accountability’. Available at http://go.world 
bank.org/Y0UDF953D0 (accessed October 11, 2008) 
World Bank (2007c) ‘World Bank Board Endorses New Governance 
Strategy’, Paul Wolfowitz, 22 March. Available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/GMBTYO0FB0 (accessed February 14) 
World Bank (2008a) ‘Approach to the World Bank’s Engagement with 
Civil Society’. Available at http://go.worldbank.org/7GF4174AK0 
(accessed October 14) 
World Bank (2008b) ‘Civil society: Defining Civil Society’. Available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/4CE7W046K0 (accessed November 10, 
2008) 
World Bank (2008c) ‘Comprehensive Development Framework: Ques-
tions and Answers’. Available at http://go.worldbank.org/ 
CXLO25YMM0 (accessed June 2008) 
World Bank (2008d) ‘Former Presidents’. Available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/5BB9Y48M70 (accessed November 10, 
2008) 
World Bank (2008e) ‘IDA: How IDA Resources are Allocated’. Available 
at http://go.worldbank.org/F5531ZQHT0 (accessed November 
18, 2008) 
World Bank (2008f) ‘IDA Summary of the Performance-Based Alloca-
tion System for IDA14’, Annex 1, June. Available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/F5531ZQHT0 (accessed July 7, 2008) 
World Bank (2008g) ‘James D. Wolfensohn’. Available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/ETW3SZ5CV0 (accessed March 10, 
2008) 
World Bank (2008h) ‘Participation at Project, Program & Policy Level’. 
Available at http://go.worldbank.org/1S57LH08E0 (accessed 
November 25, 2008) 
World Bank (2008i) ‘Social Capital’. Available at http://go.worldbank. 
org/C0QTRW4QF0 (accessed July 7, 2008) 
World Bank (2008j) ‘The World Bank and Civil Society’. Available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/PWRRFJ2QH0 (accessed May 2008) 
 References 204 
World Bank (no date) ‘Preface’, in World Bank, A Sourcebook for Poverty 
Reduction Strategies. Available at http://go.worldbank.org/ 
1XDM5Y7PH0 (accessed February 11, 2008) 
Youash, M. (2003) The PRSP Process and Parliament: Rethinking the Bounda-
ries of Parliamentary Oversight. Available at http://sarpn.org.za 
/documents/d0000934/P1038- Yoash_PRSP_May2003.pdf (ac-
cessed March 16, 2008). 
 
Quoted Interviews: 
 
Bapna, Manish, Executive Director of the Bank Information Center, Inter-
view conducted at the Bank Information Center, Washington DC 
(October 15, 2006). 
Bas, Jean-Christophe, Manager of the Development Policy Dialogue at the 
World Bank, Interview conducted at the Institute of Social Studies, 
The Hague (November 17, 2006). 
Bas, Jean-Christophe, Manager of the Development Policy Dialogue at 
the World Bank, Interview conducted during the Singapore Work-
shop on the World Bank at the Lee Kwan Yew School of Public, Sin-
gapore (September 18, 2006). 
Chase, Robert, Senior Social Development Economist in the World 
Bank’s Social Development Department, Interview conducted at the 
World Bank headquarters, Washington DC (October 10, 2006). 
Fowler, Alan, Adviser to the Bank on issues of enabling environment for 
civil society and Professor at the Centre of Civil Society of the University 
of KwaZula Natal, Interview conducted online (May 16-17, 2009). 
Gelb, Alan, Director of the Development Policy at the World Bank, Inter-
view conducted during the Singapore Workshop on the World Bank, held 
at the Lee Kwan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore (September 
18, 2006). 
Quitzow, Rainer, Social Analysis at the Social Development Department of 
the World Bank, Interviews conducted at the World Bank head-
quarters, Washington DC (September 8 and September 27, 2006). 
Sall, Khalifa Ababacar, Member of Parliament Senegal and member of 
the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNOWB), Interview 
conducted during IMF and World Bank Annual Meeting in Singa-
pore (September 19, 2006). 
 Pascale Hatcher 
 
 
Admitted to the PhD programme in 2004 on the basis of: 
 
Master of Arts in International Relations 
Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada 2003 
 
This thesis has not been submitted to any university for a degree or any 
other award.  
 
205 
  
 
 Resume 
 
 
Pascale Hatcher is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Graduate School of In-
ternational Relations of Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan. In Novem-
ber 2009, she will defend her Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree at the 
International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus University – The 
Netherlands. She has an MA in International Relations (2003) and a BA 
in Political Science (2000) from the Université du Québec à Montréal – Can-
ada, as well as a Diploma in Intercultural Study (2000) from the Centre de 
Formation en Coopération Interculturelle – Canada. 
She is currently working on the role of the World Bank Group in re-
forming mining regimes in South-East Asia, with a particular interest in 
the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency. In recent years, her main research interest has been 
the political economy of the World Bank’s aid policies, the broad subject 
of her thesis dissertation Fighting Politics: The World Bank, the Integrated De-
velopment Model & Citizenship at a Crossroad, was set.  
Over the years, she has occupied numerous coordinating and research 
positions, notably for the Garnet Network of Excellence and the Groupe de 
recherche sur les activités minières en Afrique. She has coordinated numerous 
conferences, including Civic Driven Change (2008), the Politics of Governance 
(2006), and the Land conference on Poverty, Social Justice and Development 
(2006), which were held at the ISS. 
During the period of her thesis, she received a scholarship from the 
Fonds québécois de la recherche sur la société et la culture (2004-2008), as well as a 
mobility grant from the Garnet Network of Excellence (2007) to pursue her 
research at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, War-
wick University (UK). 
 
Contacts: Graduate School of International Relations 
Ritsumeikan University, 56-1 Toji-in Kitamachi, Kita-ku, 
Kyoto, 603-8577 Japan. Email: hatcher@fc.ritsumei.ac.jp 
206 
  
